Padfield v. Padfield

• Decision Date: 30 June 1875
• Parties: CATHARINE PADFIELDv.WILLIAM R. PADFIELD et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

78 Ill. 16

1875 WL 8406 (Ill.)

CATHARINE PADFIELD

v.WILLIAM R. PADFIELD et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June Term, 1875.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of St. Clair county; the Hon. WILLIAM H. SNYDER, Judge, presiding.

Messrs. C. W. & E. L. THOMAS, for the plaintiff in error.

Mr. JAMES M. DILL, for the defendants in error.

Mr. JUSTICE WALKER delivered the opinion of the Court:

This was a bill in chancery, filed by plaintiff in error, in the St. Clair circuit court, against defendants in error. The bill alleges that Thomas Padfield, the late husband of plaintiff in error, in his lifetime, and for the purpose of evading the statute, and to deprive her, at his death, of any share in his personal estate, transferred to his son William a large amount of notes and evidences of indebtedness, amounting to about $60,000, under the agreement that he was to have one-third, and, at the father's death, two-thirds of the amount was to be delivered to Ensenmayer and Whitaker, for the use of James M. Padfield and Julia A. Bland, both his children, to be disposed of as directed by the will of Thomas Padfield; and William was, by the agreement, to pay to his father $2000 annually, while he lived, for his support; that Thomas Padfield made his will, by which he bequeathed to each of his children $5, and the remainder of his property, of every nature, kind and description, to plaintiff in error; that she, in the time limited by the statute, renounced all benefits and rights under the will; that he, by his will, gave all of the notes, etc., transferred to William, or the proceeds thereof, whether money or land, to complainant. The will was duly probated, and remains in full force.

This contract was held to be valid and binding in the cases of Padfield v. Padfield, 68 Ill. 210, and Padfield v. Padfield, June T. 1874; that it was based on a sufficient consideration, and passed the title of the property and placed it beyond the reach of Thomas Padfield; that he did not reserve any interest in or control over the notes, etc., and that all title had passed from him; that the law fully supported the transaction, and that neither Thomas Padfield nor his executor could invalidate the agreement or recover the property.

But it is urged that this transaction was void as to plaintiff in error; that, under our statute, a husband has no power to dispose of his personal property so as to deprive his wife of her distributive share therein, and that the demurrer admits the allegation that this transfer was made for the purpose of evading the statute, and preventing her from sharing in his personal property. The doctrine is correctly stated in Kerr on Fraud and Mistake, 220, in a note. It is there said: “There can be no doubt of the power of a husband to dispose absolutely of his property during his life, independently of the concurrence, and exonerated from the claim of his wife, provided the transaction is not merely colorable, and be unattended with circumstances indicative of fraud upon the rights of the wife. If the disposition of the husband be bona fide, and no right is reserved to him, though made to defeat the right of the wife, it will be good against her.” And the cases of Dunnock v. Dunnock, 3 Md. Ch. 140, Cameron v. Cameron, 10 Smedes & Mar....