Padgett v. Williams

Decision Date04 March 1960
Docket NumberNo. 8829,8829
Citation350 P.2d 353,82 Idaho 114
PartiesWm. R. PADGETT, Plaintiff, v. Joe R. WILLIAMS, State Auditor, Defendant.
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

Wm. R. Padgett, Oscar W. Worthwine, Boise, for plaintiff.

Frank L. Benson, Atty. Gen., E. G. Elliott, Thos. Y. Gwilliam, Asst. Attys. Gen., for defendant.

TAYLOR, Chief Justice.

Pursuant to the permanent writ of mandate issued herein on February 19, 1960, the defendant made return March 2, 1960, of his actions thereunder, in which he represents and shows to this court as follows:

'* * * that on the 26th day of February, 1960, he duly and formally presented plaintiff's claim to the State Board of Examiners as directed by said Writ; that on the 2nd day of March, 1960, said Board of Examiners took final action on said claim and approved in part and disapproved in part, by approving it for the period of time between August 1, 1959 and August 6, 1959 and disapproving for the period of time between August 7, 1959 and August 31, 1959 and on one ground in particular that the claim was not properly chargeable against the highway appropriation.'

The defendant further alleges that the action of the board leaves him in doubt as to his duty in the premises 'and respectfully petitions this Court for further instructions directing him how to proceed.'

The minutes of the board of examiners, of which this court takes judicial notice, I.C. § 9-101, show that meetings of the board, at which action was taken on plaintiff's claim, were held on February 26, 1960, and on March 2, 1960. At both meetings, upon motion made by the attorney general, the plaintiff's claim for attorney rendered to the state board of highway directors from the 6th of August, 1959, to the end of the month, was denied. The motions were based upon the same ground, and were carried by the votes of the attorney general and secretary of state. The governor, third member of the board, voted against the motions and urged allowance of the claim.

The motion made by the attorney general at the meeting of March 2, 1960, is as follows 'I move that the claim of Mr. William Padgett for wages for August, 1959 be allowed from the first of August to the sixth of August and that the remainder of the claim for wages that is for the balance of the month subsequent to the sixth of August be denied and particularly on the ground and for the reason the claim is not properly chargeable against the highway appropriation.'

August 6, 1959, is the date upon which plaintiff ceased to be designated as an assistant attorney general. It is, therefore, apparent that the attorney general regarded the plaintiff's claim a proper charge against the 'highway appropriation' when the services were rendered by an assistant attorney general, but not properly chargeable against that appropriation when the services were rendered by the same attorney after for ceased to be an assistant attorney general. This is the same contention which the attorney general urged when this cause was before this court on the merits. In our prior opinion herein we said :

'We find this ground of refusal to pay plaintiff's claim to be without foundation.'

That conclusion is based upon the fact that the legislature had authorized the board of highway directors to employ and pay its own counsel and is not limited to the employment of counsel designated by the attorney general. The import of that decision is that plaintiff's claim is a proper charge against the appropriation made to the board of highway directors by Chapter 114, Session Laws, 1959.

The language employed in Rich v. Williams, 81 Idaho 311, 341 P.2d 432, as quoted in our prior opinion herein, is construed to mean that as to a claim of this character the authority of the board of examiners is to determine whether the claim is in proper form, properly certified to the state auditor, whether an appropriation has been made by the legislature for the payment thereof, and whether there are funds remaining in the appropriation for such payment.

In recognizing the authority of the board of examiners to examine all such claims against the state, we said in Rich v. Williams:

'This does not mean, however, that the Board of Examiners is vested with authority by either the Constitution or statute to override the expressed will of the Legislature. By our Constitution the power to make and determine policy for the government of the State is vested in the Legislature, Idaho Const. Art. 2, § 1, and Art. 3, § 1. (Citations.)

'The Legislature having considered and determined the necessity for the building authorized by Chapter 83, and that its construction is in the interest of the people of the State, and having by the enactment of said Chapter approved the project by appropriating funds for its construction, the Board of Examiners is without power to veto the act, or reverse the policy thus declared, by refusing to approve valid claims properly presented, in execution thereof.' Rich v. Williams, 81 Idaho 311, 341 P.2d 432, at pages 440 and 441. (Emphasis supplied.)

In support of his motion made at the meeting of the board of examiners on February 26th, the attorney general cited a number of prior decisions of this court. All of these decisions have been heretofore considered by the court, a number of them being cited in Rich v. Williams, supra, and in this case. All but two of them were cited by the attorney general in the briefs submitted by him in these two cases. In so far as any of those decisions may be in conflict with the decision in Rich v. Williams or the decision herein, the same are hereby overruled. The application of Const. Art. 4, § 18, and Art. 5, § 10, which we have made in Rich v. Williams and herein is in harmony with the purpose of those provisions as shown by the debates in the constitutional convention, II Idaho Constitutional Convention, Proceedings and Debates, 1427 and 1428. The delegates were concerned with the preservation of the power of the legislature to finally determine all claims against the state. They did not consider setting up a tribunal with power to deny claims already...

To continue reading

Request your trial
11 cases
  • Oneida County Fair Bd. v. Smylie
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • September 26, 1963
    ...78 Idaho 572, 306 P.2d 1083; Noble v. Bragaw, 12 Idaho 265, 85 P. 903; Rich v. Williams, 81 Idaho 311, 341 P.2d 432; Padgett v. Williams, 82 Idaho 114, 350 P.2d 353; Caesar v. Williams, 84 Idaho 254, 371 P.2d 241. The constitutionality of a statute is to be determined without reference to t......
  • Jewett v. Williams
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • February 13, 1962
    ...that doctrine in Rich v. Williams, 81 Idaho 311, 341 P.2d 432; Padgett v. Williams, 82 Idaho 28, 348 P.2d 944, and Padgett v. Williams, 82 Idaho 114, 350 P.2d 353, in which regard, hereinafter, we shall treat more in The two defendants urge reexamination of the Rich and Padgett decisions to......
  • Idaho Telephone Co. v. Baird
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • February 2, 1967
    ...an enactment of the legislature unless the legislation clearly violates the constitution. Caesar v. Williams, supra; Padgett v. Williams, 82 Idaho 114, 350 P.2d 353 (1960). Every reasonable presumption must be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of an enactment of the legislature. Ca......
  • WMCA, Inc. v. Simon
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • August 16, 1962
    ...of the legislature; if the legislature does not clearly violate the Constitution, this court must and will uphold it. Padgett v. Williams, 82 Idaho 114, 350 P.2d 353. Every reasonable presumption must be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. Robinson v. Enking, 58 Idaho 2......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT