Padilla Cintron v. Rossello Gonzalez, No. CIV. 01-1294(JP).

• Decision Date: 19 February 2003
• Docket Number: No. CIV. 01-1294(JP).
• Citation: 247 F.Supp.2d 48
• Parties: Clara PADILLA CINTRON, Plaintiff v. Pedro ROSSELLO GONZALEZ, et al., Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

247 F.Supp.2d 48

Clara PADILLA CINTRON, Plaintiff v. Pedro ROSSELLO GONZALEZ, et al., Defendants

No. CIV. 01-1294(JP).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

February 19, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Jose A. Feliciano Rodríguez, Bayamón, PR, for Plaintiff.

Marie L. Cortés Cortés, Lespier & Munoz ñoya, Eileen Landrón Guardiola, San Juan, PR, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

PIERAS, Senior District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The Court has before it Co-Defendants the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico ("the Commonwealth"), the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("DOC"), the Juvenile Institutions Administration ("JIA"), Sila M. Calderon, in her official capacity as Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Mr. Victor Rivera González, in his official capacity as Administrator of the Juvenile Institutions Administration and Mr. Fernando Iglesias Vargas', in his official capacity as Director of Social Treatment Center, "Motion To Dismiss Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and Memorandum of Law In Support Thereof (docket No. 10); Co-Defendants Victor Rivera González, José Aponte Pérez, Fernando Iglesias Vargas, Pedro R. Figueroa Pacheco and Luis Mendez's¹, in their personal capacities, "Motion To Dismiss Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and Memorandum of Law In Support Thereof (docket No. 14); Plaintiffs opposition thereto (docket No. 28)²; Co-Defendants Myriam Quiñones and Jose Lozada Medina's "Motion[s] to Quash Summons" (docket Nos. 23, 24); and Plaintiffs opposition thereto (docket No. 27).

Plaintiff filed the instant action on March 12, 2001³, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 and 2000a-1; Title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1991; Puerto Rico Law No. 17, of April 22, 1988, 29 P.R. Laws Ann. § 155; and Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, 31 P.R. Laws Ann. §§ 5141 and 5142. Plaintiff requests a declaratory judgment as well as compensatory and punitive damages. Plaintiff claims that she has worked in an environment riddled with continuous sexual harassment, especially by her supervisor, Co-Defendant Alberto Santos Ortiz. She claims that no special efforts were taken to prohibit or avoid the discriminatory contact.

All Defendants contend that Plaintiff cannot sustain a Section 1981 cause of action because Plaintiff does not allege racial discrimination against her; that Plaintiffs claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 and 31 P.R. Laws Ann. §§ 5141 and 5142 are time-barred and, as such, all of these claims should be accordingly dismissed. Co-Defendants the Commonwealth, the DOC, the JIA and the named Co-Defendants, in their official capacities, claim that Plaintiffs claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 and 2000a-1, Title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and Plaintiffs supplemental Commonwealth law claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution and should be dismissed against them. The named Co-Defendants, in their individual capacities, claim that Title VII does not provide for individual liability and as such they cannot be held personally liable and Plaintiffs Title VII claim should be dismissed as held against them. Finally, Co-Defendants Myriam Quinones and Jose Lozada Medina claim that Plaintiff served them outside of the 120 day term provided by Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m) for service of process and Plaintiffs claims against them should be dismissed for failure to serve.

The Court deciphers from Plaintiffs muddled opposition that Plaintiff argues that the Amended Complaint contains allegations sufficient to uphold a claim under 42 U.S.C.1981; that the statute of limitations was tolled by Plaintiffs claims filed with the Department of Labor; that neither the First Circuit nor the Supreme Court of the United States have clearly held that Title VII cannot provide for individual liability; and that Plaintiff has demonstrated cause as to why she failed to effectuate service upon Co-Defendants Myriam Quinones and Jose Lozada Medina and claims that the service should be deemed effective. The Court addresses these arguments in turn.

II. DISMISSAL STANDARD

Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may, in response to an initial pleading, file a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. It is well-settled, however, that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); see also Miranda v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 948 F.2d 41 (1St Cir.1991). The Court must accept as true "all well-pleaded factual averments and indulg[e] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor." Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1996) (citations omitted); see also Berrios v. Bristol Myers Squibb Caribbean Corp., 51 F.Supp.2d 61 (D.Puerto Rico 1999) (Pieras, J.). A complaint must set forth "factual allegations, either direct or inferential, regarding each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable theory." Romero-Barcelb v. Hernandez-Agosto, 75 F.3d 23, 28 n. 2 (1st Cir.1996) (quoting Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir.1988)). The Court, however, need not accept a complaint's "`bald assertions' or legal conclusions" when assessing a motion to dismiss. Abbott, III v. United States, 144 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1998) (citing Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1216 (1st Cir.1996)). It is with this framework in mind that this Court will assess the motions before it.

III. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiffs allegations as found in her Amended Complaint, and which are taken as true for purposes of this motion, are as follows A. Plaintiff has been employed by the JIA since February 1997 as a penal guard.

B. Over the course of the last few years, Plaintiff has worked in an environment riddled with continual sexual harassment. She has been subjected to continual sexual harassment by her supervisors over that time period. The worst offender was her direct supervisor, Co-Defendant Alberto Santos-Ortiz ("Santos-Ortiz").

C. Co-Defendants were aware of the continual sexual exploits of other supervisors within the office and did nothing to stop them. Although these affairs and other sexual antics disrupted the work environment of the office, no effort was made to prohibit the conduct.

D. Plaintiff avoided Co-Defendant Santos-Ortiz on multiple occasions, in order to avoid becoming the subject of his crude remarks and stares. She also did what she could to discourage him from telling her crude jokes, sexual jokes and innuendos and making suggestive and unwanted remarks to her.

E. At one point, Co-Defendant Santos-Ortiz began approaching Plaintiff, often with the door closed, and asked her to be his lover and that he would pay all her debts and take care of all her needs. Plaintiff was appalled and offended. Plaintiff declined the offer choosing instead to suffer and be emotionally distressed.

F. Almost immediately upon commencing her duties under the supervision of Co-Defendant Santos-Ortiz, he began asking Plaintiff about her age, civil status, residence and education. Later, he asked questions specifically related to her civil status; like if she had a boyfriend or had been married. Plaintiff informed him that it was not his concern. Co-Defendant Santos-Ortiz also asked Plaintiff if she danced and what things she preferred, what places she liked to go to and after questioning her he assured her that he was interested in going out with her. Plaintiff clearly stated that she did not go out with married men.

G. Co-Defendant Santos-Ortiz began using the nick-name "Clarita" to address Plaintiff and asked that if that was the reason that she would not give him a kiss and a hug and that he was jealous because she did that with the other co-workers.

H. Co-Defendant Santos-Ortiz also accused Plaintiff of being a racist and that was the reason she would not go out with him.

I. In other instances, in front of other co-workers, Co-Defendant Santos-Ortiz stated that he wanted to marry Plaintiff and that her future husband would have to use "a chipping hammer and a lot of vinegar because Plaintiff had never tried it" and that "her vagina would be eaten by worms".

J. After an incident with the juvenile detainees, where Plaintiff was held captive and where one of the inmates forced Plaintiff to hold his penis, Co-Defendant Santos-Ortiz said that it was of no importance and asked Plaintiff if that was the first time she had ever held a penis in her hands.

K. Co-Defendant Santos-Ortiz was constantly comparing the bodies of the other female workers with Plaintiffs.

L. Plaintiff suffered from adverse employment conditions as a result of her disdain to Co-Defendant Santos-Ortiz's advances. Plaintiff was subjected to severe psychological stress, as a result of the demeaning environment, in which she was required to work.

M. On January 25, 1999, Plaintiff formally notified Co-Defendant Fernando Iglesias Vargas, Director of the Center of Social Treatment of the JIA, that she was being harassed by her supervisor, Co-Defendant Santos-Ortiz and that the harassment began in 1997.

N. Due to Defendants inaction, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination against Defendants, at the Anti-Discrimination Unit of the Puerto Rico Department of Labor on July 7, 1999, complaining of the above alleged acts of sexual harassment.

0. On or about December 12, 2000, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission informed Plaintiff of her right to sue Defendants.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1981

Defendants submit that Plaintiffs complaint contains no factual allegations to establish a Section 1981 prima facie case. Section 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides as follows:

a) Statement of...