Padilla v. Hooks Intern., Inc.

Citation1982 NMCA 162,654 P.2d 574,99 N.M. 121
Decision Date19 October 1982
Docket NumberNo. 5493,5493
PartiesLiberto PADILLA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HOOKS INTERNATIONAL, INC. and Thomas T. Manes, Defendants-Appellants.
CourtCourt of Appeals of New Mexico
OPINION

LOPEZ, Judge.

The defendants appeal a judgment in favor of the plaintiff for personal injuries following a directed verdict on the issue of liability and jury verdict on damages. We affirm.

The issues for our decision are: 1. propriety of the directed verdict on the issue of liability; 2. abuse of the trial court's discretion for excluding certain deposition testimony.

FACTS

Randall Corporation had leased a backhoe from Hooks International, Inc. Liberto Padilla, an employee of Randall, operated the backhoe for Randall. On August 25, 1978, Randall requested Hooks to send out a mechanic to repair a hydraulic leak in the piece of equipment. Hooks sent out Thomas Manes and another employee that day to fix the backhoe. On August 28, 1978, Padilla again requested his employer to call Hooks for a repairman, because the backhoe was still leaking. Manes came out to the jobsite on that day to repair the backhoe.

Padilla parked the backhoe in a clear area in front of the office; he lowered the bucket on the piece of equipment to the ground, turned off the machine, and got out. He spoke with Manes about the leak. Then Padilla turned the machine over to Manes, who stepped into the equipment, turned on the backhoe and raised the bucket as high as it would go.

Manes, with the help of Padilla, removed the hood of the backhoe. Manes stood on a tire and leaned over to work on the engine. Padilla and Dahlke, a general foreman at Randall, were standing near the backhoe; both men warned Manes that it was dangerous to work on the machine with the bucket up and no blocking. Manes ignored the warnings and continued to work inside the engine. The bucket slipped down a little, and Padilla again told him to lower the bucket. Manes again ignored the warning and kept on working around in the engine. Suddenly, hydraulic fluid spewed out of the engine onto Manes and Padilla and the bucket fell. One of the arms to the bucket came down on Manes, crushing him.

Padilla ran over and blocked the bucket with his hands and his body to keep it from falling all the way down. He also started screaming for help. Several men in the vicinity ran to the scene and helped hold the bucket. Manes was removed and taken to the hospital. He suffered some broken bones, but he lived.

Padilla suffered injuries to his back as a result of his rescue efforts. He sued Hooks and Manes for damages. After all the evidence was heard at the trial, the judge directed a verdict in favor of Padilla on the issue of liability. The jury then determined the amount of damages.

DIRECTED VERDICT ON ISSUE OF LIABILITY

Defendants contend that the directed verdict on liability was improperly granted because reasonable minds could differ on whether Padilla negligently helped create the dangerous condition which ultimately led to his injuries, and whether Padilla was negligent in his rescue efforts.

To decide these issues we must review rules governing the trial court and appellate duties in a directed verdict appeal.

In American Employers' Insurance Co. v. Crawford, 87 N.M. 375, 533 P.2d 1203 (1975), the Supreme Court addressed the trial judge's duties upon being presented with a motion for a directed verdict. The Court stated as follows:

It is the province of the trial court to determine all questions of law, including the legal sufficiency of any asserted claim or defense. If the evidence fails to present or support an issue essential to the legal sufficiency of an asserted claim, the right to jury trial disappears. (Citations omitted). It is fundamental that the evidence adduced must support all issues of fact essential to the maintenance of a legally recognized and enforceable claim. Otherwise, there can be no basis in fact for the claim, and it must be dismissed as a matter of law.

87 N.M. at 376, 533 P.2d 1203.

Moreover, the Court has stated that when reasonable minds cannot differ, a directed verdict is not only proper, but the court has a duty to direct a verdict. See Owen v. Burn Const. Co., 90 N.M. 297, 302, 563 P.2d 91, 96 (1977); Gildersleeve v. Atkinson, 6 N.M. 250, 265, 27 P. 477, 481 (1891).

The standard to be used when examining the propriety of a directed verdict is as follows:

"In ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court must view the evidence, together with all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom, in the light most favorable to the party resisting the motion, and must disregard all conflicts in the evidence unfavorable to the position of that party. (Citations omitted.)

" * * *

"The appellate court, upon reviewing a judgment entered pursuant to a directed verdict, must also view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the party resisting the motion, and must disregard all conflicts in the evidence unfavorable to the position of that party. (Citations omitted.)"

Skyhook Corp. v. Jasper, 90 N.M. 143, 146, 560 P.2d 934, 937 (1977) (quoting Archuleta v. Pina, 86 N.M. 94, 95, 519 P.2d 1175, 1176 (1974)).

Accordingly, the next step is to examine the evidence adduced at trial viewing it in the light most favorable to the defendants. When examining the evidence we must also apply the rules applicable to the creation of a dangerous situation and the rescue doctrine.

CREATION OF A DANGEROUS SITUATION

There are two ways in which a plaintiff's own negligence can become a fact question in rescue doctrine cases. First, the plaintiff may have been negligent by helping to create the very situation which later "invited" his rescue.

The rule which relieves from contributory negligence one who voluntarily exposes himself to danger in order to rescue another person from peril does not apply where the rescuer is himself solely or in part responsible for the peril which confronts the one whom he attempts to save. If the third person's peril is due in part to the plaintiff's own negligence, such negligence is a contributing factor in producing any harm which he sustains in his rescue attempt. * * * 57 Am.Jur.2d Negligence Sec. 423 (1971). See also Cords v. Anderson, 80 Wis.2d 525, 259 N.W.2d 672 (1977).

The defendants argue that Padilla, as agent for Randall, had a duty to exercise reasonable care to provide a safe place to work for Manes, a business invitee. They further argue that a jury question exists whether Padilla fulfilled that duty by the actions he took before the accident. The defendants based this argument on the idea that Padilla was in possession and control of the premises on which the backhoe was parked.

The question whether Padilla had a duty to provide safe premises is a matter of law. Sanchez v. United States, 506 F.2d 702, 704 (10th Cir.1974). If Padilla owed no duty to Manes, then limiting his actions to warning Manes could not be considered negligent.

Fresquez v. Southwestern Ind. Con. & Riggers, Inc., 89 N.M. 525, 554 P.2d 986 (Ct.App.) cert. denied, 90 N.M. 8, 558 P.2d 620 (1976), provides some enlightenment on the question of Padilla's duty to Manes. In that case, a subcontractor rented a crane and crane operator for a job. A piece of stabilizing equipment fell off the crane and killed Fresquez, an employee of the subcontractor. The court discussed the duty of a general contractor to provide a safe jobsite for his own employees and employees of an independent contractor. The court stated that "[t]he 'place' the general contractor must keep safe does not include the equipment of the independent contractor." 89 N.M. at 531, 554 P.2d 986 (citations omitted). It held that the general contractor was not liable for Fresquez' death on the theory that the general contractor controlled the premises. Id. at 532, 554 P.2d 986.

A similar situation presents itself in this case. The backhoe was owned by Hooks. Manes was Hooks' employee, sent out to repair the backhoe. Once Padilla turned the piece of equipment over to Manes, Padilla was no longer exercising any control over it. The fact that the backhoe was standing on ground that was under under Randall's control does not automatically bring the piece of equipment under Randall's control. The total facts are very important, and are as follows: 1) Hooks owned the backhoe and controlled repairs to the backhoe, 2) Manes was Hooks' employee, sent by Hooks to repair the backhoe, 3) Manes had taken control of the machine to effect repairs, and 4) Manes created the dangerous situation after he took physical control of the backhoe. There is not sufficient reason to conclude that Padilla, as agent for Randall, had a duty to ensure that Manes, or others repairing the backhoe, would do so with reasonable care.

We conclude that there is no evidence, or reasonable inferences deducible therefrom, upon which reasonable minds could base a finding of negligence on the part of the plaintiff. Therefore, the question of Padilla's negligence became a matter of law for the court. The court properly directed a verdict on this matter.

RESCUE DOCTRINE

The defendants contend that the issue of contributory negligence under the rescue doctrine should have gone to the jury instead of the court granting a directed verdict. We shall review the doctrine from the standpoint of our appellate court and other jurisdictions.

In 1921 Justice Cardozo in Wagner v. International Ry. Co., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921), set forth the principles underlying the doctrine that absolved the rescuer from the finding of contributory negligence:

Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the...

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