Padilla v. Kentuchy, No. 08–651.

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtJustice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Citation130 S.Ct. 1473,559 U.S. 356,176 L.Ed.2d 284
PartiesJose PADILLA, Petitioner, v. KENTUCKY.
Decision Date31 March 2010
Docket NumberNo. 08–651.

559 U.S. 356
130 S.Ct.
1473
176 L.Ed.2d 284

Jose PADILLA, Petitioner,
v.
KENTUCKY.

No. 08–651.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Oct. 13, 2009.
Decided March 31, 2010.


Stephen B. Kinnaird, for petitioner.

Michael R. Dreeben for United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of Court, supporting affirmance.

Wm. Robert Long, Jr., for respondent.

Richard E. Neal, U'Sellis & Kitchen, PLC, Louisville, KY, Timothy G. Arnold, Dept. of Public Advocacy, Frankfort, KY, of counsel, Stephanos Bibas, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, Stephen B. Kinnaird, Counsel of Record, Alexander M.R. Lyon, D. Scott Carlton, Mitchell A. Mosvick, Elizabeth A. Stevens, Leeann N. Rosnick, Adam S. Cherensky, Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker LLP, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner.

Jack Conway, Attorney General of Kentucky, Wm. Robert Long, Jr., Counsel of Record, Matthew R. Krygiel, Assistant Attorneys General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Office of the Attorney General, Frankfort, Kentucky, for Respondent.

Opinion

Justice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

559 U.S. 359

Petitioner Jose Padilla, a native of Honduras, has been a lawful permanent resident of the United States for more than 40 years. Padilla served this Nation with honor as a member of the U.S. Armed Forces during the Vietnam War. He now faces deportation after pleading guilty to the transportation of a large amount of marijuana in his tractor-trailer in the Commonwealth of Kentucky.1

130 S.Ct. 1478

In this postconviction proceeding, Padilla claims that his counsel not only failed to advise him of this consequence prior to his entering the plea, but also told him that he “ ‘did not have to worry about immigration status since he had been in the country so long.’ ” 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky.2008). Padilla relied on his counsel's erroneous advice when he pleaded guilty to the drug charges that made his deportation virtually mandatory. He alleges that he would have insisted on going to trial if he had not received incorrect advice from his attorney.

Assuming the truth of his allegations, the Supreme Court of Kentucky denied Padilla postconviction relief without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing. The court held that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of counsel does not protect a criminal defendant from erroneous advice about deportation because it is merely a “collateral” consequence

559 U.S. 360

of his conviction. Id., at 485. In its view, neither counsel's failure to advise petitioner about the possibility of removal, nor counsel's incorrect advice, could provide a basis for relief.

We granted certiorari, 555 U.S. 1169, 129 S.Ct. 1317, 173 L.Ed.2d 582 (2009), to decide whether, as a matter of federal law, Padilla's counsel had an obligation to advise him that the offense to which he was pleading guilty would result in his removal from this country. We agree with Padilla that constitutionally competent counsel would have advised him that his conviction for drug distribution made him subject to automatic deportation. Whether he is entitled to relief depends on whether he has been prejudiced, a matter that we do not address.

I

The landscape of federal immigration law has changed dramatically over the last 90 years. While once there was only a narrow class of deportable offenses and judges wielded broad discretionary authority to prevent deportation, immigration reforms over time have expanded the class of deportable offenses and limited the authority of judges to alleviate the harsh consequences of deportation. The “drastic measure” of deportation or removal, Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10, 68 S.Ct. 374, 92 L.Ed. 433 (1948), is now virtually inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens convicted of crimes.

The Nation's first 100 years was “a period of unimpeded immigration.” C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure § 1.(2)(a), p. 5 (1959). An early effort to empower the President to order the deportation of those immigrants he “judge[d] dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States,” Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 571, was short lived and unpopular. Gordon § 1.2, at 5. It was not until 1875 that Congress first passed a statute barring convicts and prostitutes from entering the country, Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477. Gordon § 1.2b, at 6. In 1891, Congress added to the list of excludable persons those “who have been convicted of a felony or other infamous

559 U.S. 361

crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.” Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084.2

The Immigration Act of 1917 (1917 Act) brought “radical changes”

130 S.Ct. 1479

to our law. S.Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 54–55 (1950). For the first time in our history, Congress made classes of noncitizens deportable based on conduct committed on American soil. Id., at 55. Section 19 of the 1917 Act authorized the deportation of “any alien who is hereafter sentenced to imprisonment for a term of one year or more because of conviction in this country of a crime involving moral turpitude, committed within five years after the entry of the alien to the United States ... .” 39 Stat. 889. And § 19 also rendered deportable noncitizen recidivists who commit two or more crimes of moral turpitude at any time after entry. Ibid. Congress did not, however, define the term “moral turpitude.”

While the 1917 Act was “radical” because it authorized deportation as a consequence of certain convictions, the Act also included a critically important procedural protection to minimize the risk of unjust deportation: At the time of sentencing or within 30 days thereafter, the sentencing judge in both state and federal prosecutions had the power to make a recommendation “that such alien shall not be deported.” Id., at 890.3 This procedure, known as a judicial recommendation

559 U.S. 362

against deportation, or JRAD, had the effect of binding the Executive to prevent deportation; the statute was “consistently ... interpreted as giving the sentencing judge conclusive authority to decide whether a particular conviction should be disregarded as a basis for deportation,” Janvier v. United States, 793 F.2d 449, 452 (C.A.2 1986). Thus, from 1917 forward, there was no such creature as an automatically deportable offense. Even as the class of deportable offenses expanded, judges retained discretion to ameliorate unjust results on a case-by-case basis.

Although narcotics offenses—such as the offense at issue in this case—provided a distinct basis for deportation as early as 1922,4 the JRAD procedure was generally available to avoid deportation in narcotics convictions. See United States v. O'Rourke, 213 F.2d 759, 762 (C.A.8 1954). Except for “technical, inadvertent and insignificant violations of the laws relating to narcotics,” ibid., it appears that courts treated narcotics offenses as crimes involving

130 S.Ct. 1480

moral turpitude for purposes of the 1917 Act's broad JRAD provision. See ibid. (recognizing that until 1952 a JRAD in a narcotics

559 U.S. 363

case “was effective to prevent deportation” (citing Dang Nam v. Bryan, 74 F.2d 379, 380–381 (C.A.9 1934))).

In light of both the steady expansion of deportable offenses and the significant ameliorative effect of a JRAD, it is unsurprising that, in the wake of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the Second Circuit held that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel applies to a JRAD request or lack thereof, see Janvier, 793 F.2d 449. See also United States v. Castro, 26 F.3d 557 (C.A.5 1994). In its view, seeking a JRAD was “part of the sentencing” process, Janvier, 793 F.2d, at 452, even if deportation itself is a civil action. Under the Second Circuit's reasoning, the impact of a conviction on a noncitizen's ability to remain in the country was a central issue to be resolved during the sentencing process—not merely a collateral matter outside the scope of counsel's duty to provide effective representation.

However, the JRAD procedure is no longer part of our law. Congress first circumscribed the JRAD provision in the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),5 and in 1990 Congress entirely eliminated it, 104 Stat. 5050. In 1996, Congress also eliminated the Attorney General's authority to grant discretionary relief from deportation, 110 Stat. 3009–596, an authority that had been exercised to prevent the deportation of over 10,000 noncitizens during the 5–year period prior to 1996, INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 296, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001). Under contemporary law, if a noncitizen has committed a removable offense after the 1996 effective date of these amendments

559 U.S. 364

, his removal is practically inevitable but for the possible exercise of limited remnants of equitable discretion vested in the Attorney General to cancel removal for noncitizens convicted of particular...

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6399 practice notes
  • McWhorter v. Dunn, Case No. 4:13-CV-02150-RDP
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Court of Northern District of Alabama
    • 22 Enero 2019
    ...Harrington Court explained:"Surmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. [356], [371-372], 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010). An ineffective-assistance claim can function as a way to escape rules of waiver and forfeiture and raise iss......
  • Moncrieffe v. Holder, No. 11–702.
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • 23 Abril 2013
    ...advised of the immigration [133 S.Ct. 1692]consequences of a conviction,” as defense counsel is required to do under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010), and as a result counsel can build an appropriate record when the facts are fresh. Brief for Respond......
  • Acker v. Director, CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:06-cv-469
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. United States District Court of Eastern District Texas
    • 14 Junio 2016
    ...of counsel claims as follows:"Surmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. [356], [371], 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010). An ineffective-assistance claim can function as a way to escape rules of waiver and forfeiture and raise issue......
  • Escobedo v. Lund, No. C 10–4111–MWB.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 8th Circuit. Northern District of Iowa
    • 3 Junio 2013
    ...'s high bar is never an easy task.’ ” Richter, supra, at ––––, 131 S.Ct., at 788 (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. [356, 371], 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1484, 176 L.Ed.2d 284, (2010)). The Strickland standard must be applied with “scrupulous care.” Richter, supra, at ––––, 131 S.Ct., at 788.Cull......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
6383 cases
  • McWhorter v. Dunn, Case No. 4:13-CV-02150-RDP
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Court of Northern District of Alabama
    • 22 Enero 2019
    ...Harrington Court explained:"Surmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. [356], [371-372], 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010). An ineffective-assistance claim can function as a way to escape rules of waiver and forfeiture and raise iss......
  • Moncrieffe v. Holder, No. 11–702.
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • 23 Abril 2013
    ...advised of the immigration [133 S.Ct. 1692]consequences of a conviction,” as defense counsel is required to do under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010), and as a result counsel can build an appropriate record when the facts are fresh. Brief for Respond......
  • Acker v. Director, CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:06-cv-469
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. United States District Court of Eastern District Texas
    • 14 Junio 2016
    ...of counsel claims as follows:"Surmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. [356], [371], 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010). An ineffective-assistance claim can function as a way to escape rules of waiver and forfeiture and raise issue......
  • Escobedo v. Lund, No. C 10–4111–MWB.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 8th Circuit. Northern District of Iowa
    • 3 Junio 2013
    ...'s high bar is never an easy task.’ ” Richter, supra, at ––––, 131 S.Ct., at 788 (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. [356, 371], 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1484, 176 L.Ed.2d 284, (2010)). The Strickland standard must be applied with “scrupulous care.” Richter, supra, at ––––, 131 S.Ct., at 788.Cull......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
10 books & journal articles
  • ELIMINATING THE FUGITIVE DISENTITLEMENT DOCTRINE IN IMMIGRATION MATTERS.
    • United States
    • Notre Dame Law Review Vol. 97 Nbr. 3, March 2022
    • 1 Marzo 2022
    ...unlawfully in this country is itself a crime." (citing 8 U.S.C. [section][section] 1302, 1306, 1325 (1976))); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365-66 (2010) (affirming civil nature of removal proceedings, but commenting on how criminal convictions and the penalty of deportation are (20) F......
  • BEYOND STRICKLAND PREJUDICE: WEAVER, BATSON, AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT.
    • United States
    • University of Pennsylvania Law Review Vol. 170 Nbr. 4, March 2022
    • 1 Marzo 2022
    ...held that a lawyer can provide constitutionally ineffective counsel by failing to exclude reliable evidence of guilt, Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 388 (2010), where the Court held the same for an attorney's failure to advise a client of the collateral deportation risks of a guilty ple......
  • A PROSECUTORIAL SOLUTION TO THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS.
    • United States
    • University of Pennsylvania Law Review Vol. 169 Nbr. 6, June 2021
    • 1 Junio 2021
    ...state of intoxication which might bar conviction of a chronic alcoholic for being drunk in a public place."). (106) Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 388 (2010) (Scalia, J., (107) Id. (108) See Martin v. City of Boise, 920 F.3d 584, 590 (9th Cir.) (M. Smith, J., dissenting from the denial ......
  • Restructuring Public Defense After Padilla.
    • United States
    • Stanford Law Review Vol. 74 Nbr. 1, January 2022
    • 1 Enero 2022
    ...the editors of the Stanford Law Review, especially Lyndsey Nicole Franklin and Olivia Glass, for their superb editorial assistance. (1.) 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2.) Id. at 365,369. (3.) Id. at 373. (4.) Margaret Colgate Love & Gabriel J. Chin, Padilla v. Kentucky: The Right to Counsel and th......
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