Padilla v. Utah Bd. of Pardons and Parole

Decision Date10 October 1997
Docket NumberNo. 960355,960355
Citation947 P.2d 664
Parties327 Utah Adv. Rep. 54 Daniel D. PADILLA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE and State of Utah, Defendants and Appellees.
CourtUtah Supreme Court

Edward K. Brass, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.

Jan Graham, Atty. Gen., Nancy L. Kemp, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendants.

RUSSON, Justice:

INTRODUCTION

Daniel D. Padilla, an inmate at the Utah State Prison at Draper, Utah, appeals the district court's denial of his petition for extraordinary relief. In his petition, Padilla sought relief from the actions of the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole (the "Board") in relation to an original parole grant hearing. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

In 1987, Padilla was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to five years to life in prison for the shooting death of Anthony Palacios. 1 Padilla's first parole grant hearing was held before the Board on July 27, 1988. At that hearing, one of the members of the Board recused herself because she was related to Padilla's victim, Palacios. She then sat in the audience during the hearing. Padilla filed a habeas corpus petition (the "first petition"), challenging the actions of that Board. The court of appeals ordered a new hearing, finding that although the particular Board member recused herself, all actions of that Board were tainted. Padilla v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 839 P.2d 874 (Utah.Ct.App.1992).

Padilla's next parole grant hearing was held on December 11, 1992. As a result of that hearing, the Board set a new rehearing date for January 2003. In several of the documents relating to the December 1992 hearing, the Board referred to it as a "rehearing" instead of an original parole grant hearing. In May 1993, Padilla filed another habeas petition (the "second petition"), challenging the December 1992 hearing. In the second petition, Padilla argued that the Board erred in not granting him a "new" hearing as had been required by the court of appeals and in having only one officer appear at the hearing. While this petition was pending, and before this court's decision in Labrum v. Utah State Board of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902 (Utah 1993), the Board agreed to hold a new original parole grant hearing on October 29, 1993, to remedy any alleged deficiencies in the December 1992 hearing.

Padilla appeared before the Board for his third hearing on October 29, 1993, accompanied by his attorney. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board announced that it would take the case under advisement and granted Padilla ten days in which to submit any additional information he thought might be relevant to the Board's decision. The Board further promised to inform Padilla of any additional relevant information that might come before the Board during that time and, if he had not already had the chance, to allow him to respond to any such information.

After the October 29 hearing, but before the Board issued its decision in Padilla's case, this court decided Labrum, 870 P.2d 902, on December 6, 1993. In Labrum, this court held that because an original parole grant hearing is analogous to a sentencing hearing conducted by a judge in a court of law, certain due process protections apply pursuant to article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution. Id. at 911. Specifically, the court held that due process requires that inmates must be afforded "timely disclosure of the contents of their files (or reasonable summaries thereof) prior to conducting original parole grant hearings." Id. The court then addressed the issue of retroactivity and concluded that the benefits of its decision should extend not only to all future original parole grant hearings but also to "any inmate who currently has a claim pending in the district court or on appeal before this court or the court of appeals challenging original parole grant hearing procedures on due process grounds." Id. at 914.

On December 14, 1993, the Board issued its decision setting Padilla's rehearing date for January 2003. Following the Board's decision and this court's decision in Labrum, Padilla moved to amend his second petition, which was still pending in district court, to include claims based on Labrum. However, in May 1994, the district court denied Padilla's motion to amend and dismissed Padilla's second petition as moot on the ground that the Board had granted Padilla the October 29, 1993, hearing to rectify any procedural problems allegedly occurring at the December 1992 hearing. Padilla has never appealed that dismissal.

In July 1994, Padilla filed the petition for extraordinary relief at issue in this case, pursuant to rule 65B(b), (c), and (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (the "third petition"). 2 In that petition, Padilla made numerous claims that his due process rights had been violated in relation to the October 29, 1993, hearing, including the following: (1) The lack of a procedure by which a direct appeal of Board decisions can be sought violated due process rights; (2) the Board's refusal to allow Padilla to examine his file denied him due process of law under Labrum; (3) the Board's refusal to let Padilla's attorney speak for him during the hearing denied Padilla the right to effective assistance of counsel; (4) the Board denied Padilla due process of law by failing to provide a detailed written rationale for its decision; and (5) the Board's performance of the sentencing function, which is inherently a judicial function, violated the separation of powers doctrine. In July 1995, the district court denied the petition, and Padilla appealed to this court.

On appeal, Padilla argues that the trial court incorrectly ruled that Padilla's third petition was governed by rule 65B(e) but not by 65B(b) or (c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Padilla further argues that he is entitled to the benefits of the Labrum decision because the Board's final decision was made eight days after Labrum was issued. Alternatively, Padilla contends that Labrum applies because his second petition was still pending in district court at the time Labrum was decided. Padilla also repeats the five claims, listed previously, which he made in his petition to the district court and argues in addition (1) that the Board did not make an adequate inquiry into the merits of the case because it reached the same rehearing decision after the October 29, 1993, hearing as it did following the December 1992 hearing; (2) that he was denied due process because he did not have the opportunity to confront his accusers and present evidence at the hearing; and (3) that the Board's decision was arbitrary and capricious, thereby justifying a substantive review of the Board's decision.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing the dismissal of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, "we accord no deference to the conclusions of law that underlie the dismissal. They are reviewed for correctness." Neel v. Holden, 886 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1994). Further, "while 'we must review the fairness of the process by which the Board undertakes its sentencing function, ... we do not sit as a panel of review on the result.' " Id. at 1100 (quoting Lancaster v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 869 P.2d 945, 947 (Utah 1994)).

ANALYSIS
I. RULE 65B

Padilla first argues that the district court incorrectly concluded that his third petition was governed only by rule 65B(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Padilla argues that both subsections (b) and (c) of rule 65B are also applicable. In Renn v. State Board of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 682 (Utah 1995), we held that the writ of habeas corpus is available only to a petitioner challenging the legality of his or her detention, the lawfulness of the court-imposed sentence, or the conditions of his or her imprisonment. We also stated, "Rule 65B(c) cannot be used to challenge Board actions that might be challenged under Rule 65B(e)." Id. at 683.

Here, plaintiff challenges the Board's actions under 65B(b), (c), and (e), alleging that the Board denied him his right to due process. Because these challenges do not involve the legality of his detention, the conditions of his imprisonment, or a court-imposed sentence, the writ of habeas corpus is not available. His claims challenging actions taken by the Board of Pardons are reviewable only under 65B(e). Id. at 683, 685. Accordingly, we agree with the district court's conclusion in that regard and review only his 65B(e) claim.

II. APPLICABILITY OF LABRUM

Padilla argues that he is entitled to the benefits of the due process protections articulated by this court in Labrum, 870 P.2d 902. As stated above, this court held in that case that the Board must provide an inmate with "adequate notice to prepare for a parole release hearing, and ... copies or a summary of the information in the Board's file on which the Board will rely." Id. at 904. The court then held that its decision would apply to all original parole grant hearings held on or after the date of the decision and also to "any inmate who currently has a claim pending in the district court or on appeal before this court or the court of appeals challenging original parole grant hearing procedures on due process grounds." Id. at 913-14.

Padilla presents two arguments to support his claim that this case falls within the reach of Labrum. First, he claims that even though the Board held his original parole grant hearing on October 29, 1993, more than a month before Labrum was decided, the Board did not actually make its decision until December 14, 1993, eight days after Labrum was decided. This argument is unavailing. As the term plainly implies, a "hearing" contemplates a forum where parties to a matter have the opportunity to be heard. See Black's Law Dictionary 852 (4th ed.1968). This interpretation is clearly supported by sections of the Utah Code relating to Pardons and Parole. Section 77-27-5(1)(c) of the Utah Code (emphasis added) 3 states, "No restitution may be ordered, ... no...

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