Padillas v. Stork-Gamco Inc.

• Decision Date: 31 August 1999
• Docket Number: STORK-GAMC,No. 97-1853,INC,97-1853
• Citation: 186 F.3d 412
• Parties: (3rd Cir. 1999) DANIEL G. PADILLAS, Appellant v
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 412

186 F.3d 412 (3rd Cir. 1999)

DANIEL G. PADILLAS, Appellant v. STORK-GAMCO, INC.

No. 97-1853

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Argued June 1, 1999

Decided August 2, 1999

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied August 31, 1999^*

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civ. No. 95-cv-07090) District Judge: Lowell A. Reed, Jr.

ROBERT B. WHITE, JR., ESQUIRE (ARGUED), Law Offices of Robert B. White, Jr., 1800 John F. Kennedy, Boulevard, Suite 500, Philadelphia, PA 19103, Attorney for Daniel G. Padillas, Appellant

EDMUND J. SIEGERT, ESQUIRE (ARGUED), Cremer, Kopon, Shaughnessy & Spina, 225 West Wacker Drive, Suite 2500, Chicago, IL 60606

JOHN T. DONOVAN, ESQUIRE, Rawle & Henderson, One South Penn Square, The Widener Building, Philadelphia, PA 19107, Attorneys for Stork-Gamco, Inc., Appellee

Before: SCIRICA, McKEE, Circuit Judges, and SCHWARZER,^** District Judge

OPINION OF THE COURT

SCHWARZER, District Judge:

Daniel Padillas was injured while washing down the blade of a drum and thigh cutter ("DTC" or "the machine") designed, manufactured and sold by Stork-Gamco, Inc. ("Stork") and owned and operated by his employer, Pennfield Farms. The DTC carries chicken carcasses, hanging by their legs, toward a horizontally rotating blade which separates the drumstick from the thigh. The injury occurred when the high-powered hose Padillas was using to clean the machine became entangled in the overhead conveyor and drew his left forearm into the unguarded edge of the rotating blade. Padillas brought this action against Stork, alleging strict products liability, negligence, breach of warranty and failure to warn. Stork moved for summary judgment, arguing that the report of Padillas' expert, Ralph Lambert, did not meet the test of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The district court excluded the Lambert report and granted Stork's motion for lack of admissible evidence to support an essential element of Padillas' case, i.e., that the machine was defective. The district court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1332 (1994). We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 (1994) and reverse.

I. PLAINTIFF ESTABLISHED MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT FOR TRIAL

Our review of a summary judgment is plenary. See Childers v. Joseph, 842 F.2d 689, 693 (3d Cir. 1988). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party "to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Id. at 322. "[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is `genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non- moving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Stork moved for summary judgment on the ground that "[t]here is no competent evidence of record in this case to satisfy the Azzarello standard." The district court held that "[t]he only evidence of defect that Padillas proffered to defend against the motion of Stork-Gamco . . . was the report from his expert, Ralph Lambert." Having concluded that this report was not admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the court determined that Stork had met its burden under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and granted the motion. The threshold question, therefore, is whether Padillas offered evidence apart from the Lambert Report sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact.

Because this is a diversity case, Pennsylvania products liability law controls. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held, in Azzarello v. Black Brothers Co., 391 A.2d 1020 (Pa. 1978), that "in this type of case, the jury may find a defect where the product left the supplier's control lacking any element necessary to make it safe for its intended use or possessing any feature that renders it unsafe for the intended use." Id. at 1027; see also Surace v. Caterpillar, Inc., 111 F.3d 1039, 1044 (3d Cir. 1997); Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 337 A.2d 893, 902 (Pa. 1975) ("A `defective condition' is not limited to defects in design or manufacture. The seller must provide with the product every element necessary to make it safe for use.").¹ Thus, the burden on Padillas in opposing Stork's motion was to come forward with evidence from which the jury could find that the machine lacked an element necessary to make it safe or possessed an element that made it unsafe for its intended use. In his opposition to the summary judgment motion, Padillas proffered not only the Lambert Report but also the following additional evidence:

(1) A report (predating the accident) co-authored by Stork-Gamco's engineering manager responsible for the design of the Stork machines addressing problems with the machine that injured Padillas, including " Safety concerns -- not well guarded."

(2) A memorandum (also predating the accident) from a Pennfield employee to a representative of Stork referring to the machine's "Safety Problems . . . Many blades unguarded."

(3) Evidence that the design of this machine was derived from a machine designed and manufactured by Stork's sister company, which provides a guard extending over a larger segment of the cutting edge of the blade, both vertically and horizontally, than the guard on the machine at which Padilla was injured.

(4) Evidence that following the accident, Pennfield installed a tubular steel guard at the point where the Stork guard had ended.

This evidence is probative of the existence of a condition that a reasonable jury may find made the machine unsafe for its intended use. We must consider, however, whether a jury would be permitted to return a verdict on this evidence standing alone, assuming the exclusion of the Lambert Report. If so, summary judgment was erroneously granted.

We have not directly addressed the specific issue of when expert evidence is required in a products liability case although we have declared, in dictum, that "[i]n addition to expert testimony on design defect, a defective condition in a product can be established by the presentation of other types of circumstantial evidence." Barris v. Bob's Drag Chutes & Safety Equip., Inc., 685 F.2d 94, 101 (3d Cir. 1982) (citing Pennsylvania cases). We have, however, recently considered the issue in the context of a Jones Act negligence claim. In Wilburn v. Maritrans GP Inc., 139 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1998), plaintiff was swept off the deck of a tug when he was ordered to haul a line on board during a violent storm producing enormous waves causing the tug to roll and pitch. See id. at 357-59. The court held that the jury did not require expert evidence to understand that the reason plaintiff was in a position to be swept overboard was because he had been ordered to haul the line on deck and that if the line had been disconnected from the tug, there would have been no need to haul it on board, because "persons of common understanding could comprehend the primary facts offered by Wilburn to demonstrate the cause of his injuries." Id. at 359, 360.

Wilburn relied on Salem v. United States Lines, 370 U.S. 31 (1962), holding that expert testimony was not required to support a verdict of negligence and unseaworthiness in favor of Salem who had been injured as he moved from a ladder to a platform leading to the vessel's crow's nest. The Court observed, after noting that there was evidence in the form of testimony and photographs from which the jury could clearly see the construction of the crow's nest, that if there were peculiar facts and circumstances which made it impossible for a jury to decide intelligently, it had not been told what they were and the record disclosed none. See id. at 34-35. Expert evidence is not necessary, the Court held, " `if all the primary facts can be accurately and intelligibly described to the jury, and if they, as men of common understanding, are as capable of comprehending the primary facts and of drawing correct conclusions from them as are witnesses possessed of special or peculiar training, experience, or observation in respect of the subject under investigation.' " Id. at 35 (quoting United States Smelting Co. v. Parry, 166 F. 407, 415 (8th Cir. 1909)). Here the district court opined, without explanation, that "[t]his case presents complex and technical questions of product design and causation." But because this case is at the summary judgment stage, it is premature to rule out that testimony and pictures may enable the jury to clearly see the construction of the machine and the manner of its use, rendering expert evidence unnecessary. We hold only that on the record before us, we cannot exclude the possibility that plaintiff 's non-expert evidence will be sufficient to submit his claim of defect to the jury.²

II. THE COURT FAILED TO FOLLOW PROPER PROCEDURE IN EXCLUDING EXPERT EVIDENCE

As a part of its opposition to Stork's summary judgment motion, Padillas offered a report prepared by Ralph A. Lambert, a mechanical engineer with over twenty-five years of in-plant and technical experience in industrial operations, maintenance and construction systems, and manufacturing process design, including food processing machinery. Lambert's report detailed his findings regarding the machine and analyzed its operation. It concluded, in substance, that the failure to provide a guard that prevented the snagging of the hose during wash-down and to provide protection for workers against contact with the cutting blade "resulted in a defective machine with a dangerous and hazardous condition that was the cause of the accident."

The district court correctly ruled that the analysis under Daubert v. Merrell Dow...