Padmanabhan v. Hulka, Civil Action No. 17–11939–NMG
Decision Date | 03 April 2018 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 17–11939–NMG |
Citation | 308 F.Supp.3d 484 |
Parties | Bharanidharan PADMANABHAN, Plaintiff, v. Carol HULKA, Rachel Nardin, James Paikos, George Zachos, Debra Stoller, Susan Giordano, Michael Henry, Robin Richman, Brent "Woody" Giessmann, George Abraham, Candace Lapidus Sloane, Robert Bouton, Katie Merrill, Steven Horowitz, Loretta Kish Cooke, Marianne Felice, Adele Audet, Joseph Gesmundo, Barry Levin, Robert Harvey, Gerard Dolan, Chris Cecchini, Nan Browne, Maura Tracy Healey, Lucian Leape and William Kassler, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Bharanidharan Padmanabhan, MD, PhD, Brookline, MA, pro se.
Brian H. Sullivan, Rebecca A. Cobbs, Sloane & Walsh LLP, Lori K. Vaulding, Morrison Mahoney LLP, Mark P. Sutliff, Attorney General's Office, Boston, MA, for Defendants.
This case arises from the termination of the employment of Dr. Bharanidharan Padmanabhan ("plaintiff" or "Padmanabhan" or "Dr. Bharani") and his subsequent sanctioning by the Massachusetts Board of Registration in Medicine ("BORIM" or "the Board"). It is not the first lawsuit brought by the doctor in connection with these events. In this case, plaintiff brings a plethora of claims against multiple defendants. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendants 1) violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), 2) conspired to violate RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), 3) violated the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 – 7, 4 ) committed fraud, 5) tortiously interfered with contract, 6) committed trespass to chattels and 7) violated his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, plaintiff seeks declaratory judgments and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief.
Before the Court are five motions to dismiss filed by various combinations of defendants and plaintiff's motion for entry of default. For the reasons that follow, defendants' motions to dismiss will be allowed and plaintiff's motion will be denied.
Plaintiff Bharanidharan Padmanabhan, MD, PhD, resides in Massachusetts and practiced medicine as a neurologist at the Cambridge Health Aliance ("CHA") Whidden Hospital. In November, 2010, plaintiff's medical privileges were suspended. The Board revoked them following a January 2011 Fair Hearing at CHA. Plaintiff has unsuccessfully challenged that revocation in state and federal court.
In October, 2014, Dr. Padmanabhan filed a complaint in Massachusetts Superior Court for Norfolk County. See Padmanabhan v. City of Cambridge et al., Norfolk CA. NO. 1482CV01410 ("Padmanabhan I" ). That complaint asserted 12 counts against 73 defendants. The claims included various torts, fraud, violations of Massachusetts state law and violations of plaintiff's Constitutional rights. Padmanabhan accused BORIM of conspiring with CHA and asserted that BORIM's conduct constituted "corrupt collusion and racketeering". In July, 2017, the Superior Court allowed defendants' motions to dismiss, holding that plaintiff's claims were time-barred. Plaintiff appealed that decision, which is currently pending in the Massachusetts Court of Appeals.
In September, 2015, Padmanabhan filed a complaint in this Court against a handful of state officials, alleging that they violated federal law by improperly accessing the Prescription Monitoring Program computer database in order to obtain information about his patients and to accuse him falsely of Medicaid fraud. This session allowed defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Padmanabhan v. Healey, 159 F.Supp.3d 220, 226 (D. Mass. 2016), aff'd, No. 16-1159, 2017 WL 3404402 (1st Cir. Jan. 4, 2017), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S.Ct. 77, 199 L.Ed.2d 24 (2017) (" Padmanabhan II").
Plaintiff has also pursued litigation arising from BORIM disciplinary proceedings, which began in 2014. An evidentiary hearing took place before a Division of Administrative Law Appeals ("DALA") magistrate in early 2015, and the magistrate issued a recommended decision in August, 2015. In January, 2016, BORIM remanded the case to the magistrate with orders to clarify and explain parts of his decision.
In March, 2016, plaintiff filed a petition for certiorari in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC") asserting that the BORIM proceedings violated his constitutional rights and requesting that the August, 2015, decision be deemed final pursuant to 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(1l)(c)(3). After that petition was denied by a single justice of the SJC, plaintiff appealed to the full SJC. While that appeal was pending, the DALA magistrate issued an amended recommended decision in August, 2016. That decision found that plaintiff had acted below the standard of care.
Id. at 315. Plaintiff did not avail himself of that opportunity.
committed by BORIM.
In November, 2017, this session denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and allowed defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that plaintiff's suit was barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion. See Padmanabhan v. Paikos, 280 F.Supp.3d 248, 253 (D. Mass. 2017) (" Padmanabhan IV").
Plaintiff filed the complaint in this action in October, 2017, which was drawn to United States District Judge Saylor. In January, 2018, the case was reassigned to this session pursuant to Local Rule 40.1(g)(5). On February 2, 2018, plaintiff filed an emergency petition for a writ of mandamus in the First Circuit Court of Appeals ("First Circuit"), contesting that reassignment. On February 12, 2018, the First Circuit denied that petition, finding that plaintiff failed to demonstrate "a clear entitlement to the relief requested." See In re Padmanabhan, No. 16–1159 (1st Cir. Feb. 12, 2018) ("Padmanabhan V").
The complaint in the present suit is 180 pages long and consists of approximately 650 paragraphs. Many of those paragraphs recount the same events detailed in plaintiff's previous complaints in other cases. He states ten claims for relief against 26 defendants. Most of the defendants have been sued in prior actions. Two, Maura Tracey Healey and James Paikos, are named defendants in plaintiff's previous cases. See Padmanabhan II; Padmanabhan IV. Pending before the Court are five motions to dismiss filed by the defendants. The Court will address them seriatim.
Defendants have filed motions to dismiss for failure to state claims upon which relief can be granted. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). In considering the merits of a motion to dismiss, the Court may look only to the facts alleged in the pleadings, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint and matters of which judicial notice can be taken. Nollet v. Justices of Trial Court of Mass., 83 F.Supp.2d 204, 208 (D. Mass. 2000), aff'd, 248 F.3d 1127 (1st Cir. 2000). Furthermore, the Court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Langadinos v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 68, 69 (1st Cir. 2000). If the facts in the complaint are sufficient to state a cause of action, a motion to dismiss the complaint must be denied. See Nollet, 83 F.Supp.2d at 208.
Although a court must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in a complaint, that doctrine is not applicable to legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Threadbare recitals of the legal elements which are supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice to state a cause of action. Id. Accordingly, a complaint does not state a claim for relief where the well-pled facts fail to warrant an inference of any more than the mere possibility of misconduct. Id. at 1950.
Defendants contend that plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion. Padmanabhan denies that claim preclusion applies and asserts that the parties are not in privity, that the prior action did not produce a final judgment on the merits and that the state and federal cases have "no overlapping claims".
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1738, judicial proceedings of the several states "shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States." Cf. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1 ( ). Under that full-faith-and-credit mandate,...
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