Padro v. Pub. Bldg. Auth.

Decision Date15 October 2010
Docket NumberCivil No. 08–2175 (GAG).
Citation747 F.Supp.2d 319
PartiesNeftali SOTO PADRO, Plaintiff,v.PUBLIC BUILDING AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Raul Barrera–Morales, Raul Barrera Morales Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.Ineabelle Santiago–Camacho, Beatriz Annexy–Guevara, Reichard & Escalera, Edgardo Colon–Arraras, Goldman Antonetti & Cordova, Idza Diaz–Rivera, Wandymar Burgos–Vargas, Vanessa D. Bonano–Rodriguez, Department of Justice, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

GUSTAVO A. GELPÍ, District Judge.

Plaintiff, Neftali Soto Padro (Plaintiff), commenced this action against the Puerto Rico Public Building Authority (PBA) and various employees of the PBA (collectively, Defendants) in their official and personal capacities for alleged acts of political discrimination. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief as well as damages resulting from these acts of alleged discrimination, pursuant to the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; 42 U.S.C. Section 1983; and 28 U.S.C. Sections 2201–2202; P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, Sections 1301 et seq.; and Article 1802 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, Section 5141.

Presently before the court are two motions for summary judgment (Docket Nos. 62 & 64) filed by the PBA as well as Defendants in their official and individual capacities, respectively. Plaintiff timely opposed these motions (Docket Nos. 97 & 98). By leave of the court, Defendant filed a reply brief (Docket No. 102) which Plaintiff opposed by sur-reply (Docket No. 112). After reviewing these submissions and the pertinent law, the court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part 1 Defendants' motion at Docket No. 62 and GRANTS Defendants' motion at Docket No. 64.

I. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). “An issue is genuine if ‘it may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party at trial, and material if it ‘possess[es] the capacity to sway the outcome of the litigation under the applicable law.’ Iverson v. City of Boston, 452 F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir.2006) (alteration in original) (citations omitted). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the lack of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. “The movant must aver an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to establish the existence of at least one fact issue which is both genuine and material.” Maldonado–Denis v. Castillo–Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir.1994). The nonmoving party must then “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). If the court finds that some genuine factual issue remains, the resolution of which could affect the outcome of the case, then the court must deny summary judgment. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and give that party the benefit of any and all reasonable inferences. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Moreover, at the summary judgment stage, the court does not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Id. Summary judgment may be appropriate, however, if the non-moving party's case rests merely upon “conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.” Forestier Fradera v. Municipality of Mayaguez, 440 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir.2006) (quoting Benoit v. Technical Mfg. Corp., 331 F.3d 166, 173 (1st Cir.2003)).

II. Relevant Factual & Procedural Background

Plaintiff is an active member of the New Progressive Party (“NPP”). Plaintiff began working for the PBA in February 1996 in a trust position as the Regional Director of the Mayaguez Region. On March 1, 2000, Plaintiff received a letter indicating that, effective February 29, 2000, he would no longer be a Regional Director and would undergo a probationary period in a new career position. Plaintiff occupied this career position of Field Operations Supervisor in the Aguadilla Region from February 2000 until August 2008. On or around 2003 to 2004, two additional positions of Supervisor of Field Operations were created at the PBA Aguadilla Region. These two positions were filled by Adrian Acevedo and Jose Vargas, both of whom, Plaintiff alleges, are members of the Popular Democratic Party (“PDP”). Plaintiff contends that Jose Vargas did not qualify for the position of Supervisor of Field Operations at the time he was appointed.

In 2007, there was a structural reorganization across the entire PBA, which was approved by the PBA Board of Directors. This reorganization of 2007, eliminated several positions and created new positions. Following the elimination of his position, Plaintiff applied for three career positions at the PBA: Auxiliary Regional Director; Field Operations Manager; and Technical Services Supervisor. On September 13, 2007, Plaintiff received a letter from Executive Director Leila Hernandez Umpierre informing Plaintiff that he was chosen for the position of Technical Services Supervisor. In response, Plaintiff sent a letter to Hernandez voicing his contention that selecting him for said position without considering or interviewing him for the position of Field Operations Manager or for Auxiliary Regional Director constituted acts of political discrimination. He alleged that Defendants engaged in said acts because of his affiliation with the NPP. He further stated that the job designation represented a demotion in pay scale and supervisory functions.

On November 2, 2007, Rudy Martinez Calderon, Director of Human Resources, wrote a letter to Plaintiff informing him that his placement in the position of Technical Services Supervisor did not go into effect and that he would remain in his position of Field Operations Supervisor for the Aguadilla Region. Plaintiff remained in this position for an additional eight months. On July 3, 2008, Hernandez wrote another letter to Plaintiff, stating that as a result of the 2007 reorganization, his position of Field Operations Supervisor will be reclassified as Technical Services Supervisor. This reclassification did not affect Plaintiff's salary, but altered his salary scale and duties as a supervisor. Plaintiff contends that, during the reorganization period, the PBA failed to follow its own hiring and probationary procedures when hiring a new Field Operations Manager. He further alleges that these failures to comply demonstrate that Defendants' actions were motivated by political animus.

On or around February 2008, Plaintiff was named Regional Director of the PBA's Mayaguez Region, which is a trust position. As Regional Director, Plaintiff is no longer supervised by any of the individual defendants in this case.

III. DiscussionA. Summary Judgment Motion for Claims Against PBA and Defendants in Their Official Capacities (Docket No. 62)

Plaintiff's summary judgment motion at Docket No. 62 deals exclusively with the charges brought against the PBA and its individual members in their official capacity. Plaintiff requests a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and monetary damages for the alleged actions taken by the PBA and the individual defendants in their official capacities.

1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution establishes that, without their express consent, or the explicit abrogation of the immunity by Congress, states cannot be sued for damages in federal courts. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 451–52, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976). This immunity extends to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, its instrumentalities, and government officials acting in that capacity. See Pastrana–Torres v. Corporación de P.R. para la Difusión Pública, 460 F.3d 124 (1st Cir.2006); Maysonet–Robles v. Cabrero, 323 F.3d 43 (1st Cir.2003). The Eleventh Amendment seeks to protect a state's interest in its public treasury and its dignity as a sovereign. See Fresenius Med. Care Cardiovascular Res., Inc. v. P.R. & Caribbean Cardiovascular Ctr. Corp., 322 F.3d 56, 63 (1st Cir.2003).

Supreme Court jurisprudence holds that an entity must either be the state or an “arm of the state to fall under the umbrella of Eleventh Amendment immunity. See N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Chatham County, 547 U.S. 189, 193, 126 S.Ct. 1689, 164 L.Ed.2d 367 (2006); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999); Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). Following this precedent, the First Circuit has developed a two-part test to determine whether a particular entity qualifies as an “arm of the state.” Fresenius, 322 F.3d 56, 64–68 (1st Cir.2003). Under the first part of the test, the court must determine “whether the state has structured the entity to share its Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Pastrana–Torres, 460 F.3d at 126 (citing Fresenius, 322 F.3d at 68). “While this inquiry is without doubt a question of federal law, ‘that federal question can be answered only after considering the provisions of state law that define the agency's character.’ Redondo Const. Corp. v. P.R. Highway & Transp. Auth., 357 F.3d 124, 127 (1st Cir.2004) (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 n. 5, 117 S.Ct. 900, 137 L.Ed.2d 55...

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  • Ramos–Santos v. Hernandez–Nogueras
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico
    • 8 Junio 2012
    ...violation, even if the defendants' alleged actions would constitute adverse employment actions.”); see also Soto Padro v. Public Bldg. Auth., 747 F.Supp.2d 319, 332 (D.P.R.2010) (holding that there was no due process violation when change in position involved only reduction in potential sal......

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