Padron v. People of Puerto Rico

• Citation: 142 F.2d 508
• Decision Date: 28 April 1944
• Docket Number: No. 3888.,3888.
• Parties: PADRON v. PEOPLE OF PUERTO RICO ex rel. CASTRO.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)

142 F.2d 508 (1944)

PADRON v. PEOPLE OF PUERTO RICO ex rel. CASTRO.

No. 3888.

Circuit Court of Appeals, First Circuit

April 28, 1944.

Jerome H. Simonds, of Washington, D. C., Francis M. Shea, Asst. Atty. Gen., David L. Kreeger, Sp. Asst. to the Atty. Gen., and Hubert Margolies, of Washington, D. C., for the People of Puerto Rico.

Bolivar Pagan and F. Fernandez Cuyar, both of San Juan, P. R., for appellant.

Edilmiro Martinez Rivera, of San Juan, P. R., for Luis A. Castro.

Before MAGRUDER, MAHONEY, and WOODBURY, Circuit Judges.

MAHONEY, Circuit Judge.

The Attorney General of Puerto Rico because of the public interest involved authorized Luis A. Castro to file his complaint in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding against Lino Padron Rivera to investigate the title or right of the defendant to the office of secretary of the capital of Puerto Rico.

The plaintiff was appointed secretary of the capital on September 11, 1931, and reappointed on January 4, 1937. He continued in the office until April 22, 1941, when the defendant, who had been appointed secretary in February, 1941, took possession of it. At the same time the defendant was serving as a member of the Senate in the Legislature of Puerto Rico. The plaintiff filed his complaint in the District Court of San Juan alleging that he had not resigned nor abandoned his office nor had he been removed from it and that the defendant was ineligible to hold such office because of the prohibition contained in Section 30 of the Organic Act of Puerto Rico that "No senator or representative * * * shall, during his term of office, be appointed to any civil office under the Government of Puerto Rico." 39 Stat. 959, as amended in 52 Stat. 595, 48 U.S.C.A. § 819.¹ The District Court held that the fact that the defendant was a member of the Senate did not incapacitate him from appointment as secretary of the capital, but that the plaintiff had not surrendered or abandoned his office.

Upon appeal by the defendant the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico held that the official term of the secretary of the capital is four years and that the plaintiff, having completed his term in 1941, held his office at the will of the city manager who had been elected in November, 1940. It said that the plaintiff had not been suspended nor had any charges been preferred against him for his removal, but that he had voluntarily surrendered the office to his successor and did not ask to be put in possession of it. It further held that the appointment of the defendant was invalid because as a senator in the Insular Legislature he could not legally be appointed to the office of secretary of the capital as that office was a "civil office under the Government of Puerto Rico." The defendant has now appealed to this court and filed a supersedeas bond. He has submitted his case on brief but without oral argument. The plaintiff Castro has taken no part in this appeal. The People of Puerto Rico, however, have filed a brief and argued the case before us because they say it is a question of importance involving the principles of public administration in the island.

The only issue presented is whether Section 30 of the Organic Act prohibits the appointment of the defendant, a Senator in the Insular Legislature, to the office of secretary of the capital of Puerto Rico. We think the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico committed no error in answering this question in the affirmative.

The prohibition in the Act is twofold. It runs directly against the appointing power and denies it the authority to appoint a Senator or Representative in the Insular Legislature to a "civil office under the Government." But it also means that the members of the Legislature are ineligible for appointment during their term to any such civil office. The secretary of the capital who is the same as city clerk of San Juan, receives a salary of $4,500 a year, is required under Act 99 of the Laws of Puerto Rico 1931 to call special meetings of the Board of Commissioners when directed by the Governor; to keep the minutes of the Board of Commissioners; to keep the archives and civil registry of the capital and to certify all ordinances and resolutions adopted by the Board. Unquestionably his office is a civil one and no contention is made otherwise. The only question for our consideration is whether it is a civil office under the Government of Puerto Rico.

The Government of Puerto Rico is made up of the central or insular government and the various municipal governments which have been described as parts of the governmental machinery of the island. San Millan v. Pension Board, 45 P.R.R. 236, 237. The municipalities further are subject to the power and control of the Legislature which may create, consolidate and reorganize them and provide and repeal laws and ordinances for their government consistent with the Organic Act, 48 U.S.C.A. § 731 et seq.

In Municipality v. Commissioner of Health, 50 P.R.R. 789 (1937) at p. 793, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico said:

"In general terms, the relation in this Island between the municipalities and the territory is the same as that existent in the various states of the Union between their municipalities and the state."

In City of Worcester v. Street Railway Co., 196 U.S. 539, 548, 25 S.Ct. 327, 329, 49 L.Ed. 591, the Supreme Court of the United States said:

"A municipal corporation is simply a political subdivision of the state, and exists by virtue of the exercise of the power of the state through its...