Paez v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry.

• Decision Date: 13 August 2015
• Docket Number: No. 32,105.,32,105.
• Citation: 362 P.3d 116
• Parties: Rosemary PAEZ and Rey Paez, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. BURLINGTON NORTHERN SANTA FE RAILWAY, Mike A. Ortega, Hector L. Duran, County of Socorro, by and through its Commissioners, Rosalind Tripp, Jay Santillanes, Laurel Armijo, Charles Gallegos, and Stanley Herrera, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

362 P.3d 116

Rosemary PAEZ and Rey Paez, Plaintiffs–Appellants,

v.BURLINGTON NORTHERN SANTA FE RAILWAY, Mike A. Ortega, Hector L. Duran, County of Socorro, by and through its Commissioners, Rosalind Tripp, Jay Santillanes, Laurel Armijo, Charles Gallegos, and Stanley Herrera, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 32,105.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Aug. 13, 2015.

Law Office of Tibo Chavez, Jr., Tibo J. Chavez, Jr., Belen, NM, Branch Law Firm, Turner W. Branch, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellants.

Atkinson, Thal & Baker, P.C., Clifford K. Atkinson, John S. Thal, Elizabeth Losee, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway.

Robles Rael & Anaya, P.C., Marcus J. Rael, Jr., Douglas E. Gardner, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee County of Socorro.

OPINION

HANISEE, Judge.

{1} While driving her vehicle in Socorro County (the County), Rosemary Paez collided with a train owned and operated by Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway (BNSF). Mrs. Paez and her husband, Rey Paez (Plaintiffs) filed a civil lawsuit against BNSF and the County (Defendants), among others. Defendants filed numerous motions for partial summary judgment. After multiple hearings, the district court granted summary judgment as to each motion, ultimately disposing entirely of Plaintiffs' negligence claims against Defendants. Plaintiffs appeal, arguing that disputed issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

{2} This case arises from a 2008 collision in Socorro County between a train, owned and operated by BNSF, and a vehicle driven by Mrs. Paez.¹ The collision occurred at a railroad crossing known as the Paizalas Road crossing (the crossing), located within walking distance of Plaintiffs' property. Mrs. Paez was badly injured in the collision, and she and her husband sued Defendants, BNSF's train operators, and others, on the basis of negligence, for personal injury and damages.² Plaintiffs' amended complaint asserted BNSF's negligent failure to: (1) maintain a safe railroad crossing, (2) provide adequate warning devices, and (3) eliminate visual obstructions to enable motorists' "clear and unobstructed view of the crossing and approaching trains." Additionally, Plaintiffs contended that in conjunction with its train operators, BNSF failed to sound the train horn, keep a proper lookout, and slow the train "as required to protect the traveling public."³ Similarly but not identically, Plaintiffs alleged that the County failed to maintain the roadway itself in a safe condition, post adequate warning signs, and to undertake on-site measures to clear visual obstructions. In addition to general and punitive damages, Plaintiffs sought attorney fees and costs.

{3} BNSF answered Plaintiffs' amended complaint and subsequently filed nine motions for partial summary judgment, asserting at the outset and in relevant part for purposes of this appeal, that: (1) Mrs. Paez was negligent per se in failing to yield to the train and in failing to keep a lookout; (2) Plaintiffs' claim of failure to provide adequate warning devices was preempted by federal law; (3) Plaintiffs' claim regarding the unsafe condition of the crossing was preempted by federal law and failed for lack of causation; and (4) undisputed photographic evidence established the absence of visual obstructions. Initially, the district court denied BNSF's motion for partial summary judgment premised upon Mrs. Paez's negligence per se. It granted BNSF's preemption-based motions regarding both the crossing's upkeep and the asserted inadequacy of its warning devices. The record does not reflect an initial written order regarding BNSF's challenge to Plaintiffs' visual obstruction claim. Later during the litigation, BNSF filed a renewed motion for partial summary judgment on each basis that the district court initially rejected or withheld judgment.

{4} Along with ultimately joining BNSF's renewed motion for summary judgment, the County filed three of its own summary judgment motions, asserting that: (1) it had no statutory duty to maintain the railroad crossing area or the railroad crossing itself; (2) federal law preempted Plaintiffs' inadequate warning device claim; (3) it had no actual or constructive notice of an alleged defect or dangerous condition associated with the crossing; and (4) Plaintiffs lacked evidence that the asserted negligence against the County was the proximate cause of any damages. The district court initially denied the County's motions with the exception of its request for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' inadequate warning device claim. Consequently, not only did the County join BNSF's motion for reconsideration, but it filed its own motion to reconsider alleging more specifically that Plaintiffs were unable to prove that the County was negligent or that the alleged negligence was a proximate cause of Mrs. Paez's injuries.

{5} The district court eventually granted the renewed motions, following lengthy proceedings and by a written order that stated there to be "no genuine issue as to any material fact." In conjunction with its rulings on these and BNSF's remaining motions for summary judgment that are not before us on appeal, the district court resolved the entirety of Plaintiffs' case against Defendants. The reasoning employed by the district court is best discerned from its statements during and at the conclusion of the two-day motion hearing it held. Addressing Plaintiffs' claims regarding both the condition of and visual obstructions alongside the crossing, and considering photographic evidence provided by the parties, the district court stated:

The train would have been visible. When you contrast that against ... testimony that the vegetation somehow kept one from seeing it just is not—I mean, the photographs are impossible to refute. The experts that Plaintiffs have both indicate[d] ... that they are not giving opinions on causation, that the conditions on the road caused the accident, or that ... [the] conditions caused the accident.

First with particular focus on the County, the district court observed that, "very honestly it looks [as though Plaintiffs] absolutely sorely lack [ ] ... proof of causation." It later generally concluded that "Plaintiffs ha [d not] proven any proximate cause on any of their claims."

{6} The district court further found that "[f]ederal money was expended by [BNSF] in connection with the installation of [the] crossbucks," and therefore, Plaintiffs' claim that the crossing was extra-hazardous due to the inadequacy of warning devices was preempted by federal law. Additionally, considering Mrs. Paez's own negligence in light of the photographs it reviewed, the district court was "convinced ... that no reasonable jury would find that [Mrs.] Paez had not violated [NMSA 1978, Section 66–7–341(A)(2) (2003),]" requiring her to stop within a prescribed distance of the railroad crossing for a visibly approaching train. Therefore, it concluded "as a matter of law, that [Mrs.] Paez was negligent pursuant to the common law duty to stop, look, and listen, and negligent per se pursuant to [Section 66–7–341 ]."

{7} Plaintiffs appeal, contending that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Defendants. They argue that: (1) material facts conflict as to whether the condition of the crossing was a proximate cause of the collision; (2) material facts conflict as to whether visual obstructions alongside the crossing were a proximate cause of the collision; (3) federal law does not preempt Plaintiffs' claims regarding the adequacy of warning devices or hazardous conditions at the crossing; and (4) the district court wrongly concluded Mrs. Paez to have been negligent per se.⁴

STANDARD OF REVIEW

{8} An appeal from an order granting summary judgment presents a question of law that we review de novo. Farmington Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Farmington, 2006–NMCA–077, ¶ 13, 139 N.M. 750, 137 P.3d 1204. "We affirm an order granting summary judgment when there is no evidence raising a reasonable doubt about any genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Lujan v. N.M. Dep't of Transp., 2015–NMCA–005, ¶ 5, 341 P.3d 1, cert. denied, 2014–NMCERT–011, 339 P.3d 841. The moving party bears the burden to demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Brown v. Taylor, 1995–NMSC–050, ¶ 8, 120 N.M. 302, 901 P.2d 720. "Once this prima facie showing has been made, the burden shifts to the non-movant to demonstrate the existence of specific evidentiary facts which would require trial on the merits." Romero v. Philip Morris Inc., 2010–NMSC–035, ¶ 10, 148 N.M. 713, 242 P.3d 280 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In New Mexico, summary judgment is disfavored, with trial on the merits being the preferred method by which litigation is concluded. Id. ¶ 8. As such, in conducting a de novo review of the record "we resolve all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant" and view the record in the light most favorable to a trial on the merits. Lujan, 2015–NMCA–005, ¶ 5, 341 P.3d 1 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

{9} Plaintiffs sued Defendants on the basis that both had been negligent in their respective responsibilities attendant to the railroad crossing, the surrounding areas, and their upkeep. Plaintiffs likewise asserted BNSF's negligent operation of the train with which Mrs. Paez collided.

It is axiomatic that a negligence action requires that there be a duty owed from the defendant to the plaintiff; that based on a standard of reasonable care under the circumstances, the defendant breached that duty; and that the breach was a cause in fact and proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages.

Romero v. Giant Stop–N–Go of N.M., Inc., 2009–NMCA–059, ¶ 5, 146 N.M. 520, 212 P.3d 408. Here, in conjunction with its general determination that material facts were not in dispute, the district court specifically concluded that "Plaintiffs [had...