Page Motor Co., Inc. v. Baker

Decision Date16 December 1980
Citation438 A.2d 739,182 Conn. 484
PartiesPAGE MOTOR COMPANY, INC. v. George P. BAKER et al.
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court

Richard A. Schatz, Hartford, on the brief, for appellant (plaintiff).

Louis B. Blumenfeld, Hartford, on the brief, for appellees (defendants).

Before BOGDANSKI, PETERS, PARSKEY, WRIGHT and O'DONNELL, JJ.

WRIGHT, Associate Justice.

In this case the basic facts are not in dispute. The defendants are trustees of the property of the Penn Central Transportation Company (hereinafter Penn Central). Penn Central, in 1972, was the owner of property lying northerly of properties owned and rented by the plaintiff, Page Motor Company, Inc. (hereinafter Page Motors). Both properties were on the northerly side of Bridgeport Avenue (also known as the Boston Post Road) in the town of Milford. The land contours are such that the land slopes down from the Boston Post Road to the Penn Central property, which property is a raised embankment on the top of which are railroad tracks. The Page Motors' property is on the down slope between the Boston Post Road and the railroad.

The natural flow of surface water in the area is from south of the Boston Post Road, across the road, down the slope (on which is situated Page Motors) and to the base of the embankment. There is a stone culvert in the Penn Central embankment through which surface water flows at times, and from there it continues northerly across a swamp, through a ten inch pipe under a dirt service road and into Beaver Brook.

On June 18, 1972, and June 19, 1972, there was a major rainstorm in the area. The storm deposited approximately 7.16 inches of rain on the area in a twenty-nine hour period, beginning around noon on June 18, 1972, and ending by 5 p. m. on June 19, 1972. As a result of this storm, the area just south of the Penn Central property filled with water which rose on to a lot near the tracks on which Page had stored new automobiles. Forty-nine such vehicles were damaged. By stipulation of the parties, the damage to the vehicles was $39,284.04.

For many years prior to June 19, 1972, Penn Central owned, possessed, maintained and controlled the railroad culvert. For at least eighteen months prior to June 19, 1972, Penn Central did not inspect the culvert. It is the contention of the plaintiff that the flooding was due to the clogged condition of the culvert.

The trial referee made the following finding of facts in his decision: "It is important to note that the instant case deals with 'surface water' and that the surface water which created the flooding did not come from Penn Central property. 'Surface waters are those casual waters which accumulate from natural sources and which have not yet evaporated, been absorbed into the earth, or found their way into a stream or lake.' Taylor v. Conti, 149 Conn. 174, 178 (177 A.2d 670 (1962)). Each eyewitness to the flooding who testified in this case was asked the source of the flood waters. Each testified that the water creating the flooding south of the culvert was either falling from the sky or flowing down the slope from the Boston Post Road. All expert witnesses agreed that no significant amount of water came from the Penn Central property." An examination of the record reveals that this finding of facts cannot be disturbed.

Although much of the trial referee's decision deals with the history of the law on the rights of neighboring landowners in connection with surface waters, and particularly with the common enemy doctrine, the finding of facts is dispositive of this appeal. In view of the fact that the plaintiff was not able to prove that any acts by the defendants caused the damage to the plaintiff's automobiles, no liability can be assessed against the defendants. "Negligence is not a tort unless it results in the commission of a wrong ...." Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 345, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).

We feel constrained, however, to comment upon the closing words of the trial referee in his opinion: "I conclude that Penn Central had an absolute right to repel the surface (waters) here involved by direct, intentional conduct or carelessness. As such, no duty was owed Page Motors." While the trial referee was correct in his analysis of the legal history of the common enemy doctrine, we feel that the time has come to alleviate the harshness of that doctrine.

The so-called common enemy doctrine, briefly stated, is that the owner of land may repel or divert surface waters from its land on to that of another. Chadeayne v. Robinson, 55 Conn. 345, 11 A. 592 (1887); Grant v. Allen, 41 Conn. 156 (1874). The court in Tide Water Oil Sales Corporation v. Shimelman, 114 Conn. 182, 158 A. 229 (1932), summarized the law as follows (pp. 189-90, 158 A. 229): "Speaking generally, our law may be summarized as follows: A landowner is under no duty to receive upon his land surface water from the adjacent properties, but in the use or improvement of it he may repel such water at his boundary. On the other hand, he incurs no liability by reason of the fact that surface water falling or running onto his land flows thence to the property of others in its natural manner. But he may not use or improve his land in such a way as to increase the total volume of surface water which flows from it to adjacent property, or as to discharge it or any part of it upon such property in a manner different in volume or course from its natural flow, to the substantial damage of the owner of that property."

In other words, up to the present time Connecticut has adopted the common-law rule, which is termed in American Law Reports Annotated as the common enemy doctrine. This doctrine attaches to land ownership the privilege to repel surface waters, even though this might increase the burden upon another. In such event, the repelling landowner is excused from liability, in spite of the fact that his conduct may be the proximate cause of the damage.

We now feel that the inflexibility of the old rule, as correctly reported by the trial referee, should be modified so as to allow some reasonable latitude. By way of dictum, we are now inclined to adopt what some jurisdictions have termed the reasonableness of use rule.

Generally, under the rule of reasonable use, the landowner, in dealing with surface water, is entitled to take only such steps as are reasonable, in light of all the circumstances of relative advantage to the actor and disadvantage to the adjoining landowners, as well as social utility. Ordinarily, the determination of such reasonableness is regarded as involving factual issues to be determined by the trier. Annot., 93 A.L.R.3d 1193 (superseding 59 A.L.R.2d 421).

The reasonable use rule was apparently first adopted in New Hampshire. Noting the inconvenience which would arise from adopting extreme rules that a landowner has either no right of drainage or an absolute right, the court in Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569 (1862) (which was apparently primarily concerned with percolating waters), said that the sole ground of qualification of the landowners's right of drainage was the similar rights of others. The court went on to say that the extent of the qualification should be determined under the rule of reasonable use, the rights and enjoyment of each landowner being similar and dependent upon the rights and enjoyment of other landowners. In other words, such rights must be exercised with reference to the rights of others. The reasonable use rule as applied to percolating waters was held to apply also to surface waters in Swett v. Cutts, 50 N.H. 439 (1870).

New Jersey was one of the pioneers in adopting the common enemy doctrine, which was applied in that jurisdiction with considerable strictness. The common enemy rule was abandoned, however, in Armstrong v. Francis Corporation, 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4 (1956). The court said that the casting of surface waters from one's own land upon the land of another, in circumstances where the resultant material harm to the other was foreseen or foreseeable, would appear on the face of it to be as tortious and actionable as was any other unreasonable use of the possessor's land. Concluding that the problems raised by the diversion of surface waters should be approached under tort rather than property concepts, the court declared its adherence to the reasonable use rule, which was said to have the particular virtue of flexibility, since the issue of reasonableness became a question of fact to be determined in each case under a consideration of all the relevant circumstances, including such factors as the amount of harm caused, its foreseeability, the purpose or motive with which the act was done, and the consideration whether the utility of the use of the land outweighed the gravity of the harm resulting. See also Hopler v. Morris Hills Regional District, 45 N.J.Super. 409, 133 A.2d 336 (1957).

Several other jurisdictions have adopted the rule of reasonable use: Weinberg v. Northern Alaska Development Corporation, 384 P.2d 450 (Alaska 1963); Pendergrast v. Aiken, 293 N.C. 201, 236 S.E.2d 787 (1977); Butler v. Bruno, 115 R.I. 264, 341 A.2d 735 (1975); Mulder v. Tague, 85 S.C. 544, 186 N.W.2d 884 (1971); State v. Deetz, 66 Wis.2d 1, 224 N.W.2d 407 (1974). See also a recognition of this new trend in Bishop v. Richard, 193 Md. 6, 65 A.2d 334 (1949), and Battisto v. Perkins, 210 Md. 542, 124 A.2d 288 (1956).

Although we now announce our decision to replace the common enemy doctrine with the rule of reasonable use, we reiterate that our redefinition of the duty of a landowner with respect to foreign surface waters cannot avail the present plaintiff. In this case, the plaintiff cannot recover because it was not able to establish that the defendants' conduct was a substantial factor in causing the damage it suffered.

There is no error.

In this opinion PETERS and O'DONNELL, JJ.,...

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