Page v. Avila, 7563.

Decision Date18 March 1935
Docket NumberNo. 7563.,7563.
Citation177 A. 541
PartiesPAGE et al. v. AVILA et al.
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court

Exceptions from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Herbert L. Carpenter, Judge.

Action by William H. Page and another against Joseph T. Avila and others. Verdict for plaintiffs, and defendants bring exceptions.

Exception to denial of defendants' motion for new trial on ground of excessive damages sustained, and case remitted to superior court for new trial, unless plaintiffs file remittitur, and in that case with direction to enter judgment for plaintiffs in reduced sum.

Emile H. Ruch, of Providence, for plaintiffs.

Michael Pedro, of Providence, for defendants.

CAPOTOSTO, Justice.

This is an action in assumpsit brought by a firm of New York attorneys against the defendants, residents of this state, to recover compensation for legal services.

The trial in the superior court resulted in a verdict for the plaintiffs in the sum of $3,200. The case is before us on exceptions of the defendants to the admission of evidence, to instructions to the jury, and to the denial of their motion for a new trial. The defendants' main contention is that the verdict is excessive.

The services in question were rendered by the plaintiffs in a dispute between two corporate groups over certain patent rights, and included attempted corporate meetings, consultations, oral and written communications, and some incidental court proceedings.

The plaintiffs were retained on or about June 1, 1931. Between that date and September 1 of that year considerable activity was advised, decided upon, and carried out in behalf of the defendants. Negative results of a substantial nature followed after the 1st of September. From then on to December 18, 1931, the plaintiffs directed their attention mainly to a consideration of future prospects and possibilities.

The defendants paid the plaintiffs upon request a total of $2,000 for services rendered up to September 1, 1931. The claim in this case is confined to compensation for services from September 1 to December 18, 1931.

Under date of November 19, 1931, the plaintiffs sent defendants a bill, including disbursements, in the sum of $2,023.60. On December 29, 1931, they sent another bill, which, with additional charges and expenses, amounted to $2,843.21. After objection and nonpayment of this bill, the plaintiffs brought suit.

From the testimony of Richard M. Page, the attorney who actually dealt with the defendants, it appears that the plaintiffs claim compensation for 349 1/2 hours of legal services at $10 an hour, plus a stenographer's charge of 155 3/4 hours at the rate of $1.50 an hour. He now takes the position that, inasmuch as the bill of December 29, 1931, was not paid, the plaintiffs are entitled to recover for the time and at the rate stated.

The bills of November 19 and December 29, 1931, are general in character and contain no specification either of the time consumed in defendants' behalf or of the basis upon which the charge is made. Moreover, no claim was ever made before the bringing of this suit for stenographic services.

The record is clear that an appreciable part of the time charged against the defendants was used by office subordinates in looking up law, and that after September 1 the plaintiff Richard M. Page spent not more than 4 1/2 hours "in court" for the defendants. This short period includes the time consumed in going from and returning to his office.

William H. Smith, an attorney called as an expert witness by the plaintiffs on the question of reasonable charges, testified on cross-examination that he was a former associate of the plaintiffs and had been intrusted by Richard M. Page to represent the defendants in a mandamus hearing held prior to September 1, 1931. He set the price of $10 an hour for legal services and $1.25 or $1.50 an hour for the stenographer, because the plaintiffs had advised "those people with reference to attacks by gangsters and police court work." He further stated that, when the services were "negotiating contracts and closing contracts, work of that type, we sometimes...

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  • Simon Chevrolet-Buick, Ltd. v. Rhode Island Department of Administration
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Superior Court
    • January 7, 2013
    ... ... plaintiff's injuries). In the only other case provided by ... Simon Chevrolet, Page v. Avila , is factually ... inapplicable to this case. See 55 R.I. 52, 177 A ... ...
  • Simon Chevrolet-Buick, Ltd. v. Rhode Island Department of Administration
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Superior Court
    • January 7, 2013
    ...injuries). In the only other case provided by Simon Chevrolet, Page v. Avila, is factually inapplicable to this case. See 55 R.I. 52, 177 A. 541, 543 (1935). Although in that case our Supreme Court decreased a jury verdict as "markedly excessive, " that case involved a dispute over the corr......
  • Simon Chevrolet-Buick, Ltd. v. Rhode Island Department of Administration, C.A. PC 2005-5913
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Superior Court
    • January 7, 2013
    ...injuries). In the only other case provided by Simon Chevrolet, Page v. Avila, is factually inapplicable to this case. See 55 R.I. 52, 177 A. 541, 543 (1935). Although in that case our Supreme Court decreased a jury verdict as "markedly excessive, " that case involved a dispute over the corr......
  • Simon Chevrolet-Buick, Ltd. v. R.I. Dep't of Admin.
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Superior Court
    • January 7, 2013
    ...injuries). In the only other case provided by Simon Chevrolet, Page v. Avila, is factually inapplicable to this case. See 55 R.I. 52, 177 A. 541, 543 (1935). Although in that case our Supreme Court decreased a jury verdict as "markedly excessive," that case involved a dispute over the corre......
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