Page v. Berryhill
| Decision Date | 14 May 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 3:18cv302/EMT |
| Parties | ANGIE PAGE, Plaintiff, v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
This case has been referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for disposition pursuant to the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73, based on the parties' consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction (see ECF Nos. 12, 16). It is now before the court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Social Security Act ("the Act"), for review of a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner") denying Plaintiff's application for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-34.
Upon review of the record before this court, it is the opinion of the undersigned that the findings of fact and determinations of the Commissioner are supported by substantial evidence; thus, the decision of the Commissioner should be affirmed.
On March 11, 2015, Plaintiff filed an application for DIB, and in the application she alleged disability beginning October 22, 2014, but she later amended the onset date to April 3, 2015 (tr. 11).1 Her application was denied initially and on reconsideration, and thereafter she requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). A hearing was held on February 22, 2017, and on March 31, 2017, the ALJ issued a decision in which he found Plaintiff "not disabled," as defined under the Act, at any time through the date of his decision (tr. 11-23). The Appeals Council subsequently denied Plaintiff's request for review. Thus, the decision of the ALJ stands as the final decision of the Commissioner, subject to review in this court. Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2007). This appeal followed.
In denying Plaintiff's claims, the ALJ made the following relevant findings (see tr. 11-23):
(1) Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements of the Act through December 31, 20192;
(2) Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 3, 2015, the amended onset date;
(3) Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease ("DDD"), lumbar spine; lumbar radiculopathy; osteoarthritis; obesity; migraines; benign essential hypertension; hyperlipidemia; diabetes mellitus type II; and unspecified idiopathic peripheral neuropathy/peripheral nerve disease;
(4) Plaintiff has no impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1;
(5) Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b)3 except she can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; she can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl; and she can tolerate occasional exposure to unprotected heights, moving mechanical parts, and extreme heat; (6) Plaintiff is capable of performing her past relevant work as an office clerk, pastoral assistant, and receptionist, as this work does not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by Plaintiff's RFC. Alternatively, after applying the Medical Vocational Guidelines as a framework for decision making, and considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, as well as the vocational expert's testimony, Plaintiff can perform other available work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy, including work as a cafeteria attendant, counter attendant, and an information clerk; and
(7) Plaintiff has not been under a disability, as defined in the Act, from April 3, 2015, through the date of the decision.
Review of the Commissioner's final decision is limited to determining whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence from the record and was a result of the application of proper legal standards. Carnes v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1215, 1218 (11th Cir. 1991) (); see also Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997); Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987). "A determination that is supported by substantial evidence may be meaningless . . . if it is coupled with or derived from faulty legal principles." Boyd v. Heckler, 704 F.2d 1207, 1209 (11th Cir. 1983), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Elam v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 921 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1991). As long as proper legal standards were applied,the Commissioner's decision will not be disturbed if in light of the record as a whole the decision appears to be supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1322 (11th Cir. 1998); Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1439; Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but not a preponderance; it is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 59 S. Ct. 206, 217, 83 L. Ed. 126 (1938)); Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1439. The court may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). Even if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's decision, the decision must be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence. Sewell v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 1065, 1067 (11th Cir. 1986).
The Act defines a disability as an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). To qualify as a disability the physical or mental impairment must be so severe that the claimant is not only unable to do her previous work, "but cannot, considering [her] age,education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." Id. § 423(d)(2)(A). Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(g),4 the Commissioner analyzes a disability claim in five steps:
1. If the claimant is performing substantial gainful activity, she is not disabled.
2. If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful activity, her impairments must be severe before she can be found disabled.
3. If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful activity and she has severe impairments that have lasted or are expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months, and if her impairments meet or medically equal the criteria of any impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, the claimant is presumed disabled without further inquiry.
4. If the claimant's impairments do not prevent her from doing her past relevant work, she is not disabled.
5. Even if the claimant's impairments prevent her from performing her past relevant work, if other work exists in significant numbers in the national economy that accommodates her RFC and vocational factors, she is not disabled.
The claimant bears the burden of establishing a severe impairment that keeps her from performing her past work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512. If the claimant establishes such an impairment, the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show the existence of other jobs in the national economy which, given the claimant's impairments, the claimant can perform. MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 1986). If the Commissioner carries this burden, the claimant must then prove she cannot perform the work suggested by the Commissioner. Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987).
Plaintiff was fifty-two years of age on February 22, 2017, the date of her hearing before the ALJ (tr. 49-50). She weighed 250 pounds and stood at five feet, four inches tall (tr. 50). She had completed the twelfth grade and obtained a Certified Nursing Assistant Certificate ("CNA") (tr. 51). She last worked in October 2014 as an office manager for a church where her duties included filing, answering phones, and performing computerized bookkeeping services such as payroll (see id.). Shetestified that she also sang, taught choir, and played piano, and she noted that she never lifted anything that weighed more than a box of paper (tr. 51-52). Plaintiff quit this employment due to issues with "sitting up all day" and "awful" migraines, as well as a controversy within the church (tr. 52). She noted that on some days in this job she could barely function and had to "stop work or go home" (tr. 55).
Prior to this employment, Plaintiff worked full-time as a praise and worship leader for about seven years (tr. 52). Her duties included gathering songs for worship and lifting props for seasonal church plays (tr. 52-53). She also previously worked as a receptionist in an attorney's office where she scheduled appointments, answered the phone, and filed documents (tr. 53). She could not remember how much she was required to lift in this position, but she recalled that she shopped for groceries and carried miscellaneous supplies to the office, including drinks (id.).
Plaintiff testified she is unable to work due to "pain" from her "head to [her] toes" which has been ongoing for "years" (tr. 54). She also noted she suffers from migraine headaches and has pain in her back, feet, shoulders...
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