Page v. Board of Com'rs of Clay County, 172A8

• Decision Date: 14 June 1972
• Docket Number: No. 172A8,172A8
• Citation: 152 Ind.App. 359,31 Ind.Dec. 310,283 N.E.2d 571
• Parties: Sherrel PAGE, Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF the COUNTY OF CLAY, Appellee (Defendant Below).
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 571

283 N.E.2d 571

152 Ind.App. 359

Sherrel PAGE, Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF the COUNTY OF CLAY, Appellee (Defendant Below).

No. 172A8.

Court of Appeals of Indiana, Second District.

June 14, 1972.

B. Michael McCormick, Daniel L. Weber, Terre Haute, for appellant.

Joseph A. Wicker, Indianapolis, Robert J. Wicker, Greenwood, for appellee; Williams, Van Valer & Wicker, Greenwood, of counsel.

BUCHANAN, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS--Review is sought from a decision of the Full Industrial Board of Indiana (the Board) concerning a Form 14 Application (Review of an award due to change in conditions) filed by claimant-appellant Sherrel Page (Page). The Board reduced the award granted Page by the Single Member Hearing Examiner.

The findings and award of the Board consist of the following:

'BE IT REMEMBERED that pursuant to notice fixing the time and place therefor, the above-captioned cause was called for hearing and review before The Full Industrial Board of Indiana in the Hearing Room of said Board at 601 State Office Building, 100 North Senate Avenue, Indianapolis, Marion County, Indiana, on October 27, 1971, at 1:00 o'clock p.m., on Defendant's Form 16 Application for the Review by the Full Board of the Original Award, filed on the 12th day of April, 1971.

Plaintiff appeared by his attorney, B. Michael McCormick, Terre Haute, Indiana. Defendant appeared by its attorney, Joseph A. Wicker, Indianapolis, Indiana.

Said Full Industrial Board of Indiana, having heard the oral arguments of Counsel and having examined the entire filed and being duly advised in the premises herein, now finds:

That on the 4th day of January, 1966, the Plaintiff herein was in the employ of the Defendant herein at an average weekly wage in excess of the maximum; that on said date, he substained personal injury by reason of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with Defendant, of which said accidental injury the Defendant had knowledge and did furnish and pay for the statutory medical attention and supplies; that Plaintiff's said accidental injury consisted of an injury to his back, left foot, right leg, right hip; that thereafter, on the 17th day of March, 1966, the Industrial Board of Indiana approved a compensation agreement entered into by the parties, under the terms of which Defendant paid Plaintiff compensation for temporary total disability at the rate of $45.00 per week for a period of five and one-seventh (5 1/7) weeks, from January 5, 1966 to February 9, 1966, after which Plaintiff's temporary total disability as a result of his said accidental injury terminated and he returned to work; that prior to the filing of Plaintiff's application, a good faith effort was made by the parties to adjust said claim, which effort resulted in a disagreement between the parties.

It is further found that Plaintiff's said accidental injury has reached a permanent and quiescent state and that as a result of his said accidental injury, he has sustained a ten per cent (10%) permanent partial impairment to the man as a whole.

Said Full Industrial Board of Indiana now finds for the Plaintiff and against the Defendant on Plaintiff's Form 14 Application for the Review of Award on Account of a Change in Conditions, filed on the 29th day of December, 1967.

AWARD

IT IS, THEREFORE, CONSIDERED, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED by the Full Industrial Board of Indiana that there be awarded Plaintiff as against the Defendant compensation at the rate of $45.00 per week beginning January 4, 1966, for a specific period of fifty (50) weeks, for a ten per cent (10%) permanent partial impairment to the man as a whole as a result of his said accidental injury.

It is further ordered that all deferred payments of compensation shall be brought up to date, paid in cash and in a lump sum.

It is further ordered that Defendant shall pay the costs, if any, taxed in said cause.

It is further ordered that the fee of Plaintiff's attorney shall be: a minimum filing fee of $25.00; and in addition thereto, 20% upon the first $1,000.00 recovered; 15% upon the second and third $1,000.00 recovered; and 10% upon all sums in excess thereof, said fees to be paid by Defendant direct to Plaintiff's attorney, B. Michael McCormick, with credit to the defendant against the compensation awarded Plaintiff in accordance with this award.'

ISSUE--For reasons that hereinafter appear, we cannot decide this case on the merits and only consider whether the findings of fact by the Board are specific enough to enable this court to intelligently review the Board's decision.

DECISION--It is our opinion that this case must be remanded to the Board for further findings of fact because the findings before us are not specific enough to enable this court to intelligently review the Board's decision.

Our Supreme Court and this court have repeatedly held that the ultimate facts upon which an administrative agency bases its decision must be found specifically, and not generally. Carlton v. Board of Zoning Appeals (1969), 252 Ind. 56, 245 N.E.2d 337; Transport Motor Express, Inc. v. Smith (Ind.App.1972), 279 N.E.2d 262; Robinson v. Twigg Industries, Inc. (Ind.App.1972), 281 N.E.2d 135; Johnson v. Thomas & Skinner, Inc. (Ind.App.1972), 282 N.E.2d 346.

This court has in recent months repeatedly ¹ stressed the need for specificity in findings of fact by the Industrial Board. In Johnson v. Thomas & Skinner, Inc., supra, we stressed the relationship between meaningful appellate review and specific findings of facts thusly:

'* * * the Full Industrial Board should have made findings of fact from which it would be apparent whether the plaintiff-appellant was within the exception of § 48. These findings should have been 'specific enough to permit this court intelligently to review said award.' Transport Motor Express, Ind. v. Smith (1972), Ind.App., 279 N.E.2d 262, 266, 29 Ind.Dec. 417, 422; Robinson v. Twigg Industries, Inc. (1972), Ind.App., 281 N.E.2d 135, Ind.Dec. If the board had made proper findings from which it was apparent that plaintiff was not within the exception he claimed (and if those findings proved impervious to attack for want of evidentiary support) then no additional findings...