Page v. Mitchell

• Decision Date: 27 October 1864
• Citation: 13 Mich. 63
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: Stephen F. Page v. William W. Mitchell

13 Mich. 63

Stephen F. Page v. William W. Mitchell

Supreme Court of Michigan

October 27, 1864

Heard October 8, 1864 [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material]

Error to Ionia circuit.

This was an action for false imprisonment. Plea, the general issue with notice of matter in justification.

The case was tried by a jury, who returned a verdict for the plaintiff and assessed him damages at one dollar. The facts were substantially as follows:

On the 26th day of April, 1862, A. F. Bell made complaint before the defendant, who was a justice of the peace, against one Giles B. Conkey, for selling liquor in violation of law, and asked for a subpoena for witnesses to support the complaint. The defendant accordingly issued a subpoena for the plaintiff which was subsequently duly served upon him, and in obedience to which he appeared before the defendant and was sworn; but upon being asked by the prosecuting attorney whether he knew anything about Conkey's selling liquor, he refused to answer, and, persisting in such refusal, he was committed by the defendant to the county jail for contempt. Immediately after the plaintiff was delivered at the jail, he was permitted to go away, but he voluntarily returned in a short time, and remained there in custody for eighteen days. The sheriff, during the whole period of his confinement permitted the plaintiff in the day-time, to occupy his family sitting-room, or parlor, which was in a portion of the building used as a jail. At night he slept in one of the cells which had been fitted up and occupied by some members of the jailor's family as a sleeping apartment. He was not locked into a cell, but at all times, day or night, had free access to the sitting-room and other portions of the house and yard, but was forbidden to go outside of the yard. He took his meals regularly at the jailor's family table.

It was also shown that the plaintiff, before he was subpoenaed as a witness in support of the complaint, voluntarily appeared before the defendant and insisted upon being sworn in the matter; and that he again appeared, and demanded to know why he had not been subpoenaed, and insisted that the matter should be attended to at once; and that he sought, in various ways, to cause himself to be subpoenaed to testify in the matter.

There was also testimony tending to prove special damages to the plaintiff for his time, fees of officers and attorneys, and money actually expended in and about getting his liberty, of about two hundred dollars.

The court charged the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to a verdict, for the reason that the defendant had no right to issue the warrant of commitment, and that, if they found that, by virtue of the warrant issued by the defendant, the plaintiff was taken to the common jail of the county, and there confined in the jail portion of the building, according to the exigencies of said writ, then they would find the defendant guilty, and the plaintiff entitled to the special damages which he had proved, in addition to such general damages as in their judgment they should see fit to give under the evidence. On the other hand, if they should find that the plaintiff, by his own acts, procured the imprisonment complained of by procuring himself to be subpoenaed for the purpose of showing his contempt for the law, or for any other unlawful purpose, then it would be proper for them to take these facts into consideration in estimating the general damages; or if, from the evidence, they found that the plaintiff was not confined in that portion of the building used for a jail, during any part of the time he was there, but was allowed to occupy the jailor's sitting-room, parlor, dining-room, and any part of his house and yard at his pleasure, then they would find that the jailor did not execute the process as he was commanded, and that the defendant was only liable for the arrest and conveyance of the plaintiff to the jail. And under such circumstances, if they found that the defendant acted in good faith, the damages should be only nominal, that is to say, sufficient to pay the plaintiff for his time while he was being arrested and taken to jail.

To this charge the plaintiff excepted.

Judgment reversed with costs, and a new trial granted.

Theodore Romeyn, for plaintiff:

The complaint of Mr. Bell, on which the defendant, as justice of the peace, issued the warrant against Giles B. Conkey, was confessedly insufficient to give jurisdiction: In the matter of Morton, 10 Mich. 208.

The plaintiff was in fact confined to the jail. It was a close confinement within the meaning of the statute: Compiled Laws, § 3918.

The jail extends to all within the walls, and the inclosures appurtenant to it as a jail. The jail is one thing, the cells within it another, and the limits, or liberties, still another: Comp. Laws, §§ 315, 316, 342; also, §§ 6129, 6131.

This certainly is not the kind of confinement required in a case of contempt. See §§ 416, 5548, 5550, 5569.

In view of these provisions, we contend that the whole of the county buildings, with its inclosed yard, is, under the statute, the jail, and that confinement in it is close confinement in jail.

And this is so at common law: Benton v. Sutton, 1 Bos. and Pul., 24; Wool v. Turner, 10 John. 420; Bartlett v. Willis, et al., 3 Mass. 86; Partridge v. Emerson et al., 9 Mass. 122; Steere v. Field, 2 Mason 486; Burns v. Brian, 1 Speer's S. C., 131; J. J. Abbott's Digest, p. 572.

But if the plaintiff was not subjected to the full measure and degree of imprisonment specified in the order of commitment, he was yet arrested and confined under and by virtue of it; to the extent specified in the case, and the defendant is liable for such trespass.

It was a trespass ab initio, and all concerned are liable as joint trespassers: Bigelow v. Stearns, 19 John. 39; Guille v. Swan, 19 John. 381.

The defendant, having erred in issuing the process, became liable to pay the plaintiff, at least, the latter's expenditure in getting rid of the duress: Allison v. Chandler, 11 Mich. 550.

T. M. Cooley, for defendant:

1st. If the action of the defendant provoked the wrong complained of he is not entitled to the same measure of damages as the peaceful citizen, who is attacked without provocation, and suffers an injury for which he is in no degree blamable: Cushman v. Ryan, 1 Story 99; Avery v. Ray, 1 Mass. 12; Lee v. Woolsey, 19...