Paidle v. Hestad
| Decision Date | 10 June 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 3--1274A197,3--1274A197 |
| Citation | 348 N.E.2d 678,169 Ind.App. 370 |
| Parties | Joseph PAIDLE and Monica Paidle, Appellants-Defendants, v. Jane Marie HESTAD, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Roland Obenchain, Robert W. Mysliwiec, South Bond, for appellants-defendants.
Robert D. Lee, Andrew W. Nickle, South Bend, for appellee-plaintiff.
Mary Paidle held title to certain real estate in St. Joseph County, Indiana before she died intestate on September 12, 1952. Thereafter, her two children, Ann Varga Monroe and Joseph Paidle, Jr., held the real estate as cotenants. Later, February 7, 1969, Ann Varga Monroe died testate leaving her interest in the real estate to her daughter, Jane Marie Hestad. A partition suit was filed by June Marie Hestad, and the trial court ordered the real estate sold. The order further provided that Joseph Paidle and his wife account for all 'rents, profits and economic benefit which they have received from possession of said real estate since the 12th day of September, 1952.' This accounting was submitted, and the real estate was sold.
Before the proceeds from the real estate sale were distributed, Joseph Paidle and his wife filed a 'petition for incidental relief' which sought contributions from Jane Marie Hestad for taxes paid and improvements. Later, Hestad Filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted by the trial court. Summary judgment was granted upon the supposition that Paidles' claim was barred by their failure to file a claim against the estate of Ann Varga Monroe. IC 1971, 29--1--14--1(a) (Burns Code Ed.).
Paidles contend in their appeal to this Court that their failure to file a claim against the estate of Ann Varga Monroe does not bar an equitable lien upon the proceeds from a partition sale. IC 1971, 29--1--14--1(e) (Burns Code Ed.). We agree and we reverse.
The pertinent sections of IC 1971, 29--1--14--1 (Burns Code Ed.) provided: 1
'(a) All claims against a decedent's estate, other than expenses of administration and claims of the United States, and of the state and any subdivision thereof, whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract or otherwise, shall be forever barred against the estate, the personal representative, the heirs, devisees and legatees of the decedent, unless filed with the court in which such estate is being administered witnin six (6) months after the date of the first published notice to creditors.
'(e) Nothing in this section shall affect or prevent any action or proceeding to enforce any mortgage, pledge or other lien upon property of the estate.'
A claim for the purpose of the Probate Code has been defined as:
'a debt or demand of a pecuniary nature which could have been enforced against the decedent in his lifetime and could have been reduced to a simple money judgment.' Vonderahe v. Ortman (1958), 128 Ind.App. 381, 387, 146 N.E.2d 822, 825.
A claim agaimst the estate must be filed to participate in the personal assets of the estate, but liens continue against real estate unless discharged by decree or payment. E.g., Beach v. Bell (1894), 139 Ind. 167, 38 N.E. 819.
The determination of whether the right to contribution is a lien or a claim depends upon a consideration of the nature of the interest of a tenant in common. Each tenant in common is seized per my et pet tout, that is, each holds title to the whole estate until all equities relating to the tenancy are adjusted. In Andrews v. Harris (1957), 127 Ind.App. 352, 356--57, 141 N.E.2d 761, 763--64, the Court stated:
'Thompson, in his exhaustive work on Real Property, Vol. 4, § 2004, p. 526, says:
'There is much authority for the doctrine that each tenant in common has an equitable line upon the share of his cotenant until all equities relating to the tenancy are adjusted; or, in other words, while each tenant is vested with the title to his own undivided interest in the common estate, he holds a contingent interest in the entire estate until partition is made and accounts are settled.'
Clearly, amounts paid by Paidle to discharge the lien of taxes against the real estate is properly considered to be a lien against the interest of cotenant Hestad to the extent of her one-half interest in the property. In Moon v. Jennings (1889), 119 Ind. 130, 134, 20 N.E. 748, 750, the Court stated:
'(B)ut the true rule, as upheld by the weight of authority, is, that where one tenant in common pays off a lien against the joint property, he is entitled to contribution from his co-tenants to the extent of their respective interests, and a court of equity, to secure such contribution, will enforce upon the interests of the co-tenants an equitable lien of the same character as that which has been removed . . ..'
The fact that Paidle could have brought an action to enforce contribution for taxes paid during the lifetime of Ann Varga Monroe, see Eads v. Retherford (1888), 114 Ind. 273, 16 N.E. 587; Geisendorff v. Cobbs (1911), 47 Ind.App. 573, 94 N.e. 236, and could have filed a claim for the amount of taxes paid...
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Carlyle v. Jaskiewicz
...to equitable liens for contribution (see, e.g., Burkholder v. Burkholder (1956), 10 Ill.App.2d 565, 135 N.E.2d 504; Paidle v. Hestad (1976), 169 Ind.App. 370, 348 N.E.2d 678); however, cases so holding are irrelevant under the facts of this case, since the property did not pass to plaintiff......
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...adjustments to cotenants' equal shares are allowed when the cotenants hold the property as tenants in common, Paidle v. Hestad (1976), 169 Ind.App. 370, 348 N.E.2d 678, not when they hold as joint tenants. The deed in the case before us unequivocally states that the parties held the propert......