Paige v. Maine Employment Sec. Commission

• Decision Date: 06 September 1978
• Citation: 391 A.2d 321
• Parties: Ottielee J. PAIGE v. MAINE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 321

391 A.2d 321

Ottielee J. PAIGE v. MAINE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Sept. 6, 1978.

Sunenblick, Fontaine & Reben by Donald F. Fontaine (orally), Portland, for plaintiff.

Patricia M. McDonough (orally), Asst. Atty. Gen., Augusta, for defendant.

Before McKUSICK, C. J., and POMEROY, WERNICK, ARCHIBALD, DELAHANTY, GODFREY and NICHOLS, JJ.

POMEROY, Justice.

This appeal arises from a claim for unemployment benefits brought by appellant.

Ms. Paige had been employed for about a year as a "House supervisor " in an extended care facility for retarded adults run by her employer, Abilities and Goodwill, Inc. (Goodwill). Her duties included teaching and attending to the "Clients " as well as various household chores. Within three months of her transfer in March of 1976 to another, similar facility also run by Goodwill, Ms. Paige resigned.

After her resignation, Ms. Paige sought unemployment benefits from the Portland office of the Maine Department of Manpower Affairs. A deputy of that office determined that Ms. Paige was disqualified from receiving benefits from June 5, 1976 to August 28, 1976, or until she had earned $600, whichever occurred first. That determination was based on a finding that she had left her employment voluntarily without good cause related to her employment. See 26 M.R.S.A. § 1193(1)(A) (1964).

Ms. Paige appealed that decision to an appeal examiner within the Department. After a hearing, the examiner also concluded that benefits should be denied and affirmed the decision of the deputy. Ms. Paige thereupon appealed to the Maine Employment Security Commission, (Commission) which in turn affirmed the decision of the appeals examiner.

Following rejection of her appeal by the Commission, Ms. Paige instituted this suit in the Superior Court, Kennebec County, pursuant to 26 M.R.S.A. § 1194(9) (1964) and Rule 80B, M.R.Civ.P. From an adverse decision in the Superior Court, Ms. Paige appeals.

We sustain the appeal.

After the hearing before the appeal examiner, he made the following factual findings: 1. that the conditions of work in the facility to which Ms. Paige had been transferred "Had not changed "; 2. that Ms. Paige had "Condoned " the conditions at the second facility for three months; 3. that her fear that remaining on the job would endanger her health and welfare was unfounded; and 4. that there was no abnormal risk presented by her job to her health and safety. Accordingly, the examiner held that Ms. Paige had left her job "Voluntarily without good cause attributable to her employment." The examiner further found that she "May have good personal reasons for leaving, but such leaving is not attributable to the employment or the employer, within the meaning of Sections 1193-1 and 1221-3 of the Employment Security Law." These findings were later adopted by the Commission.

Ms. Paige now contends that these findings were not supported by credible evidence and that the facts clearly demonstrate that she had "Good cause " for resigning within the meaning of 26 M.R.S.A. § 1193 (1964). She also contends that the Commission failed to make all the necessary findings of fact and did not fulfill its duty to develop a full and complete record.

We find Ms. Paige's initial contention dispositive and, therefore, need not reach her second argument.

26 M.R.S.A. § 1193(1)(A) provided at the time Ms. Paige appeared before the Commission that:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

1. Voluntarily leaves work.

A. For the week in which he left his regular employment Voluntarily without good cause attributable to such employment, or to a claimant who has voluntarily removed himself from the labor market where presently employed to an area where employment opportunity is less frequent, if so found by the commission, and disqualification shall continue for 12 weeks immediately following such week or until claimant has earned 8 times his weekly benefit amount whichever occurs first. Leaving work shall not be considered voluntary without good cause when it is caused by the illness or disability of the claimant and the claimant took all reasonable precautions to protect his employment status by having promptly notified his employer as to the reason for his absence and by promptly requesting reemployment when he is again able to resume employment; (later amended by P.L.1977, c. 472, §§ 1-2) (emphasis added)

At the hearing before the appeal examiner Ms. Paige testified that the causes of her dissatisfaction with her employment following her transfer to the second facility were, in essence, her irregular working hours and the violence of the "clients" under her supervision. In regard to the working hours, Ms. Paige testified that she generally worked a 40-44 hour week. She rarely, however, had weekends off, despite the fact that she claimed that she had been originally told that she would have some weekends to herself. In fact, she was given Sundays off only after complaining to Mr. Tank, the Rehabilitation Director. Moreover, Ms. Paige alleged that at least once a week she was required to work a double shift with only a few hours of rest in a 24-hour period. She also complained of having to attend frequent staff meetings at inconvenient times, for which she was compensated, only after complaining to her supervisor.

In regard to the violence of the "clients", Ms. Paige testified that one "client" had threatened to kill her and that another had tried to kiss her while restraining her physically. She also testified that she was aware of similar acts of violence directed at both employees and "clients" of the facility. Finally, there was testimony to the effect that most of the people who had worked with her had quit at the same time; that she had been replaced by a male supervisor who, allegedly, could control the "clients" better; that her doctor had told her that her health might suffer because of her employment; and that, although she had complained to her supervisors on several occasions, nothing had been done to change the working conditions.

It is important to note that Ms. Paige's testimony stands uncontradicted and, corroborated, at least in part, by a fellow employee.

In examining the sufficiency of evidence to support factual findings by the Maine Employment Security Commission, we are guided by the principle that the findings of the Commission will be upheld if they are supported by any...