Paige v. Town Plan and Zoning Com'n of Town of Fairfield

• Decision Date: 21 November 1995
• Docket Number: No. 15092,15092
• Citation: 668 A.2d 340,235 Conn. 448
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Anthony J. PAIGE et al. v. TOWN PLAN AND ZONING COMMISSION OF the TOWN OF FAIRFIELD et al.

Page 340

668 A.2d 340

235 Conn. 448

Anthony J. PAIGE et al. v. TOWN PLAN AND ZONING COMMISSION OF the TOWN OF FAIRFIELD et al.

No. 15092.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Sept. 29, 1995.

Decided Nov. 21, 1995.

Frederic S. Ury, with whom, on the brief, was Candace D. Paige, for appellants (plaintiffs).

Roy H. Ervin, with whom was Roy H. Ervin, Jr., for appellee (named defendant).

John F. Fallon, for appellee (defendant Fairfield University).

Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General, and Janet P. Brooks, Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for the commissioner of environmental protection as amicus curiae.

Michael Stern filed a brief for the Connecticut Fund for the Environment, Inc., et al., as amici curiae.

Before CALLAHAN, BORDEN, BERDON, KATZ and PALMER, JJ.

KATZ, Associate Justice.

The sole issue on appeal is whether trees and wildlife, independent of whether they have economic value, fall within the term "natural resources" as it is used in General Statutes § 22a-19(a) and (b). ¹

The record discloses the following undisputed facts. In July, 1991, the defendant Fairfield University (university) filed with the defendant Fairfield town plan and zoning commission (commission) an application to resubdivide a 13.41 acre wooded site into forty building lots along with an application for a special permit to excavate and fill the land. The plaintiffs, Anthony J. Paige and Candace D. Paige, who are property owners of lots that adjoin the subject property, filed a notice of intervention on behalf of the environment in accordance with § 22a-19(a). They asserted a claim that approval of the application would have an adverse impact on the environment and that, therefore, the university was required to file alternative plans for the commission's consideration. ² Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that because development of the subdivision would require clear-cutting of the subject acreage, the development would likely cause unreasonable pollution, impairment or destruction of the public trust in the air, water, wildlife and other natural resources of the state. Without expressly indicating (1) whether it had determined that natural resources were involved, (2) whether development of the subdivision would cause unreasonable pollution, impairment or destruction of those resources, or (3) whether alternative plans were necessary, the commission approved the university's applications subject to twenty conditions. ³

Following the commission's approval of the applications, the plaintiffs appealed to the trial court pursuant to General Statutes § 8-8(b). ⁴ They claimed that as a result of the university's plan to clear-cut 13.4 acres of wooded area, the natural resources, in specific, the trees and wildlife that inhabit that area, would be destroyed. According to the plaintiffs, the commission acted "illegally, arbitrarily and in abuse of its discretion ... by approving the ... [a]pplication without considering the proposed development's unreasonable destruction of a natural resource and by failing to consider feasible and prudent alternatives."

The trial court held that trees and wildlife are not natural resources under § 22a-19(a) and that, consequently, the commission was not obligated to comply with § 22a-19(b). In reaching that conclusion, the trial court relied on our decision involving agricultural land in Red Hill Coalition, Inc. v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission, 212 Conn. 727, 563 A.2d 1347 (1989). Additionally, the trial court reasoned that, in the absence of a clear legislative direction either in the language of § 22a-19 or in its legislative history, it would refrain from considering trees and wildlife as natural resources because to do otherwise "would potentially be requiring the consideration of alternatives pursuant to General Statutes § 22a-19(b) for every subdivision application in the state." Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal. We note that because the trial court determined that natural resources were not involved here, and, therefore, that § 22a-19(b) did not apply, it had no occasion to review the record in order to decide whether the commission had considered the plaintiffs' claim that the subdivision unreasonably would impact adversely the natural resources of the state.

The plaintiffs petitioned the Appellate Court for certification to appeal. Following its grant of that petition, the Appellate Court held, as a matter of law, that to be a "natural resource" under § 22a-19(a), property must have economic value. Paige v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission, 35 Conn.App. 646, 651, 646 A.2d 277 (1994). Because the term "natural resource" was not specifically defined in § 22a-19(a) or (b) to include trees and wildlife, a majority of the Appellate Court construed the term using standard tools of statutory construction to ascertain the legislative intent. The court ultimately adopted a narrow definition of natural resources from Black's Law Dictionary. The court defined the term as " '[a]ny material in its native state which when extracted has economic value. Timberland, oil and gas wells, ore deposits, and other products of nature that have economic value.' " (Emphasis added.) Id., at 651, 646 A.2d 277, quoting Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed.1990). Economic value from tourism and research was also included in the definition. Id., at 653, 646 A.2d 277.

In reviewing the record of the proceedings before the commission to ascertain whether that body could have concluded as a matter of fact that the trees and wildlife had any economic value, the Appellate Court remarked that there had been "no evidence that the subdivision area had economic value. To the contrary, the testimony at the hearing indicated that the area contained absolutely no endangered or rare trees and wildlife that would cause the property to have economic value in tourism and research. Further, the testimony revealed that the property serves no other useful productive use causing the property to have economic value." Id. Accordingly, the Appellate Court held that because they had no proven economic value, the trees and wildlife were not natural resources under § 22a-19(a). Id. Therefore, the court concluded that § 22a-19(b), which would have required the university to propose and the commission to consider feasible alternatives to the subdivision project, did not apply and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

We granted the plaintiffs' petition for certification limited to the following question: "In the circumstances of this case, did trees and wildlife on the property of the defendant university fall within 'natural resources' as that term is used in General Statutes § 22a-19(a) and (b), so as to require the defendant commission expressly to consider the possible environmental impact of a proposed subdivision plan?" Paige v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission, 231 Conn. 934, 649 A.2d 256 (1994). Because we disagree that the determination of whether property is a natural resource depends on a factual determination that the property has economic value and instead conclude that trees and wildlife are natural resources regardless of their economic value, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court and remand the case for consideration by the trial court on the question of whether the commission properly applied § 22a-19.

Because § 22a-19 fails to provide a detailed definition of natural resources, we are compelled to produce a definition that reflects legislative intent using traditional tools of statutory construction. "In construing a statute, we seek to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... Vaillancourt v. New Britain Machine/Litton, 224 Conn. 382, 390, 618 A.2d 1340 (1993). In seeking to discern that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation.... State v. McVeigh, 224 Conn. 593, 607, 620 A.2d 133 (1993)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) West Hartford Interfaith Coalition, Inc. v. Town Council, 228 Conn. 498, 507-508, 636 A.2d 1342 (1994). We assume that the legislature attempts to create a consistent body of law. Zachs v. Groppo, 207 Conn. 683, 696, 542 A.2d 1145 (1988). Assuredly, "we are guided by the principle that the legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law.... Daly v. DelPonte, 225 Conn. 499, 510, 624 A.2d 876 (1993); see also Simms v. Warden, 229 Conn. 178, 187-88, 640 A.2d 601 (1994)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Derwin v. State Employees Retirement Commission, 234 Conn. 411, 420, 661 A.2d 1025 (1995). Indeed, this tenet of statutory construction requiring us to read statutes together is particularly applicable when the statutes relate to the same subject matter. Simms v. Warden, supra, at 187-88, 640 A.2d 601. Finally, "[w]e presume that the legislature had a purpose for each sentence, clause or phrase in a legislative enactment, and that it did not intend to enact meaningless provisions." Turner v. Turner, 219 Conn. 703, 713, 595 A.2d 297 (1991).

The plaintiffs argue that the narrow and restrictive definition of natural resources settled on by the Appellate Court is in derogation of the Environmental Protection Act (act); General Statutes § 22a-1 et seq.; and the applicable Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies promulgated to support its enforcement. We agree that in virtually all statutory references to natural resources, the legislature painted with a broad brush. In view of the various legislative declarations, we conclude that natural resources must be viewed "in terms of values beyond the limited economic product value ... [and that] a definition of natural resources for the purposes of § 22a-19 should not be restricted to a narrow economic product value standard, but should take into ...