Paisey v. Vitale In and For Broward County, 86-5302
| Decision Date | 23 December 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 86-5302,86-5302 |
| Citation | 807 F.2d 889 |
| Parties | 36 Ed. Law Rep. 625 Timothy PAISEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Honorable Linda L. VITALE, a Judge of the Circuit Court of the 17th Judicial Circuit In and For BROWARD COUNTY, and Nova University, Inc., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Donald Feldman, Feldman & Levy, P.A., Charles M. Levy, Miami, Fla., for plaintiff-appellant.
James A. Peters, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Legal Affairs, Tallahassee, Fla., for Vitale.
Thomas F. Panza, Panza and Maurer, Raymond O. Holton, Jr., Pyszka, Kessler, Massey, Weldon, Catri, Holton & Douberley, Fort Lauderdale, Fla., for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
Before JOHNSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and GARZA *, Senior Circuit Judge.
Appellant, Timothy Paisey, appeals the denial of his motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissal of the injunctive count of his complaint by the district court. Although we disagree with the rationale given by the district court for its decision, 634 F.Supp. 741 (1986), we affirm the district court's decision on other grounds.
Paisey was an Assistant Professor of Psychology at Appellee Nova University, Inc. ("Nova"). In January 1983, Ms. Del Pino, a student in Nova's psychology graduate program was academically dismissed. After her dismissal, Del Pino hired an attorney, Mr. Burton, who wrote a letter on her behalf to the Office of Civil Rights of the United States Department of Education ("OCR") alleging discrimination by Nova against Hispanic females and questioning the competence of Nova's faculty. This letter was written on February 24, 1983. A second letter containing similar allegations was sent to Nova's attorney, Mr. Panza, on February 25, 1983, with copies to Nova faculty members, certain administration officials, and the OCR regional office. Paisey gave Burton an affidavit that supported the letter's allegations.
On March 1, 1983, Nova filed a defamation suit in state court against Paisey, Del Pino and Burton. The action sought several million dollars in damages as well as injunctive and declaratory relief. The case was assigned to the Honorable Linda L. Vitale. Paisey and the other defendants filed complaints with the OCR alleging that Nova had filed the state lawsuit for a retaliatory purpose in violation of an anti-retaliation regulation promulgated by the Department of Education pursuant to its authority under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2000d. 1 The anti-retaliation regulation states that
No recipient or other person shall intimidate, threaten, coerce, or discriminate against any individual for the purpose of interfering with any right or privilege secured by [Sec. 2000d] or this part, or because he has made a complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing under this part.
34 C.F.R. 100.7(e). After an investigation, the regional OCR office found that Nova had filed its defamation suit for a retaliatory purpose in violation of this provision, and this finding was upheld on appeal by the main office of the OCR.
On February 22, 1985, Paisey filed an action in district court, naming as defendants Judge Vitale and Nova. The first count of the complaint asserted a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983 against Judge Vitale and sought an injunction against her continuance of the state court action. The second count of the complaint asserted a private cause of action under Title VI and the anti-retaliation regulation against Nova and sought both compensatory and punitive damages. The third count of the complaint sought damages from Nova for abuse of process. Paisey also asserted violation of the anti-retaliation provision as both an affirmative defense and a counterclaim in the state court action, although he subsequently took a voluntary dismissal of the counterclaim after Judge Vitale granted in part Nova's motion to dismiss the counterclaim.
Nova filed a motion to dismiss the federal complaint and Paisey filed a motion for a preliminary injunction against Judge Vitale's continuance of the state court action. The district court entered an order denying Paisey's motion for a preliminary injunction, granting Nova's motion to dismiss the injunctive count of the complaint and dismissing Judge Vitale as a defendant. The district court also granted the motion to dismiss with regard to Paisey's abuse of process claim against Nova, but denied that motion with regard to the count asserting a private cause of action against Nova under Title VI and the anti-retaliation regulation. Paisey filed this appeal from denial of his motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissal of the injunctive count of his complaint. He filed a separate appeal from dismissal of his abuse of process claim 2 and Nova filed an interlocutory appeal from denial of its motion to dismiss the count asserting a private cause of action under Title VI and the anti-retaliation regulation pursuant to the district court's certification of that issue for immediate appeal under 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1292(b). 3 These appeals have not been consolidated with the present appeal. Therefore, the only issue before the Court at this time is the propriety of the district court's denial of Paisey's motion for a preliminary injunction and the dismissal of his injunctive count.
The district court held that it was prohibited from issuing an injunction against Judge Vitale because of the doctrine of judicial immunity, which it construed as barring actions pursuant to Section 1983 against a judicial officer for action taken under authority of his or her office. The district court noted, however, that "[i]t is unclear from the complaint whether the plaintiff names Vitale for her role as a state official acting under color of state law for her unfavorable rulings in the state court defamation suit against Paisey or whether Paisey actually seeks to enjoin Nova from prosecuting its action in the state court." It then found that, if the complaint were construed as seeking injunctive relief against Nova, it was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2283. 4 The district court also found that the anti-retaliation regulation was not intended to preempt state court defamation actions.
Paisey argues on this appeal that the district court misconstrued the gravamen of his complaint in reaching its decision denying relief. Paisey states that he is not seeking injunctive relief against Nova, which he admits is not a party acting under color of state law. Further, he asserts that Judge Vitale is being sued "solely for acting under color of state law in entertaining the retaliatory state lawsuit" and that "[h]er section 1983 status was merely for the exercise of state judicial power, not for the manner of its exercise." (emphasis in original). Although it is not necessary to our decision, we agree with Paisey that the face of his complaint shows that he is seeking injunctive relief pursuant to Section 1983 solely against Judge Vitale because of her action in entertaining Nova's allegedly retaliatory lawsuit. Even if the complaint could be construed as asserting a Section 1983 action against Nova, however, our analysis would be the same. In either case, the issue before us is whether the district court erred in denying Paisey's motion for preliminary injunction and dismissing his Section 1983 claim when the sole basis for the claim is that a state judicial officer is entertaining Nova's retaliatory lawsuit. Although we disagree with the district court's finding that Judge Vitale was immune from suit, our answer to that question is nevertheless "no."
The district court held that Judge Vitale must be dismissed from the suit because "no civil rights cause of action can be maintained against a judicial officer for actions taken under authority of his or her office" under the doctrine of judicial immunity. This holding clearly is mistaken. While damages actions are not permitted against state judicial officers acting in their official capacities, injunctive relief is allowed. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42, 104 S.Ct. 1970, 1980-81, 80 L.Ed.2d 565 (1984). Therefore, Paisey's cause of action for injunctive relief pursuant to Section 1983 is not barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity. Nevertheless, the district court did not err in denying Paisey's motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissing the injunctive count of Paisey's complaint because Paisey has failed to state a claim for relief cognizable under Section 1983.
Section 1983 provides in pertinent part that
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983. In order to state a claim under Section 1983, the plaintiff must show that he has been deprived of a right "secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States and that, in depriving him of this right, the defendant was acting "under color of any statute" of the state. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 930, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2750, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1981); Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 1732, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978).
Paisey alleges in his complaint that actions of Judge Vitale are under color of state law and are proscribed activity when "read in pari materia with 34 C.F.R. 100.7(e) implementing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." As discussed above, the gravamen of his...
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