Pak v. Hoang

• Citation: 835 A.2d 1185,378 Md. 315
• Decision Date: 18 November 2003
• Docket Number: No. 14,14
• Parties: Ho PAK and Lisa Leone Pak, v. Minh-Vu HOANG.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland

835 A.2d 1185

378 Md. 315

Ho PAK and Lisa Leone Pak, v. Minh-Vu HOANG.

No. 14, Sept. Term, 2003.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

November 18, 2003.

Carlos M. Recio (Davis & Campbell, L.L.C., on brief), of Washington, D.C., for petitioners.

Fredric J. Einhorn of Rockville, for respondents.

Argued before BELL, C.J., ELDRIDGE,¹ RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL and BATTAGLIA, JJ.

CATHELL, Judge.

This case arises out of a landlord and tenant dispute. In December of 1999, Minh Vu Hoang, respondent, filed a complaint in the District Court of Maryland sitting in Montgomery County, against Ho and Lisa Pak, petitioners, seeking $25,000.00 in damages for a breach of lease. Petitioners were tenants in a townhouse owned by respondent.²

Petitioners prayed a jury trial and the case was transferred to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. Petitioners then filed counterclaims alleging that respondent had breached the lease and had not returned their security deposit in violation of the Maryland Security Deposit Act, Md. Code (1974, 2003 Repl.Vol.), § 8-203 of the Real Property Article.³ In July of 2000, the Circuit Court granted petitioners' Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissed with prejudice respondent's claim and entered judgment against respondent as to petitioners' counterclaims. On October 31, 2000, after a damages hearing, the Circuit Court entered a judgment of $7,378.91 in favor of petitioners. This sum included petitioners' attorney's fees up to that point.

Petitioners then filed post-judgment discovery motions in an effort to aid in their recovery of the judgment against respondent, to which there was no response. Petitioners then filed a Motion to Compel Answers to Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents in Aid of Execution. In an order dated May 23, 2001, the Circuit Court granted the motion. Petitioners thereafter filed a Petition for Civil Contempt and for the Entry of Appropriate Relief on July 23, 2001, in response to respondent's failure to comply with the Circuit Court's May 23rd order. Following a September 20, 2001 hearing, the Circuit Court entered another order directing respondent to fully and completely respond to the interrogatories and request for documents. A compliance review hearing was set for October 29, 2001. After respondent failed to appear at the October 29th hearing, the Circuit Court issued a writ of body attachment for respondent's arrest. Respondent was arrested and released on her own recognizance.

On December 6, 2001, there was a hearing in the Circuit Court on petitioners' Petition for Civil Contempt. The court found respondent in civil contempt and sanctioned respondent with 30 days of incarceration subject to a purge provision, i.e., respondent could purge the contempt with her complete compliance with the court's order regarding petitioners' Motion to Compel Answers to Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents in Aid of Execution. The Court set a compliance hearing for January 14, 2002. On December 6, 2001, petitioners filed a Motion for Supplemental Award of Attorney's Fees from respondent.

Respondent paid the original judgment and all interest then due on January 11, 2002, one business day before the compliance hearing was to take place, by delivering a check to petitioners' counsel. At the January 14th hearing, the court noted that the supplemental attorney's fees motion was outstanding and set a final hearing on that motion for February 15, 2002. The Circuit Court denied petitioners' Motion for a Supplemental Award of Attorney's Fees and a final order was issued on August 23, 2002.

Petitioners appealed that decision to the Court of Special Appeals. The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion issued on January 21, 2003, affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court.

Petitioners then filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with this Court, and, on May 7, 2003, we granted the petition. Pak v. Hoang, 374 Md. 358, 822 A.2d 1224 (2003). Petitioners present four questions for our review:

"I.

Whether the Circuit Court has the authority to award supplemental attorney's fees pursuant to the Maryland Rules where a judgment debtor has willfully violated court orders and has been found in contempt.

II.

Whether the Circuit Court has the power to award supplemental attorney's fees pursuant to a court's inherent powers as recognized in Klupt v. Krongard, 126 Md.App. 179, 728 A.2d 727 (1999).

III.

Whether the Circuit Court has the authority to award supplemental attorney's fees incident to its contempt powers.

IV.

Whether the Circuit Court has the authority to award supplemental attorney's fees pursuant to the Maryland Security Deposit Act, Maryland Code Real Estate, § 8-203, and to enforce a judgment entered pursuant to that Act."⁴

We answer petitioners' fourth question in the affirmative and hold that pursuant to the Maryland Security Deposit Act the Circuit Court has the authority to award attorney's fees earned in enforcing a judgment rendered under that statute and has the authority to award attorney's fees in respect to appeals defending any such judgment. Attorney's fees earned in the filing of post-judgment motions and appeals fit within § 8-203(e)(4)'s phrase "reasonable attorney's fees" of the remedial Maryland Security Deposit Act. The trial courts have discretion to award such fees. As we reverse on petitioners' fourth question, we need not address the remaining questions. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.

I. The Trial Court's Decision

On February 15, 2002, at the hearing on petitioners' Motion for Supplemental Award of Attorney's Fees, the trial court stated:

"I think that [respondent's] conduct is reprehensible. I think that she really has done whatever she could to throw roadblocks in the way of the other side. I think that she has defied the orders of this court. She has done a lot of things that I take a very dim view of, and I think that she ought not get away with those things.

"My problem, however, is that this was a judgment which was entered against her. She did everything she could to avoid complying with the discovery to aid in the enforcement of that judgment, but ultimately she did pay the amount of that judgment.

"The contempt finding ... was a contempt finding with regard to the discovery that was intended to help enforce the judgment.

"It seems to me that once the amount of that judgment is paid, that the thrust of that—the contempt finding disappears.

...

"So, as much as, in fairness, I would like to go ahead and impose a sanction for that contempt ... I don't think it would be enforceable.

"... I wish there were a greater sanction than that that could be imposed on her. I don't feel that I can.

"There is also a request that has been made for supplemental attorney's fees under the security deposit statute, and my reading of that statute is that the attorney's fees that were awarded at the time are really the only attorney's fees you can get.

"... I don't read the statute to say that you can go back and award supplemental attorney's fees later when you have difficulty enforcing the judgment that was entered the first time.

"So, I'm not going to award supplemental attorney's fees, and I am not going to impose any part of the 30 days [jail sentence] which I believe Judge Rupp had imposed.

"I regret that I am not going to do either one of those things, because I think in fairness [respondent] probably deserves them, but I work within the statutes and the rules I have to work with and that is where I come out." [Alterations added.]

II. Discussion

The determinative issue on review in this case is whether courts have the authority to award attorney's fees pursuant to the Maryland Security Deposit Act (the Act), specifically under § 8-203(e)(4), which are earned after a judgment has been rendered in the trial court and in pursuit of collection of that judgment. We hold that the remedial nature of the Maryland Security Deposit Act permits a trial court to award post-judgment attorney's fees under the Act in order to ensure full vindication of tenants' rights to recover security deposits owed to them as contemplated by the statute.

A. Standard of Review

When we interpret statutes, this Court has annunciated that the " `paramount goal ... is to identify and effectuate the legislative intent underlying the statute at issue.' " Moore v. Miley, 372 Md. 663, 677, 814 A.2d 557, 566 (2003)(quoting Derry v. State, 358 Md. 325, 335, 748 A.2d 478, 483 (2000)). We may ascertain the legislative intent of a statute by analyzing its plain language and by considering its context within the statutory scheme as a whole. Moore, 372 Md. at 677, 814 A.2d at 566; see also In re Mark M., 365 Md. 687, 711, 782 A.2d 332, 346 (2001)

. Where "`the words of a statute, construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning,' we `will give effect to the statute as it is written.'" Moore, 372 Md. at 677,

814 A.2d at 566 (quoting Jones v. State, 336 Md. 255, 261, 647 A.2d 1204, 1206-07 (1994)). In discerning the legislative intent where the statutory language is ambiguous, however, we look beyond the statute's plain language. Moore, 372 Md. at 677,

814 A.2d at 566; see also In re Mark M., 365 Md. at 711, 782 A.2d at 346. If a statute's language is found to be ambiguous, then it is appropriate to analyze the legislative history and other relevant factors, such as "a bill's title and function paragraphs, amendments... and other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal," which may reveal the intent or general purpose of the statute. Moore, 372 Md. at 677,

814 A.2d at 566 (quoting In re Anthony R., 362 Md. 51, 58, 763 A.2d 136, 140 (2000)(internal citation omitted)). The Court must be careful, however, to avoid a "[c]onstruction of a statute which is unreasonable, illogical, unjust, or inconsistent with...