Palacios v. Cnty. of San Diego
| Decision Date | 22 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 20-cv-450-MMA (DEB) |
| Parties | MARIA PALACIOS, individually and as successor in interest to her deceased son, Ivan Ortiz, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT COUNTY'S MOTION TO DISMISS; (2) GRANTING DEFENDANTS GORE, FRIERSON, AND PATRONS' MOTION TO DISMISS; AND (3) GRANTING DEFENDANT LEE'S MOTION TO DISMISS
On March 10, 2020, Plaintiff Maria Palacios ("Plaintiff") filed a Complaint individually and as successor in interest to her deceased son, Ivan Ortiz ("Ortiz"), against Defendants County of San Diego ("County"), William Gore ("Gore"), Erika Frierson ("Frierson"), San Diego County Sheriff's Department Chief Medical Officer ("Chief Medical Officer"), Barbara Ann V. Lee ("Lee"), Rosa Patron ("Patron"), and "Currently Unknown San Diego County Sheriff's Department Personnel" ("Unknown Department Personnel") (collectively, "Defendants"). See Doc. No. 1 ("Compl.").1 Plaintiff alleges ten causes of action: (1) violation of Ortiz's Fourteenth Amendment right to adequate medical care under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) municipal liability against the County pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213; (4) violation of California's Unruh Civil Rights Act ("Unruh Act"), California Civil Code §§ 51, 52; (5) violation of California's Disabled Persons Act ("CDPA"), California Civil Code §§ 54-55.32; (6) negligence; (7) negligent hiring, retention, and supervision; (8) violation of Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment right to familial companionship under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (9) wrongful death under California Code of Civil Procedure § 377.60; and (10) intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Compl. ¶¶ 82-180.
Three motions to dismiss are before the Court. Defendant County moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Doc. No. 3. Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion, and the County replied. See Doc. Nos. 6, 7. Defendants Gore, Frierson, and Patron also move to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Doc. No. 13. Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion, and Defendants Gore, Frierson, and Patron replied. See Doc. Nos. 15, 19. Defendant Lee further moves to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Doc. No. 16. Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion, and Defendant Lee replied. See Doc. Nos. 21, 22. The Court found the matters suitable for determination on the papers and without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. See Doc. Nos. 8, 20, 23. It does not appear that Defendant Chief Medical Officer has been served or has otherwise made an appearance.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendant County's motion to dismiss; GRANTS Defendants Gore, Frierson, and Patron's motion to dismiss; and GRANTS Defendant Lee's motion to dismiss.
This action arises from Ortiz's suicide in the San Diego Central Jail. See Compl. ¶¶ 1-6. Plaintiff, Ortiz's mother, brought suit individually for certain claims arising from Ortiz's death and as Ortiz's "sole successor in interest to prosecute those claims which survived [Ortiz's] death." Id. at 12.
Ortiz was a pretrial detainee in the County's custody at Central Jail from June 9, 2018 through March 18, 2019. Id. ¶ 22. Staff at Central Jail knew that Ortiz "had been diagnosed with schizophrenia and had a history of suicidality." Id. ¶ 23. Before March 18, 2019, Ortiz had at least one documented suicide attempt while detained in Central Jail. Id.
On March 18, 2019, the County was holding Ortiz "in Central Jail's Psychiatric Stabilization Unit ('PSU')." Id.
On the morning of March 18, 2019, jail staff found Ortiz sitting in his PSU cell with a mark around this neck indicating he had just tried to strangle himself. Jail staff then found a noose made from a towel in [Ortiz's] cell. [Ortiz] told jail staff he was "feeling sad and depressed," and he felt like "ending his life." He told jail staff he was hearing voices telling him to hurt and/or kill himself.
Id. ¶ 24. Jail staff then moved Ortiz to a "single-person observation cell within the PSU equipped with video cameras that allowed jail staff to continuously monitor the cell." Id. ¶ 25. "[A] currently unknown Department deputy, employee, and/or agent gave [Ortiz]food in a plastic bag." Id. ¶ 26. Id. ¶ 27. The recorded video footage shows Ortiz committing suicide: "[Ortiz] can be seen . . . getting the plastic bag, getting into bed, pulling the sheet over his head, and putting the plastic bag over his face until he suffocated." Id. ¶ 28. "When jail staff finally checked on [Ortiz], he was unconscious or dead." Id. ¶ 29. Jail staff called 911. Id. Ortiz arrived at USCD Medical Center around 4:30 p.m. Id. Id. ¶ 30.
Plaintiff learned of Ortiz's medical emergency from medical personnel at UCSD Medical Center. Id. ¶ 31. Plaintiff arrived at UCSD Medical Center as Ortiz's condition deteriorated. See id. ¶¶ 32-33. Medical personnel "attempted to take [Plaintiff] and her daughter to see [Ortiz] before he died." Id. ¶ 33. However, a Sheriff's Department "deputy, employee, and/or agent outside [Ortiz's] room stopped Ms. Palacios and her daughter cold—preventing them from seeing [Ortiz] one last time before he died." Id. ¶ 34.
Plaintiff drove to Central Jail to seek permission to see Ortiz at UCSD Medical Center. Id. ¶ 35. After an hour-and-a-half passed, a Sheriff Department "deputy, employee, and/or agent" "rudely inform[ed]" Plaintiff that she did not need a permit to see Ortiz because he died. Id. ¶ 36. Plaintiff and her daughter returned to UCSD Medical Center, and Detective Patron "confronted" and "rudely interrogate[d]" Plaintiff and her daughter. Id. ¶¶ 37-38. Plaintiff alleges that this interaction caused her severe emotional distress. Id. Plaintiff further claims that she "suffered damages arising from [Ortiz's] wrongful death and the conscience-shocking deprivation of her parent-child relationship with [Ortiz]." Id. ¶ 81.
Based on these allegations, Plaintiff brings ten causes of action against Defendants. See Compl. ¶¶ 82-180. Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's ten causes of action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Doc. Nos. 3, 13, 16.
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). A pleading must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). However, plaintiffs must also plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The plausibility standard demands more than a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," or "'naked assertions' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). Instead, the complaint "must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively." Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011).
In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts must assume the truth of all factual allegations and must construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Espy, 45 F.3d 1337, 1340 (9th Cir. 1995)). The court need not take legal conclusions as true merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations. Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting W. Min. Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981)). Similarly, "conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss." Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998).
In determining the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, courts generally may not look beyond the complaint for additional facts. See United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907-08 (9th Cir. 2003). "A court may, however, consider certain materials—documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in thecomplaint, or matters of judicial notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment." Id.; see also Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. Cnty. Of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2002). "However, [courts] are not required to accept as true conclusory allegations which are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint." Steckman v. Hart Brewing Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295-96 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing In re Stac Electronics Securities Litigation, 89 F.3d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1996)).
Where dismissal is appropriate, a court should grant leave to amend unless the plaintiff could not possibly cure the defects in the pleading. Knappenberger v. City of Phoenix, 566 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000)).
Through the three motions, Defendants challenge each of Plaintiff's ten causes of action. The Court assesses each of Plaintiff's...
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