Palis v. Mayorkas
| Decision Date | 14 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 19-cv-06729 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
| Parties | DINA PALIS Plaintiff, v. ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, et al., Defendants. |
Plaintiff Dina Palis challenges Defendants' denial of her naturalization application under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). She claims U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USC IS) wrongfully denied her application. Plaintiff moves for summary judgment, seeking an order directing Defendants to natural ize he r. [37]. De fe ndants oppose Plaintiff's motion and cross-move for s u mmar y ju d g me nt in the ir f av o r . [ 39] . For the reasons explained below, this Court denies Plaintiff's motion and grants Defendants' motion.
Plaintiff an Iraqi citizen and a legal permanent resident of the United States currently living in Des Plaines, Illinois, claims USCIS illegally denied her application for naturalization [1] at ¶¶ 2, 9. She claims to meet all legal and procedural requirements for naturalization. [37] at 6. Defendants (the Secretary of the United States' Department of Homeland Security, which oversees, among other agencies, USCIS; the Director of USCIS; and USCIS) argue Plaintiff does not satisfy the nat ur al i zat i o n r e qui r e me nt s be c ause she l ac ks the good moral character required for naturalization and did not have lawful permanent resident status when she applied to naturalize. [39] at 7-11. The discussion below outlines the undisputed facts relevant to these claims.
Plaintiff married Yonan Abdulla Barrota on September 9, 2004 in Rio De Janeiro, Brazil. [31] at 181. Barrota, a United States Citizen, subsequently filed a Fo rm I-130 Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130) on Plaintiff's behalf. Id. at 377- 78. USCIS approved the petition on January 31, 2005. Id. at 377. Barrota died on November 18, 2005. Id. at 182. His death certificate listed his marital status as divorced. Id.
About two months after Barrota's death, on January 31, 2006, Plaintiff sat for a co nsular interview in Brazil. [31] at 4. She attested to the truthfulness of the visa application and submitted a Form I-864 Affidavit of Support bearing Barrota's signature. Plaintiff failed to mention her husband's death during the interview. Id. at 377-89. USCIS approved the Form I-130 application. Id. Plaintiff then left Brazil and arrived in the United States on June 24, 2006. Id. at 337. She cleared quarantine protocols on June 26, 2006, and she entered the United States as a conditional permanent resident. Id. After approximately one year in the United States, Plaintiff interviewed with USCIS o n June 4, 2007, to have her conditions removed. Id. at 196. USCIS removed her conditions and granted her lawful permanent residence status. Id. at 201.
USCIS received Plaintiff's first naturalization application on March 19, 2012 . [31] at 96. Plaintiff attended naturalization interviews on July 31, 2012, and November 5, 2012. Id. USCIS denied the first application on January 29, 2014, because Plaintiff failed to mention her husband's death in her January 31, 2006 consular interview. Id. at 96, 124. Plaintiff appealed the decision, but USCIS affirmed the denial on June 19, 2014. Id. at 123-28.
Plaintiff tried again, filing another naturalization application on August 8, 2014. Id. at 35. She interviewed with USCIS on December 2, 2014. Id. at 35, 81. O n August 4, 2017, USCIS again denied her application. Id. at 33-38. Plaintiff again appealed. Id. at 4. USCIS affirmed the denial on September 5, 2019, but vacated its August 4, 2017 decision as incomplete. Id. The September 5, 2019 denial explained that Plaintiff actually “shut off a line of questioning” during her January 31, 2006 consular interview when she failed to mention her husband's death. Id.
In response to the continued denial of her naturalization application, Plaintiff sue d, seeking an order setting as i d e U S.C. I S's A u g u s t 4, 2017 an d Se p t e mbe r 5, 2019 decisions, and asking this Court to grant her application for naturalization. [1] at 8. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint [11], and the Court denied the motion, [28], finding that Plaintiff had plausibly alleged that USCIS granted her the status of legal permanent resident in 2007, and that she remained eligible for naturalization, but that USCIS nonetheless denied same. [28] at 6. In particular, the Court noted, the limited record the n before the Court failed to demonstrate that the timing of Barrota's death necessarily rendered Plaintiff ineligible for naturalization. Id.
After the Court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss, Defendants filed a certified copy of the administrative record on the docket in this case [31]. Plaintiff now seeks summary judgment based upon the complete record. [37]. Defendants oppose Plaintiff's motion and cross-move for summary judgment in their favor. [39].
A court may grant summary judgment when “no dispute as to any material fact” exists and the movant demonstrates that he is entitled to “judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A genuine issue as to a material fact exists when the evidence presents a situation where a “reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing no such issue of fact exists. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 332 (1986).
The non-moving party must identify the evidence creating a genuine issue as to a material fact. Hutchinson v. Fitzgerald Equip. Co., Inc., 910 F.3d 1016, 1021-22 () . This r e qui re s sho w i ng mo r e than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 568 (1986). A mere “scintilla of evidence” supporting the non-movant's position does not satisfy this burden. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Additionally, a court must construe all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. King v. Hendricks Cty. Comm'rs, 954 F.3d 981, 984 (7th Cir. 2020).
Plaintiff moves for summary judgment, arguing that Defendants' denial of her naturalization application ran contrary to the relevant law. See [37]. Defendants oppose the motion and seek summary judgment in their favor, arguing that their denial was proper because Plaintiff failed (and fails) to meet all statutory requirements for naturalization. [39].
Under federal regulations, nat ur al i z at i o n is only available if a person:
(1) Is at least 18 years of age;
(2) Has been lawfully admitted as a permanent resident;
(3) Has resided continuously within the United States, as defined under § 316.5 for a period of at least five years after having been lawfully admitted for permanent residence;
(4) Has been physically present in the United States for at least 30 months of the five years preceding the date of filing the application;
(5) Immediately preceding the filing of the application, or immediately preceding the examination on the application if the application was filed early pursuant to section 334(a) of the Act and the three-month period falls within the required period of residence under section 316(a) or 319(a) of the Act, has resided, as defined under § 316.5 for at least three months in a state or Service district having jurisdiction over the applicant's actual place of residence;
(6) Has resided continuously within the United States from the date of application for naturalization up to the time of admission for citizenship;
(7) For all the relevant time periods under this paragraph, has been and continues to be a person of good moral character, attache d to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and favorably disposed toward the good order and happiness of the United States; and (8) Is not a person described in Section 314 of the Act relating to deserters of the United States Armed Forces or those persons who departed from the United States to evade military services in the United States Armed Forces.
8 C.F.R. § 316. 2 (emphasis added). Plaintiff must meet every statutory requirement to naturalize. Federenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 505 (1981). And, importantly, a naturalization applicant bears the burden of proof: an applicant must establish “by a preponderance of the evidence that she meets all of the requirements for naturalization.” 8 C.F.R. § 316.2(b); see also United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U.S. 472, 475 (1917).
The parties dispute whether Plaintiff lawfully adjusted to permanent resident status and whether she possessed good moral character. See [37]; [39]. Plaintiff, w ho curre ntly asse rts legal permanent resident status, claims that she complied with all procedural requirements throughout the naturalization process, she met all of the requirements of INA section 204(1), and the time for the Attorney General to rescind her permanent resident status has passed. [37] at 3-5. In response, Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not lawfully adjust to permanent resident status be c ause t he death of her late husband automatically revoked her permanent resident status and their marriage did not last long enough for her to qualify for automatic conversion to a F o r m I-360 Petition for Amerasian, Widow(er) or Special Immigrant (Fo r m I -360) . [39] at 9. They also argue the failure to mention her husband's death during her January...
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