Palm Beach Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Strong

• Decision Date: 10 July 1974
• Docket Number: No. 44179,44179
• Citation: 300 So.2d 881
• Parties: PALM BEACH MOBILE HOMES, INC., a Florida corporation, and Dolan Corporation, a Florida corporation, Appellants, v. Beatrice STRONG, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 881

300 So.2d 881

PALM BEACH MOBILE HOMES, INC., a Florida corporation, and Dolan Corporation, a Florida corporation, Appellants, v. Beatrice STRONG, Appellee.

No. 44179.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 10, 1974.

Theodore Babbitt of Phillips & Babbitt, West Palm Beach, for appellants.

Earl R. Boyce, Lake Worth, for appellee.

Jack M. Skelding, Jr. of Madigan, Parker, Gatlin, Truett & Swedmark, Tallahassee, for Florida Mobile Home and Recreational Vehicle Assn.

Malcolm Anderson, West Palm Beach, for Federation of Mobile Home Owners of Florida, Inc.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen. and William R. Hanley, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State of Florida, as amicus curiae.

ROBERTS, Justice.

This cause is before us on direct appeal from a final judgment of the Circuit Court of Palm Beach County holding Sections 83.271, 83.281, and 83.291, Florida Statutes, to be constitutional, thereby vesting jurisdiction in this Court pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution, 1973, F.S.A.

Appellee, plaintiff below, filed a complaint and amended complaint for declaratory relief against appellants alleging that in April, 1971, she purchased a trailer from appellant Dolan Corporation; that the appellants agreed to rent her a lot at Palm Beach Mobile Homes for the annual sum of $600 and that she paid them the first year's rent; that on March 8, 1972, Sections 83.271, 83.281, and 83.291, Florida Statutes, relating to mobile homes became effective; that in April, 1972, she tendered a cashier's check in the amount of $600 to appellants and that they returned and refused the same; that she is unsure as to her rights under the new legislation and due to threats by appellants as to future action, she seeks a determination of her rights and construction of the new legislation relative to her relationship with appellants. She further alleged that appellants have continuously harassed and annoyed her, have caused her grievous anguish, pain and suffering, and have given her no legal reason to either evict her or refuse payment for annual rental. In a second count to the complaint, appellee sought damages in excess of $2,500 for alleged injury, loss of reputation and medical expenses. Appellants answered setting forth an affirmative defense that the plaintiff had violated the rules and regulations of the park and also alleging that the statute in question was unconstitutional as sought to be applied and appellants counter claimed alleging their right to refuse to renew the original oral lease when it expired on April 22, 1972, and praying for a judgment of eviction in accordance with Section 83.06, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. Appellee denied each and every allegation of the counter claim.

Upon motion of appellants, the trial court dismissed Count II of the complaint.

The case was tried before the court without a jury, and final judgment was entered on July 6, 1973, in favor of appellee on both her complaint and the appellants' counter claim. The trial court held that Sections 83.271, 83.281, and 83.291, Florida Statutes, are constitutional and in effect at all times concerning this action, ordered that appellee is entitled to rent or lease the premises without interference or harassment from appellants and found that appellee had not violated any federal, state or local laws or park regulations and that she shall be allowed to peaceful possession of the premises as long as reasonable.

Although the trial court upheld the constitutionality of Sections 83.271, 83.281, and 83.291, Florida Statutes, the determinative issue in this cause is the construction, application and constitutionality of Section 83.271, Florida Statutes, adopted by the Legislature in the 1972 legislative session as Chapter 72--28, Laws of Florida, which became effective March 8, 1972, which act pertains to evictions from mobile home parks. The remaining statutory provisions ruled on by the trial court were not material to the instant cause nor was such determination required for the disposition of this litigation. Therefore, the constitutionality vel non thereof will not be passed upon in the present cause by this Court since this Court has previously held that it is a fundamental principle that courts will not pass upon the validity of a statute or even a part of an act in a proceeding which does not involve the act or wherein the case may be disposed of upon any other ground. Williston Highlands Development Corp., et al. v. Hogue, et al., 277 So.2d 260 (Fla.1973); De Jong v. Pallotto, 239 So.2d 252 (Fla.1970); Mounier v. State, 178 So.2d 714 (Fla.1965); Lainhart v. Catts, et al., 73 Fla. 735, 75 So. 47 (1917). Specifically, this Court explicated in P. C. Lissenden Co. v. Board of County Commissioners, 116 So.2d 632 (Fla.1959):

'(W)hile the validity of this statute was raised by the appellant and actually passed upon by the trial court, it was not only determinative of the issues or essential to the disposition thereof, but such question was wholly immaterial to the determination of the merits of the action. Therefore that portion of the judgment appealed which purports to pass upon the validity of the cited statute is obiter dictum and is hereby held for naught.'

The only issue argued sub judice by counsel for the parties is the constitutionality vel non of Section 83.271, Florida Statutes, and the appropriate construction to be given thereto.

This statute provides:

'83.271 Mobile home parks; eviction, grounds, proceedings.--

(1) A mobile home park owner or operator may not evict a mobile home dweller other than for the following reasons:

(a) Nonpayment of rent.

(b) Violation of some federal, state or local ordinance which may be deemed detrimental to the safety and welfare of other dwellers in the mobile home park.

(c) Violation of any rule or regulation established by the park owner or operator, provided the mobile home owner received written notice of said violation at least thirty days prior to the date he is required to vacate. A copy of all rules and regulations shall be delivered by the park owner or operator to the mobile home owner prior to his signing the lease or entering into a rental agreement. A copy of the rules and regulations also shall be posted in the recreation hall, if any, or some other conspicuous place in the park.

(2) Cumulative eviction proceedings may be established in a written lease agreement between the park owner or operator and a mobile home dweller in addition to those established by law.

(3) This section shall not preclude summary eviction proceedings, and if the park operator or owner does not have

one of the above grounds available, the park tenant may raise the same by affirmative defense.'

The authority of the state through the Legislature to impose reasonable regulations upon mobile homes and mobile home parks is unquestionable under its broad police power in view of the fact that his enterprise peculiarly affects the public interest and bears a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare. Egan v. City of Miami, et al., 130 Fla. 465, 178 So. 132 (1938); 54 Am.Jur.2d Mobile Homes, § 5; 22 A.L.R.2d 774; Hodes and Roberson, The Law of Mobile Homes 2nd Ed.; 'Regulation of Mobile Homes,' 13 Syracuse Law Review 125. The right to contract and to use one's property as one wills are fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitution of the United States and the constitution of Florida; however, this Court has ofttimes declared that the degree of such guaranties must be determined in the light of social and economic conditions which prevail at a given time. In Robinson v. Florida Dry Cleaning & Laundry Board, 141 Fla. 899, 194 So. 269 (1940), this Court quoting with emphasis from Miami Laundry Co. v. Florida Dry Cleaning and Laundry Board, 134 Fla. 1, 183 So. 759 (1938), 119 A.L.R. 956, said:

'Liberty of contract and the right to use one's property as he wills are fundamental constitutional guaranties, but the degree of such guaranties must be determined in the light of social and economic conditions that prevail at the time the guaranty is proposed to be exercised rather than at the time the Constitution was approved securing it; otherwise the power of the legislature becomes static and helpless to regulate and extend them to new conditions that constantly arise.

'Constitutional guaranties have never been thought to be immune from regulation or limitation in the interest of the common good. When limited, the process has been evoluntary rather than spontaneous. Regulation might be appropriately denied today that could be just as appropriately granted tomorrow. When the exercise of a constitutional guaranty is limited to such a small sector of the population that the rights of the public will be protected by unrestricted competition, the legislature will not generally attempt to regulate, but when large numbers became involved, many of whom are unequal in the race, and their economic security becomes imperiled through the exercise of what may appear to be the constitutional right of another, then the legislature has not hesitated to step in and regulate.'

Freedom to contract and a citizen's right to pursue a lawful business which are valuable property rights are subject to reasonable restraint in the interest of the public welfare. The right to contract is the general rule and restraint of this right by the police power is the exception to be exercised when necessary to secure the comfort, health, welfare, safety and prosperity of the people. Adams v. Miami Beach Hotel Assoc., 77 So.2d 465 (Fla.1955); Miami Shores Village v. Wm. N. Brockway Post No. 124 of American Legion, 156 Fla. 673, 24 So.2d 33 (Fla.1945); Eccles v. Stone, 134 Fla. 113, 183 So. 628 (Fla.1938); State ex rel. Fulton v. Ives, et al., 123 Fla. 401, 167 So. 394 (Fla.1936); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 18 S.Ct. 383, 42 L.Ed. 780. The Supreme Court of the United States in Atlantic Coastline Railroad Company v....