Palmer Exploration, Inc. v. Dennis, Civ. A. No. J90-0369(L).

• Decision Date: 11 January 1991
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. J90-0369(L).
• Citation: 759 F. Supp. 332
• Parties: PALMER EXPLORATION, INC., Plaintiff, v. George S. DENNIS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi

759 F. Supp. 332

PALMER EXPLORATION, INC., Plaintiff, v. George S. DENNIS, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. J90-0369(L).

United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Jackson Division.

January 11, 1991.

Jefferson D. Stewart and Watts C. Ueltchey, Brunini, Grantham, Grower & Hewes, Jackson, Miss., for plaintiff.

Craig Castle and Thomas J. Lowe, Jr., Jackson, Miss., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

TOM S. LEE, District Judge.

This cause is before the court on cross motions of plaintiff Palmer Exploration, Inc. (Palmer) for partial summary judgment and of defendant George Dennis for dismissal. The parties have each responded to the motion of the other and the court has considered memoranda with attachments submitted by both parties in ruling on the motion.

The parties to this action were previously before the court in February 1988, when Palmer filed suit against Dennis to remove clouds on its title to certain property upon which it was drilling for oil. Palmer Exploration v. Dennis, 730 F.Supp. 734 (S.D. Miss.1989). In that action, Dennis, who had secured leases to the subject property, counterclaimed against Palmer for removal of clouds upon his title to the property. The question before the court was whether leases obtained by Dennis included "deep rights," rights to property below 5700 feet, to the subject tract. By opinion entered April 20, 1989, 730 F.Supp. 734, this court held that Palmer was entitled to summary judgment; on May 11, 1989, a judgment was entered declaring Dennis's recorded leases null and void and taxing Dennis with all costs. On February 8, 1990, the Fifth Circuit summarily affirmed this court.

Palmer filed the instant action on July 27, 1990 alleging that the actions complained of in the 1988 litigation, as well as other actions taken by Dennis after he obtained leases to the property, constituted intentional or wrongful interference with a contract and business relations. The affirmative defenses raised by Dennis in his answer to the complaint are the subject of Palmer's motion for partial summary judgment. Specifically, Dennis asserted (1) that Palmer's claim is barred by collateral estoppel, and (2) that the cause of action is essentially one for slander of title and is thus barred by Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-35, a one-year statute of limitations for suits on certain intentional torts. Dennis has moved for dismissal on the basis of the statute of limitations and also argues that Palmer has failed to state a claim of wrongful interference with a contract and/or business relations.

Palmer contends that collateral estoppel is not applicable because in the prior suit it requested only equitable relief whereas the present suit seeks recovery of monetary damages. The doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply to the present action as the prerequisites to its application are clearly not present. The three criteria for invocation of the doctrine are:

1) that the issue at stake be identical to the one involved in the prior litigation;

2) that the issue have been actually litigated in the prior litigation; and

3) that the determination of the issue in the prior litigation have been a critical and necessary part of the judgment in that earlier action.¹

Stovall v. Price Waterhouse Co., 652 F.2d 537, 540 (5th Cir.1981). Strictly speaking, the issue now presented was not actually decided or necessary to the former judgment. However, while Palmer's claim is not barred by collateral estoppel, it is nevertheless barred under the related doctrine of res judicata.²

To apply the principle of res judicata, the rule that once a matter has been finally adjudicated no subsequent action may be maintained, four criteria must be met:

(1) the parties must be identical in both suits;

(2) the prior judgment must have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction;

(3) there must be a final judgment on the merits; and

(4) the same cause of action must be involved in both cases.

Howell Hydrocarbons, Inc. v. Adams, 897 F.2d 183, 188 (5th Cir.1990). At issue in the case sub judice is whether the fourth element is satisfied; the first three prerequisites are not in dispute. Palmer asserts that the interference with contract and business relations claim is a separate cause of action from the action to quiet title. To determine whether res judicata bars a subsequent action, the essence of the two actions must be compared and a determination made as to whether the "primary right and duty or wrong are the same in each action." White v. World Finance of Meridian, Inc., 653 F.2d 147, 150 (5th Cir. 1981). A review and comparison of the claims reveals that the primary right claimed by Palmer in both suits concerns its right to use the property in question without interference, and the primary wrong alleged by both suits is Dennis's adverse claim.

Where res judicata is applicable, it bars not only the claims presented in the former action, but also "every ground as to recovery that might have been presented." Bullard v. Webster, 679 F.2d 92, 93 (5th Cir.1982). The test for whether a claim could have been presented in the earlier suit is whether the present claim arises from the same nucleus of operative fact as the earlier claim. In re Air Crash at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport, 861 F.2d 814, 816 (5th Cir.1985). Facts set...