Palmer v. City of Chicago

Decision Date09 April 1985
Docket Number83-1981,Nos. 83-1980,s. 83-1980
Citation755 F.2d 560
PartiesReuben PALMER, et al., Subclass A Plaintiffs-Appellees, and Edward Negron, et al., Subclass B Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, Richard Brzeczek, Commander Milton Deas, and Richard M. Daley, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Michael E. Deutsch, Peoples Law Office, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs-appellees.

Henry A. Hauser, Terry L. McDonald, David S. Allen, Asst. State's Attys., Wm. Carlisle Herbert, Jeremiah Marsh, Hopkins & Sutter, Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellants.

Before WOOD, CUDAHY, and COFFEY, Circuit Judges.

COFFEY, Circuit Judge.

The City of Chicago and the County of Cook, Illinois appeal the entry of a preliminary injunction requiring the Chicago Police Department and the Cook County State's Attorney's Office to revamp their internal procedures for the recording, maintaining, and production of investigative files. We reverse and remand this case to the district court with instructions to limit the preliminary injunctive relief to the preservation of "street files" now in existence for criminal defendants convicted of felonies in the Cook County Circuit Court.

I

The record reveals that in May 1981, the Cook County State's Attorney's Office charged George Jones, an eighteen year old high school honor student, with the rape and first-degree murder of thirteen year old Sheila Pointer and the aggravated battery of Sheila's ten year old brother Purvey Pointer. Jones pled not guilty, and in preparation for trial, the defense counsel served four separate subpoenas upon the Recordkeeper of the Chicago Police Department ("CPD"). One subpoena, in particular, requested:

"Any and all police reports, arrest reports, photos, supplementary reports, witness statements, inventory slips, reports of the results and any scientific tests conducted on any physical evidence, or written memorandum of any kind concerning an incident that took place at 702 West 117th Street, Chicago, Ill. on May 4, 1981 wherein Purvey Pointer, Jr., was allegedly beaten and Sheila Pointer was killed."

In addition, the defense filed a motion for discovery with the Cook County State's Attorney's Office, asking that it produce, inter alia:

"Any material or information which tends to negate the guilt of the accused as to the offense charged or would tend to reduce his punishment therefor, and any other material or information favorable to the accused which should be produced according to Brady v. Maryland, 3737 [sic] U.S. 83 [83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215] (1963), and subsequent cases."

The defense counsel received oral assurances from the members of the CPD and the State's Attorney's Office that their respective offices had complied with the subpoenas and discovery request. The record reveals, however, that when the defense counsel subpoenaed Purvey Pointer's hospital record, he learned for the first time that on May 11, 1981, CPD officers Kelly and Binkowski had shown Purvey a picture of George Jones, while Purvey was confined in his hospital room. The following day, Purvey, while still confined, positively identified Jones as the assailant. 1 Upon discovery of this photo display, the defense counsel immediately filed another motion, requesting the complete production of "all statements, notes of interviews, memorandums, reports or written records of any kind regarding any and all interviews conducted of any person in connection with the investigation of this case." In response, the Cook County State's Attorney's Office transmitted a one-page memo obtained from the CPD's files, describing Purvey Pointer's reaction to the photograph of George Jones. According to the memo:

"The photo of George Jones was also shown to Purvy [sic] and when asked if he knew this person he said yes but gave no response when asked if he were [sic] the offender.... He kept trying to say a last name but no one was able to ascertain what it was. It sounded like Anderson-Henderson-Harrison."

When Jones' murder trial commenced in April 1982, the prosecution expressed an intent to seek the death penalty for Jones. As the trial unfolded, the prosecution called Purvey Pointer to the witness stand and he positively identified George Jones as the assailant. This testimony concerning the identification of Jones appeared in the Chicago Tribune and caught the attention of Detective Frank Laverty, a member of the CPD's violent crimes unit who participated in the original investigation of the Sheila Pointer homicide. Purvey's testimony directly conflicted with Laverty's theory of the case, which he had presented to his supervisors in October 1981, that a Lester Pique was the assailant. After reading the newspaper article, Laverty immediately contacted the defense counsel and informed him that "he had written ... two reports--two separate memos on two separate occasions" concerning the investigation of Sheila Pointer's death. The defense counsel had not received either of these reports in response to the subpoenas served upon the CPD or the discovery motions filed with the Cook County State's Attorney's Office. As a result, the defense counsel not only subpoenaed the specific reports, but called Laverty to the witness stand and examined him in the presence of the state court judge.

Laverty related the content of one report in which Purvey Pointer stated, "George's name is George Anderson, ... he is the leader or a member of the 'Pirate' gang, because he wears the cap with the P on it, and ... he lurks in the vicinity of the Pullman School with other gang members." In the other report, Laverty asked Lester Pique, who had confessed to the murder and rape of a Sharon Hudson in July 1981, "if he was the offender in the Pointer homicide and he stated that he might have been but that he blacked out and couldn't remember." Laverty's report further noted that according to lab tests, Pique's hair was "similar" to the hair samples found in the Pointer home and that Pique was able to accurately describe the lead pipe murder weapon used in the Pointer homicide. Based upon this information, Laverty's report concluded that Lester Pique "is the offender with a 2nd person in [the] Pointer homicide and that the person charged is a case of mistaken identity." Laverty presented this information to his commanding officers in October 1981, requesting that Pique be placed in a lineup, but the supervisors responded that "Purvey Pointer's condition would not be such that he could view a lineup...."

Following Laverty's testimony in the state trial court, the defense counsel served a subpoena on the Area 2 Watch Commander of the CPD, 2 this time requesting:

"Any and all record reports, supplementary reports, notes, memos and written reports, records of any kind, including but not limited to any watch investigator file or area # 2 file or area # 2 general files or reports concerning the Sheila Pointer homicide. R.D. # C-160031. Said homicide occurred on 5-4-81 at 702 W. 117th St., Chgo, Illinois."

In response, the CPD produced a "street file" consisting of additional memos not previously submitted to the defense counsel in response to their earlier subpoenas and discovery motions. In light of this previously undiscovered evidence contained in the CPD's "street file," the state trial judge granted the defendant's motion for a mistrial and the Cook County State's Attorney's Office entered a plea of nolle prosequi (Lat: "will no further prosecute"). 3

On April 16, 1982, following the uncovering of the CPD's alleged practice in the Jones case--to maintain unofficial "street files" that were not transmitted to defendants in response to subpoenas or discovery requests--the plaintiffs filed a class action, civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 against the City of Chicago and Cook County, Illinois. 4 The plaintiff class consisted of seven named plaintiffs in subclass A, in their individual capacity and on behalf of those similarly situated, that were "convicted [of felonies] after trial or plea of guilty in Cook County and sentenced to probation or imprisonment in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections." 5 The plaintiff class also included eleven named plaintiffs in subclass B who were "charged with felonies and awaiting trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Criminal Division." The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants, acting through the CPD and the Cook County State's Attorney's Office, were:

"continuing their policy and practices of concealing basic investigative working files, known as 'street files,' 'running files,' or 'office files,' in order to restrict and prevent the flow of exculpatory evidence to criminal defendants, in spite of the Constitutional requirements of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 [83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215] (1963) and the discovery rules of the Illinois Supreme Court (Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 38, Sec. 110-A, S.Ct.Rules 412, et seq.)."

According to the plaintiffs' complaint:

"This intentional double file system maintained by the Defendants as a matter of policy violated the discovery rules of the Illinois Supreme Court, and, additionally, deprived the Plaintiffs and the sub-classes they represent of their rights to a fair trial and to be free from a deprivation of life, liberty and property without due process of law as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, et seq."

The plaintiffs requested that the district court enter a declaratory judgment, finding that the defendants' alleged policy and practices violate the plaintiffs' due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and their right to a fair trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. In addition, the plaintiffs asked the district court to...

To continue reading

Request your trial
75 cases
  • Thomas v. Walton
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois
    • 19 d2 Setembro d2 2006
    ...deadly force, given a lack of evidence that it was the invariable practice of the police to choke all arrestees); Palmer v. City of Chicago, 755 F.2d 560, 571 (7th Cir.1985) ("[A] plaintiff's standing must be premised upon more than hypothetical speculation and conjecture that harm will occ......
  • Wag-Aero, Inc. v. US
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin
    • 26 d5 Novembro d5 1993
    ...which was not asked to provide information, does not have standing to maintain its claim under the Act.20 See Palmer v. City of Chicago, 755 F.2d 560, 570-71 (7th Cir.1985) (in order to satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisite of standing, abstract injury is not enough; the plaintiff must sh......
  • Schiro v. Clark
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana
    • 26 d3 Dezembro d3 1990
    ...427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). See also United States v. Jackson, 780 F.2d 1305 (7th Cir.1986); Palmer v. City of Chicago, 755 F.2d 560 (7th Cir.1985); United States v. Fairman, 769 F.2d 386 (7th Cir.1985); and Carey v. Duckworth, 738 F.2d 875 (7th Cir.1983). However, it......
  • Doulin v. City of Chicago
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • 20 d1 Abril d1 1987
    ...opinion of July 9, 1984. The only significant new authority cited by defendants in their motion to decertify is Palmer v. City of Chicago, 755 F.2d 560 (7th Cir.1985). Nothing in that opinion, however, justifies reconsideration of Judge Moran's holding that class certification is proper eve......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • Weekly Case Digests January 25, 2021 January 29, 2021.
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Law Journal No. 2021, November 2021
    • 29 d5 Janeiro d5 2021
    ...consciously approved at the highest policy-making level for decisions involving the police department. See also Palmer v. City of Chicago, 755 F.2d 560 (7th Cir. 1985). In fact, the City in Jones did not even contest that the use of such a practice presented a due process problem, although ......
  • Sufficiency of Evidence.
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Law Journal No. 2021, November 2021
    • 25 d1 Janeiro d1 2021
    ...consciously approved at the highest policy-making level for decisions involving the police department. See also Palmer v. City of Chicago, 755 F.2d 560 (7th Cir. 1985). In fact, the City in Jones did not even contest that the use of such a practice presented a due process problem, although ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT