Palmer v. Franz
| Decision Date | 26 June 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 18-1384,18-1384 |
| Citation | 928 F.3d 560 |
| Parties | Leroy PALMER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Craig P. FRANZ, RN, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Walter C. Carlson, Attorney, Andrew Chinsky, Attorney (argued), SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff - Appellant.
Jamie Lynn Hull, Julie Ann Teuscher, Miguel E. Larios, Attorneys, CASSIDAY SCHADE LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendant - Appellee.
Before Bauer, Rovner, and Hamilton, Circuit Judges.
LeRoy Palmer ("Palmer") is an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections ("IDOC"). In lieu of a left-hand, Palmer has a nub which terminates at the wrist and does not have any functional fingers.
Prior to his residency at the Northern Reception and Classification Center (the "NRC"), Palmer was a resident of the Shawnee Correctional Center ("Shawnee"). While at Shawnee, the medical director issued Palmer a low bunk pass for an indefinite duration.
In preparation for a court appearance in Cook County, Palmer was transferred to the NRC on January 11, 2012. When he arrived defendant Craig P. Franz ("Franz"), an employee of Wexford Health Services, Inc. ("Wexford"), conducted a routine intake screening. A transferred inmate is accompanied by a transfer summary completed by the originating institution. The top half of Palmer's intake form had been completed by a nurse at Shawnee and noted Palmer's missing hand. Franz noted the deformity but ignored Palmer's explicit request for a low bunk permit. Franz took no other steps in conjunction with Palmer's deformity or his request for an accommodation: he did not issue a permit, notify any other member of the medical staff, or put Palmer in queue to see a doctor.
When Palmer was escorted to his assigned cell the bottom bunk was occupied. Palmer informed the guard that he had a low bunk pass at Shawnee but was told that without a pass for the NRC, the guard could not do anything. Palmer was forced to use the top bunk.
Over the next eleven days Palmer made two requests to see a doctor to get a low bunk pass; neither request was acknowledged. On the morning of January 22, 2012, Palmer fell while attempting to climb down from the upper bunk. He landed on his knee and suffered a severe injury. Following his fall from the top bunk, Palmer was issued a low bunk permit and assigned to a low bunk.
From February 2, 2012, through July 11, 2012, Palmer was transferred throughout the Illinois correctional system. He was transferred from the NRC to the Cook County Jail, back to the NRC, and back to Shawnee before he was again transferred to the NRC. In April and August of 2012, Palmer filed grievances with IDOC because he was unable to secure a low bunk permit and as a result he was injured.
On September 12, 2012, after not receiving a response to his grievances, Palmer appealed the apparent denials to the Administrative Review Board, which also went unanswered.
On March 5, 2013, Palmer filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. On March 11, 2013, the district court granted Palmer's motions to proceed in forma pauperis and for the appointment of counsel pursuant to the local rule. Finally, the operative complaint (Fourth Amended Complaint) was filed.
This Complaint alleged, inter alia , that Franz was deliberately indifferent to Palmer's serious medical need when he refused to issue a low bunk permit and that this constituted a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Following the close of discovery, Franz filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that: Palmer's deformity did not constitute a serious medical need; Palmer failed to show Franz was subjectively aware of the alleged medical need; and that Palmer failed to show Franz was deliberately indifferent to any medical need or risk.
On September 18, 2017, the district court granted Franz's motion for summary judgment. The court determined that Franz was not deliberately indifferent to Palmer's serious medical need because he was not authorized to issue a low bunk permit and he was unaware of any issue regarding Palmer's bunk assignment. And, Palmer's negligence claim raised issues of medical judgment, and necessarily implicated the Healing Arts and Medical Practices Act that Palmer had not complied with. The district court entered judgment in favor of Franz on Palmer's Eighth Amendment claim and dismissed Palmer's negligence claim without prejudice.
Our review of a district court's grant of summary judgment is de novo and all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmovant. Valenti v. Lawson , 889 F.3d 427, 429 (7th Cir. 2018). "Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Dunderdale v. United Airlines, Inc. , 807 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
"A genuine issue of material fact exists when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Wells v. Coker , 707 F.3d 756, 760 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007).
To succeed in his claim for a violation of the Eighth Amendment, Palmer must show he faced a substantial risk due to an objectively serious medical condition and that Franz was deliberately indifferent to that risk. Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97, 104–05, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) ; Burton v. Downey , 805 F.3d 776, 784 (7th Cir. 2015).
Gayton v. McCoy , 593 F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010). If Palmer can prove the objective component, he must then show that Franz deliberately disregarded the risk of harm. Greeno v. Daley , 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). "[A] factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious." Zaya v. Sood , 836 F.3d 800, 805 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 842, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) ).
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