Palmer v. Hoffman, No. 300

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtDOUGLAS
PartiesPALMER et al. v. HOFFMAN
Decision Date01 February 1943
Docket NumberNo. 300

318 U.S. 109
63 S.Ct. 477
87 L.Ed. 645
PALMER et al.

v.

HOFFMAN.

No. 300.
Argued Jan. 7, 8, 1943.
Decided Feb. 1, 1943.
Rehearing Denied March 1, 1943.

See 318 U.S. 800, 63 S.Ct. 757, 87 L.Ed. —-.

Page 110

Mr. Edward R. Brumley, of New York City, for petitioners.

Mr. Wm. Paul Allen, of New York City, for respondent.

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case arose out of a grade crossing accident which occurred in Massachusetts. Diversity of citizenship brought it to the federal District Court in New York. There were several causes of action. The first two were on behalf of respondent individually, one being brought under a Massachusetts statute, Mass.Gen.L. (1932) c. 160 §§ 138, 232, the other at common law. The third and fourth were brought by respondent as administrator of the estate of his wife and alleged the same common law and statutory negligence as the first two counts. On the question of negligence the trial court submitted three issues to the jury failure to ring a bell, to blow a whistle, to have a light burning in the front of the train. The jury returned a verdict in favor of respondent individually for some $25,000 and in favor of respondent as administrator for $9,000. The District Court entered judgment on the

Page 111

verdict. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, one judge dissenting. 2 Cir., 129 F.2d 976. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari which presents three points.

I. The accident occurred on the night of December 25, 1940. On December 27, 1940, the engineer of the train, who died before the trial, made a statement at a freight office of petitioners where he was interviewed by an assistant superintendent of the road and by a representative of the Massachusetts Public Utilities Commission. See Mass. Gen.L. (1932), c. 159, § 29. This statement was offered in evidence by petitioners under the Act of June 20, 1936, 49 Stat. 1561, 28 U.S.C. § 695, 28 U.S.C.A. § 695.1 They offered to prove (in the language of the Act) that the statement was signed in the regular course of business, it being the regular course of such business to make such a statement. Respondent's objection to its introduction was sustained.

We agree with the majority view below that it was properly excluded.

We may assume that if the statement was made 'in the regular course' of business, it would satisfy the other provisions of the Act. But we do not think that it was made 'in the regular course' of business within the meaning of the Act. The business of the petitioners is the railroad business. That business like other enterprises

Page 112

entails the keeping of numerous books and records essential to its conduct or useful in its efficient operation. Though such books and records were considered reliable and trustworthy for major decisions in the industrial and business world, their use in litigation was greatly circumscribed or hedged about by the hearsay rule—restrictions which greatly increased the time and cost of making the proof where those who made the records were numerous.2 5 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed., 1940) § 1530. It was that problem which started the movement towards adoption of legislation embodying the principles of the present Act. See Morgan et al., The Law of Evidence, Some Proposals for its Reform (1927) c. V. And the legislative history of the Act indicates the same purpose.3

Page 113

The engineer's statement which was held inadmissible in this case falls into quite a different category.4 It is not a record made for the systematic conduct of the business as a business. An accident report may affect that business in the sense that it affords information on which the management may act. It is not, however, typical of entries made systematically or as a matter of routine to record events or occurrences, to reflect transactions with others, or to provide internal controls. The conduct of a business commonly entails the payment of tort claims incurred by the negligence of its employees. But the fact that a company makes a business out of recording its employees' versions of their accidents does not put those statements in the class of records made 'in the regular course' of the business within the meaning of the Act. If it did, then any law office in the land could follow the same course, since business as defined in the Act includes the professions. We would then have a real perversion of a rule designed to facilitate admission of records which experience has shown to be quite trustworthy. Any business by installing a regular system for recording and preserving its version of accidents for which it was potentially liable could qualify those reports under the Act. The result would be that the Act would cover any system of recording events or occurrences provided it was 'regular' and though it had little or nothing to do with the management or operation of the business as such. Preparation of cases for trial by virtue of being a 'business' or incidental thereto would obtain the benefits of this liberalized version of the early shop book rule. The probability of

Page 114

trustworthiness of records because they were routine reflections of the day to day operations of a business would be forgotten as the basis of the rule. See Conner v. Seattle, R. & S. Ry. Co., 56 Wash. 310, 312, 313, 105 P. 634, 25 L.R.A.,N.S., 930, 134 Am.St.Rep. 1110. Regularity of preparation would become the test rather than the character of the records and their earmarks of reliability (Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Co. v. United States, 250 U.S. 123, 128, 129, 39 S.Ct. 407, 408, 409, 63 L.Ed. 889) acquired from their source and origin and the nature of their compilation. We cannot so completely empty the words of the Act of their historic meaning. If the Act is to be extended to apply not only to a 'regular course' of a business but also to any 'regular course' of conduct which may have some relationship to business, Congress not this Court must extend it. Such a major change which opens wide the door to avoidance of cross-examination should not be left to implication. Nor is it any answer to say that Congress has provided in the Act that the various circumstances of the making of the record should affect its weight not its admissibility. That provision comes into play only in case the other requirements of the Act are met.

In short, it is manifest that in this case those reports are not for the systematic conduct of the enterprise as a railroad business. Unlike payrolls, accounts receivable, accounts payable, bills of lading and the like these reports are calculated for use essentially in the court, not in the business. Their primary utility is in litigating, not in railroading.

It is, of course, not for us to take these reports out of the Act if Congress has put them in. But there is nothing in the background of the law on which this Act was built or in its legislative history which suggests for a moment that the business of preparing cases for trial should be included. In this connection it should be noted that the Act of May 6, 1910, 36 Stat. 350, 45 U.S.C. § 38, 45 U.S.C.A. § 38, requires officers of common carriers by rail to make under oath

Page 115

monthly reports of railroad accidents to the Interstate Commerce Commission, setting forth the nature and causes of the accidents and the circumstances connected therewith. And the same Act, 45 U.S.C. § 40, 45 U.S.C.A. § 40, gives the Commission authority to investigate the to make reports upon such accidents. It is provided, however, that 'Neither the report required by section 38 of this title nor any report of the investigation provided for in section 40 of this title nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose in any suit or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said report or investigation.' 45 U.S.C. § 41, 45 U.S.C.A. § 41. A similar provision, 36 Stat. 916, 54 Stat. 148, 45 U.S.C. § 33, 45 U.S.C.A. § 33, bars the use in litigation of reports concerning accidents resulting from the failure of a locomotive boiler or its appurtenances. 45 U.S.C. §§ 32, 33, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 32, 33. That legislation reveals an explicit Congressional policy...

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933 practice notes
  • Ebenhoech v. Koppers Industries, Inc., No. 00-5641(JBS).
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey
    • December 24, 2002
    ...because they were not made in the regular course of business. (Pis.' Br. at 4.) In support of their argument, they cite Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 63 S.Ct. 477, 87 L.Ed. 645 (1943) in which the Supreme Court upheld the exclusion of an employee's report about an accident. The Court hel......
  • Stewart Organization, Inc v. Ricoh Corporation, No. 86-1908
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • June 20, 1988
    ...659 (1980); Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 556, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1230, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949); Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117, 63 S.Ct. 477, 482, 87 L.Ed. 645 (1943); cf. P. Bator, D. Meltzer, P. Mishkin, & D. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and t......
  • Hagans v. Ellerman & Bucknall Steamship Company, No. 13881
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)
    • May 17, 1963
    ...F.2d 711, 718 (9 Cir. 1961). Cert. denied 370 U.S. 952, 82 S.Ct. 1602, 8 L.Ed.2d 818 (1962). And in the leading case of Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 63 S.Ct. 477, 87 L.Ed. 645 (1943) the Court, in interpreting the historic aims of that Act, "* * * But `regular course\' of business must ......
  • Litton Systems, Inc. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., Nos. 1323-26
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)
    • February 3, 1983
    ...on speech. We recognize that the standard of proof may well be a substantive element of a claim or defense, see, e.g., Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117, 63 S.Ct. 477, 482, 87 L.Ed. 645 (1943), but by requiring a plaintiff to prove that a defendant's conduct was a sham, the Supreme Court......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
934 cases
  • Ebenhoech v. Koppers Industries, Inc., No. 00-5641(JBS).
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey
    • December 24, 2002
    ...because they were not made in the regular course of business. (Pis.' Br. at 4.) In support of their argument, they cite Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 63 S.Ct. 477, 87 L.Ed. 645 (1943) in which the Supreme Court upheld the exclusion of an employee's report about an accident. The Court hel......
  • Stewart Organization, Inc v. Ricoh Corporation, No. 86-1908
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • June 20, 1988
    ...659 (1980); Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 556, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1230, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949); Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117, 63 S.Ct. 477, 482, 87 L.Ed. 645 (1943); cf. P. Bator, D. Meltzer, P. Mishkin, & D. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and t......
  • Hagans v. Ellerman & Bucknall Steamship Company, No. 13881
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)
    • May 17, 1963
    ...F.2d 711, 718 (9 Cir. 1961). Cert. denied 370 U.S. 952, 82 S.Ct. 1602, 8 L.Ed.2d 818 (1962). And in the leading case of Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 63 S.Ct. 477, 87 L.Ed. 645 (1943) the Court, in interpreting the historic aims of that Act, "* * * But `regular course\' of business must ......
  • Litton Systems, Inc. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., Nos. 1323-26
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)
    • February 3, 1983
    ...on speech. We recognize that the standard of proof may well be a substantive element of a claim or defense, see, e.g., Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117, 63 S.Ct. 477, 482, 87 L.Ed. 645 (1943), but by requiring a plaintiff to prove that a defendant's conduct was a sham, the Supreme Court......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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