Palmer v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 19 October 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98-50595,98-50595
• Citation: 193 F.3d 346
• Parties: (5th Cir. 1999) DEVLIN R. PALMER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GARY L. JOHNSON, ET AL., Defendants; BRYAN HARTNETT, Warden; OSCAR MENDOZA, Assistant Warden, Defendants-Appellants
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 346

193 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 1999)

DEVLIN R. PALMER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GARY L. JOHNSON, ET AL., Defendants BRYAN HARTNETT, Warden; OSCAR MENDOZA, Assistant Warden, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 98-50595

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

October 19, 1999

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, San Antonio Division

Before GARWOOD, DUHE, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:

Bryan Hartnett and Oscar Mendoza appeal the district court's denial of their motion for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. We affirm.

I

Devlin R. Palmer, an inmate of the Texas prison system, initiated the instant suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights and seeking monetary damages and injunctive relief. Palmer's claims were based on events that transpired on October 29 and 30, 1996. According to Palmer, at approximately 1:30 P.M. on October 29, Palmer and other members of his squad were reporting to the field for work after lunch, when they were stopped and lectured by a sergeant. As the squad resumed walking to the work site, some of its members made profane remarks about the lecture. The sergeant responded by halting the squad, drawing a firearm, and ordering the squad members to sit in the field. At approximately 3:00 P.M., Assistant Warden Mendoza arrived at the scene. Palmer explained to Mendoza why the squad had been stopped. Despite the fact that most of the inmates indicated that they wanted to go to work, Mendoza ordered them to remain seated in the field.

Warden Hartnett arrived at approximately 5:00 P.M. He ordered the forty-nine inmates to remain overnight in the field. These inmates were confined to an area measuring approximately twenty feet by thirty feet, bounded by poles and a string of lights. Hartnett directed the correctional officers overseeing the inmates to shoot anyone who attempted to leave the designated area of the field. When Palmer asked to leave the area to urinate and defecate, he was informed that he would have to do so within the confined space or he would be shot for attempting to escape. ¹ Palmer also requested and was denied medication to treat insect bites. Palmer additionally asked that the nearby tractor engines be turned off because their noxious fumes disturbed him. The guards indicated that they could not shut the engines without the warden's permission because they were being used to keep the bounded area lit throughout the night.

Palmer had been dressed for a day of work in the fields so he wore only a short-sleeved shirt. Because he was denied a jacket, blankets, or other means of keeping warm, Palmer became extremely cold as the temperature fell below fifty-nine degrees Fahrenheit. He and his fellow inmates tried to stay warm by huddling together, piling on top of one another, and digging holes in the dirt in an unsuccessful attempt to construct earthen walls to block the winds. Meanwhile, the guards wore jackets and stayed warm by lighting a fire and by periodically retreating to vehicles with running heaters. Both Hartnett and Mendoza were aware of these conditions and observed the inmates during the night.

At approximately 5:30 A.M. on October 30, each inmate was provided a meal consisting of milk, cereal, and a peanut butter and jelly sandwich. ² Soon after, Warden Hartnett informed the inmates that, if they refused to go to work, they would be forced to remain outside for another night to "freeze again." Palmer and forty-six of the other squad members then went to work until approximately 11:30 A.M., when they returned to their unit for lunch.

Soon after he filed his complaint, Palmer moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability. The defendants asserted the defense of qualified immunity in their answer. The defendants then moved for summary judgment based on the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of qualified immunity. The defendants acknowledged the occurrence of the "sleep-out" and did not deny any of Palmer's specific allegations regarding the conditions of his confinement. According to Warden Hartnett, the sleep-out was not punitive but was an administrative measure intended to gain control of unruly inmates.

The magistrate judge recommended dismissing with prejudice Palmer's claims against all of the defendants in their official capacity and against defendant Gary L. Johnson in his individual capacity. The magistrate judge concluded that defendants Hartnett and Mendoza were not entitled to qualified immunity and recommended that the district court issue a partial summary judgment granting declaratory and injunctive relief against Hartnett and Mendoza in their individual capacities and allow Palmer's claims against them for monetary damages to proceed to trial.

The district court accepted the magistrate judge's recommendations, granting in part and denying in part both Palmer's summary judgment motion and the defendants' summary judgment motion. The district court dismissed with prejudice all of Palmer's claims against Johnson as well as his claims against Hartnett and Mendoza in their official capacities. The district court found Hartnett and Mendoza to be liable in their individual capacities for violating Palmer's rights under the Eighth Amendment and enjoined them from forcing Palmer to endure any future sleep-outs without adequate clothing or shelter. The district court ordered Palmer's claims for monetary damages against Hartnett and Mendoza in their individual capacities to proceed to trial.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), Hartnett and Mendoza moved to alter or amend the judgment or for reconsideration or in the alternative for leave to file a supplemental motion for summary judgment. The magistrate judge recommended the denial of the motion. The district court accepted the magistrate judge's recommendation and denied the defendants' motion, leaving its previous decision intact. Hartnett and Mendoza then filed a notice of interlocutory appeal, advancing their claim of entitlement to the defense of qualified immunity and challenging the magistrate judge's recommendations, the district court's partial grant of summary judgment and injunctive relief in favor of Palmer, and the district court's denial of their motion for reconsideration.

II

A

We first consider our jurisdiction to consider the merits of this interlocutory appeal. Ordinarily, we do not have jurisdiction to review a denial of a summary judgment motion because such a decision is not final within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 1291. Under the collateral order doctrine, however, a district court's denial of qualified immunity on a motion for summary judgment is immediately appealable if it is based on a conclusion of law. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 115 S. Ct. 2151 (1995); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S. Ct. 2806 (1985). Such orders are not appealable if they are based on a claim regarding the sufficiency of the evidence.

See Naylor v. State of Louisiana, Dep't of Corrections, 123 F.3d 855, 857 (5th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).

Thus, orders denying qualified immunity are immediately appealable only if they are predicated on conclusions of law, and not if a genuine issue of material fact precludes summary judgment on the question of qualified immunity. Stated another way, we have jurisdiction over law-based denials of qualified immunity, but do not have jurisdiction over a genuine-issue-of-fact-based denial of qualified immunity.

Id.; see Johnson, 515 U.S. at 313, 115 S. Ct. at 2156 (holding that district court's summary judgment order denying qualified immunity is not immediately appealable when the decision "determines only a question of 'evidence sufficiency,' i.e., which facts a party may, or may not, be able to prove at trial"). Therefore, if the district court concludes that the summary judgment record raises a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether the defense of qualified immunity is applicable, then that decision is not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. See Petta v. Rivera, 143 F.3d 895, 898 (5th Cir. 1998).

In this case, the district court's summary judgment decision addressed both qualified immunity and liability. The district court's denial of qualified immunity turned on its conclusion that the alleged conduct of Hartnett and Mendoza violated Palmer's constitutional rights and was objectively unreasonable. To the extent this determination involves a question of law, as opposed to an assessment of the facts established by or inferable from the evidence, we have jurisdiction to review the denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity; but on this interlocutory appeal we do not review in this connection the district court's assessment of what facts are established by or inferable from the evidence. Nor do we have jurisdiction to review the district court's grant of Palmer's motion for summary judgment holding that defendants are liable for violating his constitutional rights and are not entitled to qualified immunity.

B

The doctrine of qualified immunity shields a state official from personal liability for damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 when the official's exercise of discretionary authority results in a violation of an individual's federal constitutional or statutory rights, "unless at the time and under the circumstances of the challenged conduct all reasonable officials would have realized that it was proscribed by the federal law on which the suit is founded." Pierce v. Smith, 117 F.3d 866, 871 (5th Cir. 1997). The bifurcated test for qualified immunity asks whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly established right and, if so, whether the defendant's conduct was objectively unreasonable. See Hare v. City of Corinth, 135 F.2d 320, 325 (5th...