Palmer v. Murray
| Decision Date | 12 February 1889 |
| Parties | PALMER v. MURRAY. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
On motion for rehearing. 19 P. 553.
William H. De Witt, for appellant.
Cole & Whitehill, for respondent.
The plaintiff complains that there has been error in the opinion of the court-- First, in refusing to allow interest as demanded, and allowed by the jury, from the day of the illegal conversion of the property; second, that the court refused to allow the interest accruing between the date of conversion and the verdict to be capitalized, and thus included in the judgment. She also complains that the court has erroneously imposed upon her the costs of appeal.
The complaint alleges that the defendant wrongfully carried away and converted to his own use certain personal property of the plaintiff, to her damage in the sum of $4,500, for which she prays judgment, with interest from the date of conversion. It is true, the complaint in another count alleges that sum to be the value of the property described; but the demand is for damages, with interest thereon; and whether it be a demand in trover or replevin, it still retains the character of suit sounding in damages, and is most assuredly for an unascertained, and therefore unliquidated, demand.
We cheerfully concede that the general rule as to the measure of damages in actions of trover is the value of the converted property at the time and place of its conversion, and interest thereon as a matter of law. Sutherland, in his work on Damages, (volume 3, p. 488) announces this to be the rule in the American cases. What he means by interest as a matter of law is not very plain, unless it is that interest is allowed or refused on the amount of damage after it is ascertained when sanctioned or denied by law. Most assuredly the rule is equitable and just; but, where interest eo nomine is asked for on the amount demanded as damages it must be allowed or denied as provided in the statute.
All the obligations of individuals to each other result from either a promise, a benefit, or an injury, and, when the obligation has the sanction of the law, the interested party may compel performance. Under this classification the obligation of the defendant was to repair the injury done by the illegal conversion, but it certainly did not extend to the obligation to pay interest, for that is a separate and distinct obligation, which could exist only by contract, and in the absence of any express agreement under the provisions of the law itself, for it has been repeatedly said that interest is a creature of the law. The law-making power in Montana has undertaken to regulate the rate of interest, and to specify the contracts and debts which shall bear interest in the absence of any express agreement therefor. To be more exact section 1236, Rev. St., provides the legal rate of interest when there is no agreement, while section 1237 provides that creditors shall be allowed to collect interest at the above rate, in the absence of any agreement, upon all moneys after they become due; on any bond, bill, promissory note, or other instrument in writing; and on any judgment from the date of entry; on money lent or due on settlement of account, from date of settlement; on money received to the use of another and retained without the owner's knowledge, and on money withheld by unreasonable and vexatious delay. In neither of these classes can the demands of the plaintiff be included.
The statute regulates interest in a variety of cases in which there is no agreement, and it will be noticed that it includes all kinds of demands, except those for damages or unliquidated claims. After enumerating such a number of cases in which interest is to be allowed in the absence of any agreement, it is hardly to be contended that it would leave open the question of interest on so important a subject as that of damages. We have no doubt that it was never the intention of the law to allow interest on demands for damages from the date of the act complained of, but only from the date of damage when ascertained by judgment.
It is said that section 1237 regulates the interest only upon those matters where the relation of creditor and debtor exists; leaving to the general law of damages the question of interest. A careful analysis will readily demonstrate the fallacy of the proposition. The relation of creditor and debtor is not more apparent in the matter of open and unsettled accounts than in that of the injured party to be compensated by the wrong-doer for the injury he has occasioned. The implied promise on the part of the individual who gets the goods is to pay for them, and on the part of the trespasser to pay for the injury occasioned by his acts. To all intents the injured party is as much the creditor of the wrong-doer as the person who has parted with his goods without first receiving the express promise to pay. In both instances the law makes the contract; in the one case it obliges, and in the other it implies, a promise to pay. The subtle distinction that the law of interest as it exists in section 1237 applies only to contractive matters, or those in which the relation of debtor or creditor exists by express or implied promise, does not seem to be well founded; but rather the general rule is deducible, that interest is not to be allowed on any demands except from the day on which the exact amount due is ascertained.
Does any reason satisfactory to the mind exist why interest should be denied to the creditor until there has been a settlement agreed upon, and yet allowed on an unascertained and disputed demand for damages before it can be known whether any debt or liability on the part of the defendant actually exists? In order to determine in this action whether any debt, and, if so, what amount, actually existed on the part of the defendant, it took the judgment of the court to decide. That this was the view of the supreme court in 1872, when the case of Isaacs v. McAndrew was decided, (reported in 1 Mont. 454,) cannot be doubted. That was a demand for interest on money expended for the benefit of another; yet the court said, in denying the right: "However reasonable the claim for interest may be in the present case, we must administer the law as we find it and not take upon ourselves the duties of the legislature." In 1880 the case of Randall v. Greenhood (reported in 3 Mont. 512) was decided, in which the demand was for damages on account of the conversion of a stock of goods; and, interest being allowed from the date of conversion, it was stricken out, as not...
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