Palmer v. Palmer, 3864.

• Decision Date: 04 March 1940
• Docket Number: No. 3864.,3864.
• Citation: 31 F. Supp. 861
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: PALMER v. PALMER et al.

31 F. Supp. 861

PALMER v. PALMER et al.

No. 3864.

District Court, D. Connecticut.

March 4, 1940.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Thomas R. Robinson, of New Haven, Conn. (Woodruff & Klein, of New Haven, Conn., of counsel), for plaintiff.

Frank L. McGuire, of New London, Conn. (Hull, McGuire & Hull, of New London, Conn., and Pullman & Comley, of Bridgeport, Conn., of counsel), for defendants.

CLARK, Circuit Judge (acting as District Judge pursuant to statutory designation).

The plaintiff herein is suing to recover his inheritance in the estates of Charles T. Palmer and Louisa T. Palmer upon the claim that he is son of the former and grandson of the latter decedent. Both estates have been fully settled before the Probate Court for the District of New London, Connecticut, with no recognition even of plaintiff's existence, and plaintiff's appeals from the probate decrees of distribution have been dismissed in the Superior Court of Connecticut on the ground that he was not related to the decedents. Palmer v. Reeves, 120 Conn. 405, 182 A. 138 (affirming the dismissals). In this action brought against the distributees of the two estates, and the personal representatives of the estates of Louisa T. Palmer and those distributees who have died, plaintiff again attacks the validity of these probate decrees and asks for such legal and equitable relief as will give him his claimed shares, or their monetary equivalent, in the two estates.

Even since coming to this court, the case has had a considerable history. A plea to the jurisdiction having been denied, defendants filed extensive defenses, relying on the probate decrees. After hearings on various motions Judge Hincks eventually held in substance, on a demurrer to the defenses, that the probate decrees of distribution were final and a defense to the action if the probate court had initial jurisdiction to administer the estates by reason of the deaths of the decedents while residents of and owning property within the probate district. Thereupon plaintiff obtained permission to and did replead, asserting that Charles T. Palmer was actually a resident of New York City, and not of New London, at his death.

Accordingly the case now stands upon new pleadings filed about a year ago, consisting of a "Substituted Complaint," the defendants' "Defenses to the Second Substituted Complaint," and a "Reply" by the plaintiff. The reply was originally filed without authorization under Federal Rules 7(a) and 12, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, but an order for it has since been entered by the court. The present proceedings arise on defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings and motion for summary judgment. These are presented as two separate motions, the former dealing only with issues of law on the pleadings and the latter only with whether there were any triable issues of fact in view of the affidavits filed. I see no occasion for treating them as thus distinct. Both motions seek a single relief, judgment for the defendants; in granting that relief I feel I am justified in relying on any or all appropriate grounds disclosed by any or all the papers of record in the case. United States Trust Co. of New York v. Sears, D.C.Conn., 29 F. Supp. 643, 645.¹

Though the action was begun prior to the adoption of the new federal rules of civil procedure, yet all the present pleadings have been filed after those rules became effective. The pleadings here hardly demonstrate "the simplicity and brevity of statement which the rules contemplate." Federal Rule 84. Instead, the parties have followed the clothesbasket theory of pleading, with everything conceivable dumped in without overmuch regard for order. A long and repetitious complaint in four counts and various appendices has called forth the defendants' "defenses," twenty-three in number, strewn with incorporations by reference, and supported by an appendix thereto attached, and another attached to a former pleading and therein referred to, both running to hundreds of typewritten pages.² This document, in turn, has brought forth a reply in twenty-six counts. And that has served to bring us to the pending motions and the supporting affidavits. True, the nature of the case made extensive reference to probate records natural; but the allegations of claim and defense proper might still have remained simple and direct.

Notwithstanding this avalanche of words, the substantial issues of the case do appear. Though important, they are rather clear cut. They involve the validity and extent of the probate decrees, whether plaintiff is now entitled to attack them in view of his unsuccessful venture to that end in the Connecticut courts, and whether a genuine issue of material fact, surviving a motion for summary judgment, exists as to the place of last residence of Charles T. Palmer. In addition, there are subordinate issues involving the statute of limitations and the statute of non-claim barring claims not duly presented against the estates of Connecticut decedents.

It is the plaintiff's contention that he was born to Charles T. Palmer and Audrey A. Palmer in 1914 and that they were married in 1918. Audrey A. Palmer was named as a defendant in this action, but has not been served with process and has not appeared. Charles T. Palmer died July 22, 1922, and on August 15, 1922, Audrey A. Palmer made application to the Probate Court for the District of New London for the grant of administration on his estate, reciting under oath that the deceased last dwelt in the Town of New London and died intestate, possessed of an estate and leaving herself as his widow and Louisa T. Palmer, his mother, as his only heirs at law. The latter, describing herself as "all the heirs at law" of the deceased, signed a waiver of notice on the application. The court thereupon dispensed with notice "for cause shown" and granted administration to the defendant Reeves, who proceeded to settle the estate. In 1923, the court of probate passed an order finding that "Audrey A. Palmer is the widow, and Louisa T. Palmer, mother, are the heirs at law" and directing distribution "to the heirs at law according to law." The widow and the mother then signed an agreement of mutual distribution entitled, "Estate of Charles T. Palmer, late of New London, in said District, Deceased," wherein they stated that they were "all of the persons interested, as widow, heir, next of kin and distributees in the distributive property of the estate of said deceased," and made division of the property between them. The probate court then passed an order approving and accepting the mutual distribution and ordering it recorded, and in due course accepted the administrator's accounts showing that this distribution had been made.

The division of the property thus made was in accordance with the statutory rule of distribution of an intestate estate when the widow and the mother are the takers (now Conn.Gen.Stat.1930, § 5156);³ the widow received $2,000 outright and shared the remainder equally with the mother. The amount so divided was barely short of $800,000 after paying all taxes, claims, and expenses of administration. Of this estate plaintiff now claims two-thirds in accordance with the same statute which gives the widow one-third and children two-thirds when these survive. On this basis one-sixth is due from Audrey A. Palmer, his alleged mother, and the balance from the estate of Louisa T. Palmer and the legatees under the latter's will.

Louisa T. Palmer died in 1925, and her will was thereafter admitted to probate by the New London Court of Probate on an application made by her daughters Theodora and Virginia claiming to be all of her heirs at law and with notice waived by them and dispensed with by the court "for cause shown." Her will gave one-third of her residuary estate to her son Charles, but provided that if he did not survive her, his share should go to his child or to his children. The court appointed the two daughters and Reeves as administrators c.t.a. of the will, and they proceeded to settle this estate. On January 27, 1926, the three administrators petitioned the court to order distribution of the residuary estate to Theodora Palmer and Virginia Palmer, "the residuary legatees named in the will and the sole heirs of the estate of the late Louisa T. Palmer." The court found the allegations of this application true, ordered this distribution to be made, and accepted accounts showing that it had been made. Under this distribution each daughter received about $700,000. Plaintiff therefore claims from Reeves, as surviving administrator of this estate, and from the personal representatives of the two daughters, both now deceased (one after action brought, her representatives having been cited in the action), the sum of nearly $400,000 as that part of his inheritance from Charles T. Palmer's estate which was converted by Louisa T. Palmer before her death, and the further sum of more than $500,000 as one-third of the residuary estate due him under Louisa's will.

Plaintiff's appeals from the probate decrees of distribution, which resulted unsuccessfully, Palmer v. Reeves, supra, were taken in 1934, some years after settlements of both estates had been completed. Plaintiff alleged that he was a minor and was acting through a next friend. His appeals were duly allowed by the probate court. Gen.Stat. § 4992. In the Superior Court, Reeves, as administrator of Charles T. Palmer's estate, and Reeves and Virginia Palmer, as administrators c.t.a. of Louisa T. Palmer's estate, filed pleas to the jurisdiction asserting that appellant was not Charles's son and hence was not a person "aggrieved" by the probate orders, as required under Gen.Stat. § 4990, to support a probate appeal. After a full trial on the merits, the court found that "in each action, the appellant is Robert Byron Price, the son of William A. Price and Elizabeth M. Price, and not the son of Charles T. Palmer and Audrey Palmer,"...