Palmer v. People
| Decision Date | 14 September 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 97SC369,97SC369 |
| Citation | 964 P.2d 524 |
| Parties | Aaron Robert PALMER, Petitioner, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
David F. Vela, Colorado State Public Defender, Julie Iskenderian, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for petitioner.
Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, Martha Phillips Allbright, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Richard A. Westfall, Solicitor General, John Daniel Dailey, Deputy Attorney General, Robert Mark Russel, First Assistant Attorney General, Elizabeth Rohrbough, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Enforcement Section, Denver, Colorado, for respondent.
We review the court of appeals' decision in People v. Palmer, 944 P.2d 634, 637 (Colo.App.1997), which held that "conspiracy to commit reckless manslaughter" is a cognizable crime in Colorado. We conclude that it is not.
The gist of the crime of conspiracy is an agreement, between two or more persons, to commit or attempt to commit a crime. See § 18-2-201(1), 6 C.R.S. (1997). Conspiracy requires two distinct mental states. First, it requires the specific intent to agree to commit a particular crime. Second, it requires the specific intent--or the conscious objective--to cause the result of the crime to which the conspirators agreed.
By contrast, the culpable mental state required by the crime of reckless manslaughter is that the defendant consciously disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk that someone will be killed. The culpable mental states mandated by conspiracy and reckless manslaughter are both legally and logically inconsistent. In short, one cannot intend to cause a death unintentionally.
Our earlier cases recognizing the crimes of attempted reckless manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide based on a complicity theory are inapposite. Attempt does not require the specific intent to achieve a criminal result, and complicity is not a crime but a legal theory by which a defendant is liable for the conduct of another.
We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals on this issue only, and we vacate the defendant's conviction for conspiracy to commit reckless manslaughter. We remand this case to the court of appeals to return to the district court with the remaining directions contained in the court of appeals' decision.
The defendant, Aaron Palmer, was convicted of multiple felonies for having fired gunshots at several victims. 1 The district court sentenced Palmer to the Department of Corrections for a substantial period of time and imposed a concurrent term for the single count of conspiracy to commit reckless manslaughter that is at issue here. On appeal, Palmer argued that conspiracy to commit reckless manslaughter is not a legally cognizable crime in Colorado. Noting that conspiracy is a crime requiring a specific intention to achieve the forbidden result and that reckless manslaughter is a crime requiring recklessness with respect to the result, Palmer argued that it is logically impossible to specifically intend that an unintended death occur.
The court of appeals rejected Palmer's argument. The court of appeals determined that conspiracy does not require that the conspirator intend to cause a particular result but merely requires that the conspirator know that he or she and another are engaging in criminal conduct. See Palmer, 944 P.2d at 637. Since it is possible to know that an agreement to engage in conduct creates a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death, and to disregard that risk, the court of appeals concluded that conspiracy to commit reckless manslaughter is a legally cognizable crime. See id. In reaching this decision, the court of appeals relied on our decisions in People v. Thomas, 729 P.2d 972, 977 (Colo.1986), in which we recognized the crime of attempted reckless manslaughter, and People v. Wheeler, 772 P.2d 101, 105 (Colo.1989), in which we held that criminally negligent homicide can result in criminal liability for a complicitor.
Palmer petitioned this court for certiorari on the issue of whether conspiracy to commit reckless manslaughter is a legally cognizable crime. 2 He asserts that the culpable mental state required for conspiracy conflicts with the culpable mental state for reckless manslaughter.
We begin with a brief discussion of well-settled principles of criminal law regarding the culpable mental states defined by statute. We then distinguish conspiracy, attempt, and complicity in order to address the analogies drawn by the court of appeals between these areas of law. Lastly, we apply these legal principles to this case and conclude that conspiracy to commit reckless manslaughter is not a legally cognizable crime.
A criminal "offense" or "crime" is a violation of, or conduct defined by, any state statute for which a fine or imprisonment may be imposed. See § 18-1-104, 6 C.R.S. (1997). The General Assembly has the exclusive authority to define criminal offenses. See Bogdanov v. People, 941 P.2d 247, 250 (Colo.1997). The General Assembly alone may define proscribed conduct and the culpable mental state that must accompany such conduct. See id.
The General Assembly established four culpable mental states applicable to crimes in the Colorado Criminal Code: intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, and with criminal negligence. See § 18-1-501, 6 C.R.S. (1997). The General Assembly created precise statutory definitions of these mental states, which differ from the common usage of these same words. These statutory definitions only apply to "offenses," or crimes. See id. When these same words appear in other contexts in the criminal code, they retain their plain and ordinary meaning. See Wheeler, 772 P.2d at 103.
The General Assembly declared that all offenses in the criminal code in which the mental culpability requirement is expressed as "intentionally" or "with intent" are specific intent offenses. See § 18-1-501(5). "A person acts 'intentionally' or 'with intent' when his conscious objective is to cause the specific result proscribed by the statute defining the offense." Id.
The legislature declared that all offenses in the criminal code in which the mental culpability requirement is expressed as "knowingly" or "willfully" are general intent crimes. See § 18-1-501(6). "A person acts 'knowingly' or 'willfully' with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstance exists." Id.
"A person acts recklessly when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a result will occur or that a circumstance exists." § 18-1-501(7). "A person acts with criminal negligence when, through a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise he fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a result will occur or that a circumstance exists." § 18-1-501(3).
To summarize, the definitions of these terms, "intentionally," "knowingly," "recklessly," and "criminal negligence," that appear in section 18-1-501 apply only to the culpable mental states for "offenses," or substantive crimes established by Colorado's Criminal Code. See § 18-1-501.
Having set forth the defined culpable mental states applicable to the offenses in Colorado's Criminal Code, we examine Colorado's conspiracy, attempt, and complicity statutes and the mental state required by each statute.
One of the essential elements of a conspiracy is an agreement, between two or more persons, to commit or attempt to commit a crime:
A person commits conspiracy to commit a crime if, with the intent to promote or facilitate its commission, he agrees with another person or persons that they, or one or more of them, will engage in conduct which constitutes a crime or an attempt to commit a crime, or he agrees to aid the other person or persons in planning or commission of a crime or of an attempt to commit such crime.
Conspiracy is a substantive "offense." See § 18-1-104. Thus, the phrase "with [the] intent" as it appears in this statute refers to and relies on the statutory definition of these words for its meaning: the defendant must have the "conscious objective ... to cause the specific result proscribed by the statute defining the offense." § 18-1-501(5). Since the culpable mental state for the crime of conspiracy is "with intent," conspiracy is a specific intent crime. See § 18-1-501(5).
The crime of conspiracy requires two mental states. First, the defendant must possess the specific intent to agree to commit a particular crime. Second, the defendant must possess the specific intent to cause the result of the crime that is the subject of the agreement. Specific intent is an integral part of the crime and "must be established with the same certainty as any other material element of the crime." Armijo v. People, 157 Colo. 217, 219, 402 P.2d 79, 80 (1965). For example, in Watkins v. People, 655 P.2d 834, 838 (Colo.1982), the defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to commit the crime of escape. At the providency hearing, the district court failed to explain the elements of escape, the crime that was the object of the conspiracy. See id. We held that the advisement failed to establish the defendant's understanding of the crime of conspiracy because "conspiracy has legal significance only with respect to some other crime which is the object of the conspiracy." Id.
Having discussed the culpable mental state for the crime of conspiracy, we now address the required mental state for the crime of attempt. A criminal attempt requires that the accused act with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the underlying offense:
A person commits criminal attempt if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise...
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