Palmer v. Richardson

• Decision Date: 30 September 1873
• Citation: 1873 WL 8640,70 Ill. 544
• Parties: EUGENE P. PALMERv.MICHAEL J. RICHARDSON.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

70 Ill. 544

1873 WL 8640 (Ill.)

EUGENE P. PALMER

v.MICHAEL J. RICHARDSON.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September Term, 1873.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. JOHN G. ROGERS, Judge, presiding.

Messrs. SLEEPER & WHITON, for the appellant.

Mr. WM. T. BUTLER, and Mr. ROBERT HERVEY, for the appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE CRAIG delivered the opinion of the Court:

This was an action on the case, brought by Michael J. Richardson against Eugene P. Palmer, in the circuit court of Cook county, to recover for an alleged malicious prosecution, instituted by the latter against the former.

The cause was tried by a jury, and a verdict rendered in favor of the plaintiff for $1000. A motion for a new trial was made and overruled, and judgment entered upon the verdict, from which the defendant appealed to this court.

A reversal of the judgment is asked, mainly, on the ground that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence.

It seems to be difficult for a jury to comprehend that an innocent person may be arrested for a criminal offense, and at the same time the law afford no redress against the person who caused the arrest and prosecution, and yet, experience teaches us this is not an uncommon occurrence.

While it is a great hardship that an innocent person should be prosecuted for a criminal offense, yet it is far better for the preservation of peace, order and the well being of society that this should occasionally occur, than that the citizen should be deterred from instituting criminal prosecutions for a violation of the laws of the land.

In order for the plaintiff to recover in this case, the burden of proof was upon him to show, clearly, by a preponderance of evidence, that the defendant did not have probable cause to institute the criminal prosecution against him. Ross et al. v. Innis, 35 Ill. 487. Good faith on the part of the prosecutor is always a good defense, unless it appears that he closes his eyes to facts around him which are sufficient to convince a reasonably cautious man that no crime, in fact, has been committed by the person about to be prosecuted.

Probable cause has been defined, by this court, to be a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense charged. Richey v. McBean, 17 Ill. 65; Jacks v. Stimpson, 13 ib. 701; Ross et al. v. Innis, 35 ib. 505; Collins et al. v. Hayte, 50 ib. 353.

The main question for consideration in this case, then, is, did the plaintiff, by his proof, tested by the correct rules of law that govern this class of cases, make a case which justified the jury in rendering the verdict they did?

Upon a careful examination of the facts in this case, as shown by the record, we have arrived at the conclusion that the verdict is manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence, and that the jury did not comprehend the law as applicable to the evidence in the case.

The prosecution instituted by the defendant, Palmer, which the jury found to be malicious and without probable cause, so far as it is material to state them, grew out of these facts:

About 4 o'clock on the morning of the fire in Chicago, Oct. 9, 1871, the plaintiff and one Carrager, with a horse and wagon, went to the store of Hotchkin, Palmer & Co., which was about to be burned, and loaded their wagon with valuable goods, worth from $1500 to $2000, and started to the place of business of plaintiff; as the wagon started, Palmer's attention was called to it by his clerk, and he followed and got upon the wagon. The three men had not proceeded far, when a controversy arose between Palmer and Richardson in regard to where the...