Palmer v. State

• Decision Date: 14 March 1890
• Citation: 19 A. 1003,65 N.H. 221
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court
• Parties: PALMER v. STATE.

19 A. 1003

65 N.H. 221

PALMER

v. STATE.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Rockingham.

March 14, 1890.

G. Marston and C. Page, for petitioner. D. Barnard, Atty. Gen., and S. W. Emery, for the State.

CLARK, J. This is a petition for a new trial in a capital case, on the ground that one of the jurors had formed an opinion of the guilt of the petitioner before hearing any evidence, and was prejudiced and incompetent to sit upon the trial, and because the jury improperly had a view of the locality where the murder was committed, without the order of the court, and without the knowledge of the petitioner or his counsel. The matters alleged as reasons for a new trial were not known to the petitioner or his counsel until a short time before the filing of the petition. The petition was presented at the fourth term after the judgment, and adjourned into the law term for a hearing of all questions of law and fact.

In support of the first ground upon which the application for a new trial is based, the petitioner has introduced the evidence of five witnesses tending to show that Samuel P. Eaton, the foreman of the jury by whom the petitioner was tried, had said in substance, at different times after the trial, that, the moment he set his eyes on Palmer, he made up his mind that he was guilty; that he was satisfied from his appearance that he was a villain and a guilty man; and that on one or more occasions he added that all the evidence in the world would not change his opinion. Under the general rule, resting upon grounds of public policy, that the testimony of jurors is not admissible to impeach their verdict, (Knight v. Epsom, 62 N. H. 356.) this evidence would not be received. If the testimony of a juror is not admissible to impeach the verdict, evidence of his declarations cannot be received for that purpose. But, following the precedent of Buzzell v. State, 59 N. H. 61, in the mode of procedure, and the broad principles of equity and justice, there adopted, the ordinary rule has been waived in favor of the petitioner, and the evidence has been received and considered.

The state has introduced the testimony of Eaton, who denies having made the statements testified to by some of the witnesses, and says that he does not recollect making such statements to any one at any time; that he never saw the petitioner before he saw him in the court-room, on the day before the jury was impaneled; that he had no bias, prejudice, or malice against him when he was called, examined, and sworn as a juror, and had not then formed any opinion as to his guilt or innocence; and that he did not come to a decision of that question until after hearing all the evidence produced at the trial. The stenographer's minutes of Eaton's examination prior to his being sworn as a juror have also been furnished, in addition to the testimony of Eaton, there has been introduced the testimony of other jurors, and of the officers in charge of the jury, tending to show that his conduct and acts during the trial were inconsistent with a feeling of prejudice or bias against the petitioner. This evidence was excepted to, but it was clearly...