Palmer v. State

• Decision Date: 12 December 1985
• Docket Number: No. 284S74,284S74
• Parties: Thomas L. PALMER, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 477

486 N.E.2d 477

Thomas L. PALMER, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

No. 284S74.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Dec. 12, 1985.

George W. Gesenhues, Jr., Lorch Moyer Gesenhues & Bitzegaio, New Albany, for appellant-defendant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen. of Ind., Michael Gene Worden, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee-plaintiff.

SHEPARD, Justice.

This is a direct appeal from a jury conviction for rape, a class B felony, Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-4-1(a) (Burns 1985 Repl.). Appellant-defendant, Thomas L. Palmer, received a prison term of twenty years.

Appellant raises the following five issues in this appeal:

(1) Whether the Indiana insanity defense statute denies due process and equal protection;

(2) Whether the statute permitting a verdict of guilty but mentally ill is unconstitutional because it permits convictions absent proof of intent beyond a reasonable doubt;

(3) Whether appellant's tendered instruction regarding post-trial insanity proceedings was erroneously refused by the trial court;

(4) Whether the trial court erred by refusing to appoint a medical expert to assist in the preparation of appellant's defense; and

(5) Whether the trial court erred by denying appellant's motion for mistrial based upon alleged prosecutorial misconduct stemming from improper cross-examination.

These are the facts which tend to support the trial court's judgment. On December 8, 1982, the prosecutrix was raped several times by appellant. Appellant went to the victim's house at ten o'clock that evening. The two were conversing when suddenly appellant struck her face, twisted her arm behind her back, taped her mouth, removed her clothes, and tied her hands with twine. Appellant brought the tape and twine with him to the victim's house. He had borrowed blue duct tape, similar to the tape exhibited as State's evidence, from a friend shortly before he went to the victim's house. Appellant testified that he loved the victim and intended to knock her unconscious so he could have sexual intercourse with her. After appellant made sure that the front and back doors were locked, he raped the victim at least three times during a five hour period. Appellant left her house at 3:30 a.m. and was subsequently arrested.

After being advised of his constitutional rights, appellant waived these rights and gave a full confession to the police. The waiver and taped confession were both admitted into evidence at his trial. While he was incarcerated, appellant wrote a letter to the prosecutrix wherein he apologized and also requested that the victim ask the prosecutor to seek help for him rather than a prison sentence.

Prior to trial appellant filed notice of his insanity defense. The three court appointed psychiatrists who examined him concluded appellant was probably legally sane at the time he committed the offense, although he did exhibit an anti-social personality and had a history of alcohol and drug abuse. The psychiatrists further testified that appellant's ability to function was not impaired by any psychiatric disorder.

During the trial several witnesses, including close friends of appellant who were called to testify on his behalf, opined that he knew right from wrong. In addition, the victim testified that when appellant raped her he stated that this "was about the worse thing that anyone could do to anybody." Appellant admitted that he went to the victim's house "with the intention of destroying" her. He was frustrated because he felt that the victim had "jilted" him and he wanted "to pay her back". Appellant also testified that he knew what he was doing when he raped her. He also told one court appointed psychiatrist that he knew he wasn't crazy when he raped her but that he just didn't care at the time.

The jury was presented with the alternative verdicts available under Ind.Code Sec. 35-36-2-3 (Burns 1985 Repl.) when the insanity defense is interposed and returned a guilty verdict.

I & II Constitutional Issues

Appellant argues that the Indiana insanity defense statute is unconstitutionally vague and that it denies a defendant equal protection and due process of law. He maintains that the distinctions between the insanity and guilty but mentally ill verdicts permitted under Ind.Code Sec. 35-36-2-3 (Burns 1985 Repl.) are insufficiently drawn and are not based on scientific psychological definitions. He contends that the court-appointed psychiatrists used these terms interchangeably and inconsistently and that therefore they were confused about the meaning of these statutory definitions.

This Court has previously determined that the insanity statute does not violate equal protection or due process of law. Green v. State (1984), Ind., 469 N.E.2d 1169; Taylor v. State (1982), Ind., 440 N.E.2d 1109. We similarly found that the statutory definitions of mentally ill and insanity are not unconstitutionally vague. Taylor, 440 N.E.2d at 1111-1112. While the psychiatrists' testimony does not appear to be confusing, such confusion would be an insufficient basis to establish the unconstitutionality of this statute.

Appellant also claims that the guilty but mentally ill verdict permits convictions absent proof of intent beyond a reasonable doubt. Essentially, appellant maintains that a person who is mentally ill is unable to entertain the requisite mens rea, yet, such a person may be convicted of a crime under the provisions of this statute which permit a verdict of guilty but mentally ill.

Appellant does not have standing to raise this issue. To have standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute appellant must establish that his rights were adversely affected by the operation of the statute. State v. Clark (1966), 247 Ind. 490, 217 N.E.2d 588; Terrel v. State (1976), 170 Ind.App. 422, 353 N.E.2d 553. In this case, the jury had to find that appellant intended to rape the prosecutrix before rendering their guilty verdict. Appellant was therefore not harmed by the alleged defect in the guilty but mentally ill statute. Moreover, if there was any error, we deem it to be harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. There is little probability that the availability of the guilty but mentally ill verdict contributed to appellant's conviction and thereby affected his substantial rights. Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705.

III Instructions

Appellant argues that his tendered instruction regarding the post-trial insanity proceedings was erroneously refused by the trial court. The trial court submitted to the jury forms of verdicts tracking verbatim the alternatives contained in Ind.Code Sec. 35-36-2-3. Appellant claims that a form containing the phrase "not responsible by reason of insanity" incorrectly suggests to the jury that the defendant would be set free if the jury returns this verdict. He maintains that the following tendered instruction was necessary to cure the misleading impression which was allegedly conveyed to the jury by the verdict forms:

The Court further charges you that if you find the defendant, Thomas L. Palmer, not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, this does not mean that he will be free to live in society again. Under our law if a person is acquitted by reason of mental disease or defect, this Court may order him to the care and custody of the Department of Mental Health for commitment if he is considered mentally incompetent and/or dangerous to himself or to others.

Appellant is not entitled to have the jury instructed on the statutory procedure to be followed upon a verdict of not responsible by reason of insanity, Tyson v. State (1979), 270 Ind. 458, 386 N.E.2d 1185; Johnson v. State (1977), 265 Ind. 689, 359 N.E.2d 525, unless an erroneous view of the law has been presented to the jury. Dipert v. State (1972), 259 Ind. 260, 286 N.E.2d 405. An instruction on the post-trial insanity proceedings should not be given to the jury when the record does not indicate that the jury has been erroneously informed. Dailty v. State (1980), 273 Ind. 595, 406 N.E.2d 1172. Here, the verdict forms recited the precise words of the statute. We fail to see how those words can be said to convey an erroneous impression of the law. The trial court is affirmed on this question.

IV Expert Assistance

Appellant argues the trial court erred by refusing to appoint a medical expert to assist in the preparation of his defense. On January 24, 1983, appellant filed his notice to interpose the insanity defense and moved the court to appoint three psychiatrists to examine him. Two days later the trial court ordered that defendant be examined "by three (3) psychiatrists for the purpose of determining whether or not he was sane or insane at the time of the commission of the offense of Rape and whether or not he is presently able to stand trial and aide in his defense." After the examinations were conducted, the psychiatrists filed their psychiatric evaluations and the State delivered the psychiatric evaluations to appellant. Two days later, counsel filed a motion for the provision of funds to hire a medical expert to assist in the preparation of defendant's insanity defense. This motion was based upon the need to "provide the defendant with his equal protection, fair trial, and effective assistance of counsel rights." The trial court denied the motion. Appellant claims the trial court's refusal to appoint an expert constituted an abuse of discretion and was prejudicial to the preparation of his case because:

(1) the court appointed psychiatrists did not comprehend our insanity defense statute, and

(2) the court appointed psychiatrists conducted a cursory one-hour examination of appellant and did not investigate his life history or family background.

Indiana has long recognized that it is appropriate under certain circumstances to appoint experts to assist a defendant in preparation for trial. The trial court must provide access to experts where...