Palmer v. United States

• Decision Date: 10 June 2021
• Docket Number: 17-CV-581S,11-CR-202S (1)
• Parties: CHARLES PALMER, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of New York

CHARLES PALMER, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

17-CV-581S

11-CR-202S (1)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

June 10, 2021

DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Presently before this Court are Petitioner Charles Palmer's pro se Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct his Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and motions related thereto. For the reasons discussed below, Palmer's § 2255 motion is denied, and the related motions are resolved as set forth herein.

II. BACKGROUND

On December 22, 2014, Palmer appeared before this Court and pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute, and possess with intent to distribute, five kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.¹ See Docket Nos. 399, 400. He did so with the benefit of a plea agreement, in which he agreed that his mandatory minimum sentence by statute was a 10-year term of imprisonment and that his maximum possible sentence by statute was life imprisonment, a fine of $10,000,000, a mandatory special assessmentof $100, and supervised release of at least five years and up to life. See Plea Agreement, Docket No. 399, ¶ 1.

Palmer further agreed that his Sentencing Guidelines calculations were dependent on whether the Career Offender guideline in § 4B1.1 (b)(1) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G.") applied. Id. ¶ 7. If, as the government believed, the guideline applied, Palmer agreed that he would have a total offense level of 34 and a criminal history category of VI, which would result in a Guidelines sentencing range of 262-327 months' imprisonment, a fine of $17,500 to $10,000,000, and a 5-year term of supervised release. Id. ¶ 10 (a). If, as Palmer believed, the guideline did not apply, Palmer agreed that he would have a total offense level of 27 and a criminal history category of III, which, given the mandatory minimum sentence, would result in a Guidelines sentencing range of 120 months' imprisonment, a fine of $12,500 to $10,000,000, and a 5-year term of supervised release. Id. ¶ 10 (b). Either way, Palmer waived his right to appeal or collaterally attack any sentence of 240 months' imprisonment or less. Id. ¶ 17.

On April 22, 2015, this Court found that Palmer was a Career Offender under the Guidelines, consistent with the government's position and the probation officer's Presentence Investigation Report, and sentenced him to 144 months' imprisonment, 5 years' supervised release, a $100 special assessment, and no fine, fees, or costs. See Docket Nos. 476, 524. The Clerk of Court entered judgment on April 28, 2015. See Docket No. 480.

Palmer filed the equivalent of a Notice of Appeal on May 5, 2015. See Docket Nos. 481, 489, 491. On January 17, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for theSecond Circuit granted the government's motion to dismiss Palmer's appeal as barred by the waiver of appellate rights in the plea agreement. See Docket No. 548. The court specifically found that Palmer failed to demonstrate that the appeal waiver was unenforceable. See id. The court entered its mandate on March 13, 2017. See id.

Palmer filed the instant Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct his Sentence on June 26, 2017. See Docket No. 550. He thereafter filed a series of related motions² and submissions, the last of which he filed on March 11, 2020. See Docket Nos. 551, 553, 566, 569, 570, 572, 575, 576, 578, 579, 581. The government responded to Palmer's petition on October 23, 2017. See Docket No. 565. This Court took all pending matters under advisement without oral argument.

III. DISCUSSION

A. § 2255 Proceedings

Twenty-eight U.S.C. § 2255 allows federal prisoners to challenge the legality of their sentences. That section provides, in pertinent part, that:

A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.

28 U.S.C. § 2255 (a).

Importantly, a § 2255 motion is not a substitute for an appeal. See Bousley v.United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621, 118 S. Ct. 1604, 140 L. Ed. 2d 828 (1998) ("Habeas review is an extraordinary remedy and 'will not be allowed to do service for an appeal.'") (quoting Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 354, 114 S. Ct. 2291, 2300, 129 L. Ed. 2d 277 (1994)). Relief under § 2255 is therefore narrowly limited, with collateral attack on a final criminal judgment available "only for a constitutional error, a lack of jurisdiction in the sentencing court, or an error of law or fact that constitutes a fundamental defect which inherently results in complete miscarriage of justice." Graziano v. United States, 83 F.3d 587, 589-90 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Bokun, 73 F.3d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted)). This narrow limitation preserves respect for finality, allows for the efficient allocation of judicial resources, and recognizes an aversion to retrying issues long after they occur. See Bokun, 73 F.3d at 12 (citations omitted).

To shape the narrow relief available under § 2255, two procedural rules apply to make it more difficult for a defendant to upset a final criminal judgment on collateral review. See Yick Man Mui v. United States, 614 F.3d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 2010). First, the "mandate rule" bars re-litigation of issues already decided on direct appeal. See id.; see also Burrell v. United States, 467 F.3d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Perez, 129 F.3d 255, 260 (2d Cir. 1997) ("[I]t is well-established that issues decided on direct appeal may not be re-litigated in the context of a petition under § 2255.") This includes "not only . . . matters expressly decided by the appellate court, but also . . . re-litigation of issues impliedly resolved by the appellate court's mandate." Yick Man Mui, 614 F.3d at 53 (citing United States v. Ben Zvi, 242 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2001)). But an exception exists for cases involving intervening changes in the law, in which case the petitioner"must show that there is new law which, when applied to their claims, would result in a different disposition." Chin v. United States, 622 F.2d 1090, 1092 (2d Cir. 1980) ("Reconsideration [of claims previously raised on direct appeal] is permitted only where there has been an intervening change in the law and the new law would have exonerated a defendant had it been in force before the conviction was affirmed on direct appeal.") (citing United States v. Loschiavo, 531 F.2d 659, 664 (2d Cir. 1976)).

Second, the "procedural default" rule bars the collateral review of non-constitutional, non-jurisdictional claims that could have been raised on direct appeal, unless the petitioner shows cause for failing to raise the claims on direct review and actual prejudice or actual innocence. See Bousley, 523 U.S. at 622-23 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Thorn, 659 F.3d 227, 231 (2d Cir. 2011); Brennan v. United States, 867 F.2d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 1989) ("non-constitutional and non-jurisdictional claims are generally procedurally foreclosed to a section 2255 petitioner if not raised on direct appeal"). To satisfy the cause component, the petitioner must show circumstances "external to the petitioner, something that cannot be fairly attributed to him." Marone v. United States, 10 F.3d 65, 67 (2d Cir. 1993). To satisfy the prejudice component, the petitioner must demonstrate prejudice that creates an "actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting . . . error of constitutional dimensions." See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 71 L. Ed. 2d 816 (1982). To establish actual innocence, the petitioner must show "that, in light of all the evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him." Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But this rule does not apply to ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, which may be brought in a § 2255 motion regardless ofwhether they could have been raised, or were raised, on direct appeal. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 508-09, 123 S. Ct. 1690, 1696, 155 L. Ed. 2d 714 (2003).

In addition to these two rules, waiver principles also apply. It is well established that a knowing, voluntary, and competent waiver made as part of a plea agreement is presumptively and generally enforceable. See Sanford v. United States, 841 F.3d 578, 580 (2d Cir. 2016) (per curiam); see also United States v. Riggi, 649 F.3d 143, 147 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Hernandez, 242 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2001). "An enforceable waiver bars claims based on grounds that arose after, as well as before, the [plea] agreement was signed." Muniz v. United States, 360 F. Supp. 2d 574, 577 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing Garcia-Santos v. United States, 273 F.3d 506, 509 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam)). Thus, "[i]n no circumstance . . . may a [petitioner] who has secured the benefits of a plea agreement and knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to appeal a certain sentence, then appeal the merits of a sentence conforming to the agreement. Such a remedy would render the plea bargaining process and the resulting agreement meaningless." United States v. Salcido-Contreras, 990 F.2d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1993). Waivers, however, are strictly construed against the government due to its greater bargaining power and because it usually drafts the plea agreement. See Yushuvayev v. United States, 532 F. Supp. 2d 455, 468 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).

Discovery in § 2255 proceedings is governed by Rule 6 of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts. Leave of court is required to engage in discovery, which may be granted for good...