Palmer v. Walker Jamar Co.

• Decision Date: 01 July 2020
• Docket Number: A18-2114,A19-0155
• Citation: Palmer v. Walker Jamar Co., 945 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 2020)
• Parties: Deborah J. PALMER, surviving spouse and TRUSTEE FOR the heirs of Gary J. PALMER, Appellant, v. WALKER JAMAR COMPANY, Defendant, Honeywell International, Inc., Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

945 N.W.2d 844

Deborah J. PALMER, surviving spouse and TRUSTEE FOR the heirs of Gary J. PALMER, Appellant,

v.WALKER JAMAR COMPANY, Defendant,Honeywell International, Inc., Respondent.

A18-2114

A19-0155

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Filed: July 1, 2020

DeWayne Johnston, Johnston Law Office, P.C., Grand Forks, North Dakota; and David C. Thompson, David C. Thompson, P.C., Grand Forks, North Dakota, for appellant.

Mark R. Bradford, Jonathan C. Marquet, Jeffrey R. Peters, Bassford Remele, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent Honeywell International, Inc.

Sarah E. Bushnell, Jeffrey M. Markowitz, Arthur, Chapman, Kettering, Smetak & Pikala, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Cheryl Hood Langel, Brian J. Kluk, McCollum Crowley P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota Defense Lawyers Association.

OPINION

GILDEA, Chief Justice.

This case asks us to determine when a claim accrues in an asbestos-related wrongful death action. Appellant Deborah Palmer brought this wrongful death action against respondent Honeywell International after her husband, Gary Palmer, died from mesothelioma.¹ The district court granted summary judgment for Honeywell, concluding that the statute of limitations bars Deborah's claim because she filed her action more than 6 years after Gary learned that exposure to asbestos had caused his mesothelioma. The court of appeals affirmed. Palmer v. Walker Jamar Co. , Nos. A18-2114, A19-0155, 2019 WL 4409720 (Minn. App. Sept. 16, 2019). Because we conclude that a claim accrues in an asbestos-related wrongful death action when the fatal disease is causally linked to asbestos, we affirm.

FACTS

The facts are undisputed. In 2009, Gary's pulmonologist informed him that he had calcium deposits on his lungs due to asbestos exposure. On December 24, 2011, Gary was diagnosed with mesothelioma. The next month, in January 2012, Gary learned that asbestos exposure had caused his mesothelioma. Gary and Deborah filed an asbestos-related product liability action in North Dakota against 177 companies the following year.

Gary died of mesothelioma on March 1, 2015. On February 23, 2018, Deborah filed this action under Minn. Stat. § 573.02, subd. 3 (2018), against Honeywell.² She alleged that Gary contracted mesothelioma and died because he was exposed to asbestos-containing brake products sold by Bendix Corporation.³ Deborah asserted that Gary was exposed to the brake products while he worked as a janitor at a car dealership for 4 months in 1974.

Honeywell moved for summary judgment, arguing that Deborah's action was barred because she filed it outside of the 6-year period of limitations. In the alternative, Honeywell argued that Deborah failed to establish that Gary was exposed to Bendix brake products. The district court agreed with Honeywell and granted its motion for summary judgment. Because Gary knew in January 2012 that asbestos exposure had caused his mesothelioma, and because Deborah did not file her action until February 2018, the district court concluded that the statute of limitations barred Deborah's action. The district court further determined that Deborah failed to provide any evidence that Gary was exposed to Bendix brake products.

Deborah appealed, arguing that the district court erred in concluding that the statute of limitations barred her action. Palmer , 2019 WL 4409720, at *1. She asserted that the period of limitations did not begin to run until Gary could identify Bendix brake products as the cause of his mesothelioma. Id. at *4. The court of appeals rejected her argument, determining that the period of limitations began in January 2012 when Gary became aware that exposure to asbestos had caused his mesothelioma. Id. at *5. The court of appeals concluded that the statute of limitations barred Deborah's action because she filed suit more than 6 years later.⁴ Id.

We granted Deborah's petition for review.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Deborah argues that her wrongful death claim did not accrue—and therefore the period of limitations did not begin to run—until it was reasonably discoverable that Bendix brake products were the proximate cause of Gary's mesothelioma.⁵ In response, Honeywell asserts that the period of limitations began when Gary learned that exposure to asbestos had caused his mesothelioma.

This case comes to our court on review of the entry of summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and "the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01. There are no material facts in dispute in this case, and the only question before us is whether the district court properly determined when Deborah's wrongful death claim accrued.⁶ Determining when a wrongful death claim accrues is a question of law that we review de novo. MacRae v. Grp. Health Plan, Inc. , 753 N.W.2d 711, 716 (Minn. 2008).

In Minnesota, plaintiffs have 6 years after the wrongful act or omission to bring a wrongful death claim. Minn. Stat. § 573.02, subd. 1 (2018) ("When death is caused by the wrongful act or omission of any person or corporation, ... [the] action ... may be commenced within three years after the date of death provided that the action must be commenced within six years after the act or omission.").⁷ An "[a]ction[ ] can only be commenced ... after the cause of action accrues ...." Minn. Stat. § 541.01 (2018). And a cause of action "accrue[s] at such time as it could be brought in a court of law without dismissal for failure to state a claim." Dalton v. Dow Chem. Co. , 280 Minn. 147, 158 N.W.2d 580, 584 (1968).

We apply the "some damage" rule to determine when a claim accrues. Hansen v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n , 934 N.W.2d 319, 327 (Minn. 2019). Under this rule, "the statute of limitations begins to run when ‘some’ damage has occurred as a result of the alleged [negligent act]." Antone v. Mirviss , 720 N.W.2d 331, 336 (Minn. 2006) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Dalton , 158 N.W.2d at 585 ("Until there is some damage, there is no claim and certainly a statute prescribing the time in which suit must be filed ... can never operate prior to the time a suit would be permitted." (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Most relevant here, we have applied the some damage rule to determine when a claim accrues in an asbestos-related wrongful death action. DeCosse v. Armstrong Cork Co. , 319 N.W.2d 45 (Minn. 1982). DeCosse brought a wrongful death action against respondent manufacturers after learning that her husband may have died from mesothelioma caused by asbestos exposure. Id. at 47. Mr. DeCosse had died 4 years earlier. Id. at 46–47. The respondents argued that the statute of limitations barred the wrongful death claim. Id. at 46 (citing Minn. Stat. § 573.02, subd. 1 (1976) ).

We determined that "the act or omission of exposing Mr. DeCosse to asbestos would continue until the disease manifested itself and was causally linked to respondents’ products. " Id. at 49. We further explained that although "the disease may have manifested itself some months before [Mr.] DeCosse died, it was apparently never linked to asbestos or diagnosed as a mesothelioma before death." Id. We held that, "because of the unique character of asbestos-related deaths, wrongful death actions brought in connection with those deaths accrue either upon the manifestation of the fatal disease in a way that is causally linked to asbestos , or upon the date of death—whichever is earlier." Id. at 52 (emphasis added). Because Mr. DeCosse's illness had not been causally linked to asbestos, we concluded that the claim accrued upon the date of Mr. DeCosse's death. Id. at 48–49.

DeCosse is dispositive of the question presented here. Under our holding in DeCosse , Deborah's wrongful death claim accrued in January 2012. It is undisputed that Gary knew in January 2012, years before his death, that exposure to asbestos caused the mesothelioma. Because the mesothelioma manifested itself in a way that was causally linked to asbestos before Gary died on March 1, 2015, DeCosse requires the earlier date—January 2012—as the date of accrual of the wrongful death claim, id. at 52. And because Deborah did not file this wrongful death action against Honeywell until February 2018, more than 6 years after the claim accrued, it is barred. Minn. Stat. § 573.02, subd. 1 ("Any other action under this section may be commenced within three years after the date of death provided that the action must be commenced within six years after the act or omission." (emphasis added)).

In urging us to reach a different conclusion, Deborah argues that we should adopt a discovery rule: that the point of accrual in a wrongful death claim begins when all of the elements of the cause of action, including the identity and fault of the tortfeasor, are discoverable or reasonably discoverable by the plaintiff. A discovery rule, she asserts, is consistent with federal and Minnesota law. But the cases she cites do not compel us to depart from DeCosse .

One of the cases Deborah relies on is Karjala v. Johns-Manville Products Corp. , 523 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975) (applying Minnesota substantive law). There, the jury awarded damages to the plaintiff because he had contracted asbestosis from using the defendant's asbestos products. Id. at 156. On appeal, the defendant challenged the district court's instruction to the jury. Id. at 159. The jury instruction provided, in relevant part: "The statute doesn't commence to run against [the plaintiff] until he has contracted the disease of asbestosis, and the process of contracting the disease does not cease until physical impairment manifests itself." Id. at 159 n.7. The Eighth Circuit held that the instruction "adequately and fairly instructed the jury under Minnesota law," id. at 161, determining that exposure to asbestos "is more in the nature of a continuing tort[,]" id. at 160. The court concluded that the statute of limitations for...