Palmer v. Yorks

• Decision Date: 14 June 1899
• Docket Number: 11,578 - (128)
• Citation: Palmer v. Yorks, 77 Minn. 20, 79 N. W. 587 (Minn. 1899)
• Parties: TIMOTHY R. PALMER and Another v. THOMAS J. YORKS and Another
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

79 N.W. 587

77 Minn. 20

TIMOTHY R. PALMER and Another v. THOMAS J. YORKS and Another

Nos. 11,578 - (128)

Supreme Court of Minnesota

June 14, 1899

Action in the district court for Washington county to quiet title to land.The case was tried before Crosby, J., who found in favor of plaintiffs; and from a judgment entered pursuant to the findings, defendants appealed.Affirmed.

SYLLABUS

Action to Remove a Cloud upon Title -- Action to Determine Adverse Claims -- Knudson v. Curley Overruled.

Held G.S. 1894, § 5817, authorizing the bringing of an action to determine an adverse claim to land, authorizes such an action to determine one particular adverse claim, which may be specified or described in the complaint, and, if an equity action to remove a cloud from the title cannot be sustained as such, it may still be sustained as an action to determine adverse claims under the statute, if the complaint is sufficient for that purpose; overruling former decisions holding to the contrary.

Action to Remove a Cloud upon Title -- Possession of Plaintiff Immaterial.

Where in such an action, the defendant in his answer sets up his own claims to the land, and asks to have plaintiff's claims adjudged void, the question of whether or not the plaintiff is in possession, or the land is vacant and unoccupied, is thereby rendered immaterial.

F. W. Gail and J. N. Castle, for appellants.

B. H. Schriber, for respondents.

OPINION

CANTY, J.

On May 13, 1886, one Gale was the owner of a certain quarter section of land, and on that day conveyed the same by quitclaim deed to one Senrick.Thereafter, on the 31st of the same month, Senrick, by quitclaim deed, conveyed the land to defendantThomas J. Yorks.These deeds were both recorded December 28, 1891, but not before.On August 31, 1891, Gale made a quitclaim deed of the land to plaintiff Whaley, and this deed was recorded December 11, 1891, 17 days before said other two deeds were recorded.Whaley afterwards conveyed a half interest to plaintiff Palmer.

This is an action in the form of a bill in equity to quiet plaintiffs' title.The foregoing facts are alleged in the complaint.It is further alleged, in effect, that Whaley purchased in good faith, for a valuable consideration, and without notice of the existence of said deeds to Senrick and Yorks.The prayer is that the latter deeds be canceled, and that plaintiffs be declared the owners of the land.The answer denies that plaintiffs or either of them are innocent purchasers for value, without notice; admits all of the other allegations of the complaint; alleges that Thomas J. Yorks is the owner of the land; and prays that plaintiffs be adjudged to have no right, title, or interest therein.On the trial, the court found that Whaley was an innocent purchaser for value, without notice; that plaintiffs are the owners of the land; and that the deed to Senrick and the one from him to Yorks are a cloud on plaintiffs' title; and ordered judgment that the same be cancelled.From the judgment entered thereon, defendants appeal.

Appellants contend that, as against the prior recorded deed to plaintiff Whaley, the deed to Senrick, and the deed from him to Yorks, were void on their face, and, as the court found, void in fact, and it follows that they were no cloud on plaintiffs' title, and therefore this action cannot be maintained; citing Mogan v. Carter,48 Minn. 501, 51 N.W. 614;andMaloney v. Finnegan,38 Minn. 70, 35 N.W. 723.On the other hand, respondents contend that the burden was on them to show that they were innocent purchasers for value, without notice; citing Roussain v. Patten,46 Minn. 308, 48 N.W. 1122(see alsoMead v. Randall,68 Minn. 233, 71 N.W. 31); that, therefore, on the face of the records in the office of the register of deeds, defendants were prima facie the owners of the land, and it would take parol evidence to show they were not; but plaintiffs were the owners, and that, therefore, the deed to Senrick, and the deed from him to Yorks, were a cloud on plaintiffs' title, and a bill in equity to remove that cloud can be maintained.The latter deeds were kept off record for more than five and a half years.

Speaking for myself alone, I will say that it seems to me that a deed as stale as these were at the time they were recorded is discredited on its face, and there should be no presumption that it conveys a title paramount to a deed subsequently executed, and first recorded.As between the immediate parties, the doctrine of Roussain v. Patten and Mead v. Randall is properly applied to a case where the prior instrument subsequently recorded is of recent date, or where an apparently bona fide attempt to record it was made, but failed by reason of some mistake, as was the case in Nickerson v. Wells-Stone Mercantile Co.,71 Minn. 230, 74 N.W....