Palmquist v. Mercer

• Decision Date: 25 June 1954
• Citation: 43 Cal.2d 92,272 P.2d 26
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: PALMQUIST v. MERCER et al. L. A. 22604

Page 26

272 P.2d 26

43 Cal.2d 92

PALMQUIST v. MERCER et al.

L. A. 22604.

Supreme Court of California

June 25, 1954.

Fred N. Howser, Arcadia, Russell H. Pray and Eric A. Rose, Long Beach, for appellant.

Parker, Stanbury, Reese & McGee, Richard E. Reese, Los Angeles, Ball, Hunt & Hart, Clarence S. Hunt, Long Beach, Moss, Lyon & Dunn, Sidney A. Moss, Henry F. Walker, Los Angeles, for respondents.

SPENCE, Justice.

Plaintiff sought damages for personal injuries sustained by him while riding a horse which he had rented from a riding academy. At the close of plaintiff's case, the court granted defendants' motions for nonsuit, and plaintiff appeals from the judgment subsequently entered. Upon consideration of the record, we have concluded that plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to require submission of the case to the jury as to defendant Mercer, who was the owner of the riding academy, but that the nonsuit was properly granted as to the other defendants.

A motion for nonsuit may properly be granted '* * * when, and only when, disregarding conflicting evidence, and giving to plaintiff's evidence all the value to which it is legally entitled, indulging in every legitimate inference which may be drawn from that evidence, the result is a determination that there is no evidence of sufficient substantiality to support a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.' Card v. Boms, 210 Cal. 200, 202, 291 P. 190, 191, see also, Blumberg v. M. & T. Incorporated, 34 Cal.2d 226, 229, 209 P.2d 1; Golceff v. Sugarman, 36 Cal.2d 152, 153, 222 P.2d 665. 'Unless it can be said as a matter of law that * * * no other reasonable conclusion is legally deducible from the evidence, and that any other holding would be so lacking in evidentiary support that a reviewing court would be impelled to reverse it upon appeal, or the trial court to set it aside as a matter of law, the trial court is not justified in taking the case from the jury.' Estate of Lances, 216 Cal. 397, 400, 14 P.2d 768, 769; see, also, Raber v. Tumin, 36 Cal.2d 654, 656, 226 P.2d 574.

On October 10, 1950, plaintiff and his wife visited defendant Mercer's riding academy at 223rd Street and Golden Avenue in the city of Long Beach. Plaintiff told the attendant that they would like to rent two horses and asked for 'a couple of old nags.' He explained that he had not been on a horse in six or seven years, that his companion had never previously ridden at any time, and that they would like 'tame and gentle horses.' The attendant said that he would 'fix them up' and asked plaintiff to come into the office. Plaintiff there signed the register pad, as requested, and then followed the attendant out of the room. He was in the office approximately fifteen seconds. He did not read the paper that he signed, a printed form which was introduced at the trial as Exhibit D and which contained a general release of the academy from any liability. Plaintiff was not requested to read the form nor were its provisions called to his attention, but neither was he prevented from reading it.

After again discussing plaintiff's need for 'gentle' horses, the attendant chose a horse named 'Doc' for plaintiff and another horse for plaintiff's wife. At the time plaintiff mounted 'Doc,' the horse was feeding at a trough. When plaintiff tried to get the horse to move away, it refused to respond to his reining, and it was necessary for the attendant to lead the horse from the trough. The attendant told plaintiff to go north on Golden Avenue, west on 223rd Street, and then north again under a pipe trestle. The horses proceeded out of the driveway and at Golden and 223rd Street, the horses, of their own accord, turned east. After going some thirty feet, plaintiff and his wife succeeded in turning the horses west. They continued a short distance, when the horses, again of their own accord, turned into a stable, walked to a water trough, began drinking, and for a time could not be guided away as plaintiff pulled on the left rein. Finally, the horses, plaintiff's mount in the lead, left the trough of their own volition and retraced the way to the riding academy. Plaintiff told the attendant that they were having trouble managing their horses. Upon reassuring them that 'there was nothing wrong with the horses,' the attendant gave a demonstration of how to direct the horses by use of the reins. He then accompanied them back to the intersection of Golden and 223rd Street, and then west on 223rd Street until they were opposite a pipe line trestle located on the north side of the street. There was a road going west under the trestle and then making a bend and proceeding in a northerly direction. The attendant told them to bend over going under the trestle and then to ride as far as they liked.

The trestle traverses the Los Angeles River in an east-west direction and carries oil pipe lines of defendants Union Oil Company of California and Tidewater Associated Oil Company. It was built and maintained with permission from the Los Angeles Flood Control District, on public property under the control of the district.

Plaintiff and his wife rode under the trestle along the indicated road, with plaintiff's horse in the lead. After proceeding about four hundred feet to the north at a walk, plaintiff turned his head to the left and called to his wife. As he made this movement, plaintiff's horse suddenly reeled about to the left and began racing back on the road toward the trestle, gaining speed as it went. Plaintiff attempted in vain to control or stop the horse by pulling back on the reins as hard as he could with both hands, but the horse kept going faster, passed plaintiff's wife and ran around the bend in the road towards the trestle. Immediately before the accident and at a distance of some eight to ten feet from the trestle, plaintiff noticed some underhanging beams stretching over the traveled area at a height of about six feet. Plaintiff was then lying flat in the saddle, with his head held down as far to the right as he could get it and his left shoulder pointing upward. His left shoulder and neck hit a stationary object such as the understructure of the pipe trestle, and plaintiff blacked out. When he regained consciousness he was lying immediately to the south of the pipe trestle, approximately five feet from the nearest substructure of the trestle and immediately south of the traveled area under the trestle. As a result of the accident, plaintiff is permanently paralyzed from the waist down.

Plaintiff, who was twenty-one years of age when the accident occurred, sought damages from defendants Mercer, owner of the riding academy and stables; the Union Oil Company, owner of the trestle; and Tidewater Associated Oil Company, which maintained a pipe line upon the trestle. Plaintiff's complaint rests on two theories of recovery: breach of warranty and negligence. The breach of warranty cause of action is directed only against defendant Mercer and is based on the alleged unsuitability of the horse rented to plaintiff in view of plaintiff's disclosed inexperience in riding. The negligence cause of action is directed against all three defendants: against Mercer in assigning to plaintiff a horse allegedly known to be both dangerous and unmanageable, and in telling plaintiff to ride along what appeared to be a public road whereon a hazardous condition existed; and against the two oil companies in maintaining a hazardous condition, the trestle, without providing reasonably effective safeguards. By separate answer defendant Mercer denied plaintiff's charges of breach of warranty and negligence, and he pleaded as an affirmative defense that plaintiff failed to exercise ordinary care in the control of his horse and in observing the route over which he was traveling. Upon stipulation of the parties, defendant Mercer filed an amendment to his answer setting up as a second affirmative defense the written release of the riding academy signed by plaintiff. The oil companies in their answers denied plaintiff's charges of negligence and pleaded that any injuries sustained by plaintiff were caused by his own lack of ordinary care. At the close of plaintiff's case, the respective defendants successfully moved for a nonsuit; Mercer on the ground that the release of the riding academy constituted a bar to plaintiff's recovery from him as a matter of law; and the two oil companies on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to impose liability upon them.

In support of the nonsuit exonerating him from liability, defendant Mercer relies on the release signed by plaintiff at the time of hiring the horses. It stated that plaintiff did 'fully and forever release and discharge the Equestrotel Riding Academy and the operators thereof from any and all claims, demands, damages, rights of action or causes of action on account of either known or unknown, concealed or hidden, external or internal, personal, physical injuries, damages or causes, or otherwise, or damages or injuries of every kind and character resulting from or which may result from or during the rental time therein provided, either directly or indirectly * * *. I expressly rent the horse at my own risk and assume full responsibility for all matters resulting from or that may occur by reason thereof and agree to pay the rental charges on demand.' Admittedly plaintiff was not prevented from reading the release, and whether he did or not would be immaterial. As stated in Smith v. Occidental etc., Steamship Co., 99 Cal. 462, at pages 470-471, 34 P. 84, 86: 'The general rule is that, when a person with the capacity of reading and understanding an instrument signs it, he is, in the absence of fraud and imposition, bound by its contents, and is estopped from saying that its provisions are contrary to his intentions or understanding'. See also, Nichols v. Hitchcock Motor Co., 22 Cal.App.2d 151, 153 et seq., 70 P.2d 654.

Plaintiff maintains that the question of validity of the...