Palumbo v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.

• Citation: 199 N.E. 335,293 Mass. 35
• Parties: PALUMBO v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.
• Decision Date: 31 December 1935
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

293 Mass. 35
199 N.E. 335

PALUMBO
v.
METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

Dec. 31, 1935.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Worcester County; Donnelly, Judge.

Action of contract by Lucia Palumbo against the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. Verdict for plaintiff in the sum of $515, and defendant brings exceptions.

Exceptions sustained.

[293 Mass. 35]M. J. Rubin and J. C. McDonald, both of Worcester, for plaintiff.

L. E. Stockwell, of Worcester, for defendant.

LUMMUS, Justice.

This is an action to recover disability benefits provided for by ‘supplementary contracts' or ‘riders' attached to two policies of life insurance issued by the defendant in 1927 and 1928. These provide in substance that upon proof that the insured, while under sixty years of age, has ‘become totally and permanently disabled, as the result of bodily injury or disease occurring and originating after the issuance of said Policy, so as to be prevented thereby from engaging in any occupation and performing any work for compensation or profit, and that such disability has already continued uninterruptedly for a period of at least three months,’ the defendant will, during the continuance [293 Mass. 36]of such disability, waive the payment of further premiums and pay to the insured a stipulated monthly income.

The case is here, after a verdict for the plaintiff, upon the exceptions of the defendant. There was evidence for the plaintiff that the insured was in good health until July, 1929, but that ever since he has been totally and permanently disabled by

[199 N.E. 336]

hypertrophic arthritis of the spine. See Rezendes v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 285 Mass. 505, 189 N.E. 826;Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. South, 179 Ga. 653,177 N.E. 499,98 A.L.R. 781, and note. There was evidence for the defendant that the insured must have had the disease long before the policies were issued. We need not consider whether the judge was right in his construction of the words ‘bodily injury or disease occurring and originating after the issuance of said Policy,’ or in his distinction between an active disease and a condition which, if it should progress sufficiently, might become a disease. See Leland v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 233 Mass. 558, 124 N.E. 517;Silverstein v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 254 N.Y. 81, 171 N.E. 914;Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Dodge (C.C.A.) 11 F.(2d) 486, 59 A.L.R. 1290;Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Nicholson...