Palya v. Palya

• Citation: 42 Ill.Dec. 638,409 N.E.2d 133,87 Ill.App.3d 472
• Decision Date: 14 August 1980
• Docket Number: No. 79-891,79-891
• Parties: , 42 Ill.Dec. 638 William PALYA and Dean Palya, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. William PALYA, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 133

409 N.E.2d 133

87 Ill.App.3d 472, 42 Ill.Dec. 638

William PALYA and Dean Palya, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. William PALYA, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 79-891.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

Aug. 14, 1980.

Eugene P. Daugherity, Myers & Daugherity, Streator, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Gerald A. Drendel, Drendel & Kelly, and Judith Z. Kelly, Streator, for defendant-appellee.

STOUDER, Justice:

This is an appeal by plaintiffs, William and Dean Palya, from an order of the circuit court of LaSalle County dismissing their complaint against defendant, William Palya Sr., on the ground that the action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The present complaint stems from a divorce between the defendant and Bona Palya Davis. The plaintiffs are the children of defendant and Bona Palya Davis. The parents were divorced June 21, 1971. The decree of divorce provided that certain silver coins approximately valued at $3,800 were to be kept by defendant and preserved and maintained in his care and custody for the use and benefit of the minor children, the plaintiffs here, to be used primarily for the plaintiffs' education or such other uses as might be necessary.

Prior to September 7, 1978, Davis filed a petition in the divorce action to modify the decree to increase child support and for an order directing the father to turn over to the children the silver coins which he held for their use and benefit. On September 7, 1978, an order was entered which contained a representation by defendant that the coins had been sold six years earlier and ordered defendant to turn over to Davis $3,800 plus 51/2% interest. This was pursuant to Davis' petition seeking a turnover of the funds for the use and benefit of the plaintiffs. Defendant subsequently gave Davis $5,525 in lieu of the coins. Plaintiffs subsequently filed the instant action for an accounting against defendant. The action was dismissed on defendant's motion on the grounds the order in the divorce action of September 7, 1978 barred and estopped prosecution of the accounting action.

On appeal, plaintiffs raise three issues: (1) whether plaintiffs' action for accounting is barred by the order of the divorce action; (2) whether the order in the divorce action estops them from proceeding in the accounting action; and (3) whether the order in the divorce proceeding is void and therefore has no effect for estoppel purposes. We affirm.

We initially examine plaintiffs' contention that the order in the divorce proceeding is void. If it is, then obviously it will not bar or estop plaintiffs from bringing this action. Plaintiffs argue that the order was beyond the jurisdiction of the court because property rights determined in a divorce become vested after thirty days and the court is without jurisdiction to modify them. While this statement is true, it is inapplicable to the instant case. In the case at bar, the decretal court was not modifying the disposition of the parties' property. The defendant was merely custodian for the coins. The order of September 7, 1978 merely transferred custody of the coins from defendant to the plaintiffs. Because defendant no longer had the coins, the court ordered him to give the plaintiffs the value of the coins as of the date of the decree plus interest. In so doing, the court was not modifying the property settlement but merely enforcing its decree, an order clearly within its jurisdiction. Brickey v. Brickey (1976), 44 Ill.App.3d 563, 3 Ill.Dec. 239, 358 N.E.2d 406. Therefore, the order in the divorce action is not void.

Having decided that the order was not void, we must now determine whether it serves to bar or estop the instant action. We believe the doctrine of res judicata serves to bar the instant action. The doctrine of res judicata is based on requirements of justice and public policy and reflects a public policy that requires an end to litigation after each party has had a full opportunity to present all pertinent facts. City of Elmhurst v. Kegerreis (1946), 392 Ill. 195, 64 N.E.2d 450. The elements which must be present to invoke res judicata are identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. In re Estate of Garrett (1969), 109 Ill.App.2d 243, 248 N.E.2d 539.

Plaintiffs argue that there is no identity of parties because plaintiffs' mother brought the initial action and they are bringing the instant action. They claim that since they were not formally parties to the prior action, res judicata cannot be invoked to bar the present action. We disagree. It is a maxim that in an equitable action, the court looks to substance and not form. Pope v. Pope (1972), 7 Ill.App.3d 935, 289 N.E.2d 9. The...