Pamela H. v. Kijakazi
| Decision Date | 20 January 2022 |
| Docket Number | 20-CV-6460F |
| Parties | PAMELA H., Plaintiff, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, [1]Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of New York |
APPEARANCES:
LAW OFFICES OF KENNETH R. HILLER, PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
KENNETH R. HILLER, and SAMANTHA J. VENTURA, of Counsel
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
Attorney for Defendant
Federal Centre
and
JASON PARKERSON PECK
Special Assistant United States Attorney, of Counsel
Social Security Administration
Office of General Counsel
DECISION AND ORDER
On October 7, 2021, the parties to this action consented pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) to proceed before the undersigned. (Dkt. 19). The matter is presently before the court on motions for judgment on the pleadings filed by Plaintiff on April 5, 2021 (Dkt. 16), and by Defendant on September 1, 2021 (Dkt. 18).
Plaintiff Pamela H. (“Plaintiff”), brings this action under Title XVI of the Social Security Act (“the Act”) 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), seeking judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security's final decision denying Plaintiff's application filed with the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) on February 19, 2014, for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Act (“disability benefits”). Plaintiff alleges she became disabled on March 1, 2013, based on blindness in one eye, back trouble, mental health, and diabetes. AR[2] at 185, 202, 207. Plaintiff's application initially was denied on April 24, 2014. AR at 92-93. At Plaintiff's timely request, AR at 94-96, on December 8, 2015, an administrative hearing was held via videoconference before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Julia D. Gibbs (“ALJ Gibbs”), located in Falls Church, Virginia. AR at 25-67 (“first administrative hearing”). Appearing and testifying at the first administrative hearing in Buffalo, New York, were Plaintiff, then represented by Gerry J. Ruiz, Esq., and vocational expert Donna J. Bardsley (“VE Bardsley”).
On April 28, 2016, ALJ Gibbs issued a decision denying Plaintiff's claims, AR at 7-24 (“First ALJ's Decision”), which Plaintiff timely appealed to the Appeals Council. AR at 1061-63.
On June 30, 2017, the Appeals Council adopted the First ALJ's Decision that Plaintiff was not disabled, AR at 1-6, thus rendering the First ALJ's Decision the Commissioner's final decision at that time. On August 29, 2017, Plaintiff commenced an action in this court seeking review of the First ALJ's Decision. In a Decision and Order filed November 19, 2018, addressing cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings filed by both parties, Honorable Charles J. Siragusa granted Plaintiff's motion, denied Defendant's motion, and remanded the matter for a new administrative hearing. AR at 655-68; see Henry v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 6039297, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2017).
Accordingly, on November 7, 2019, a second administrative hearing was held in Rochester, New York before ALJ Michael W. Devlin (“ALJ Devlin”). AR at 600-627. Appearing and testifying at the hearing were Plaintiff, represented by Jeffrey Valentine, Esq. (“Mr. Valentine”), and vocational expert Sakinah Malik (“VE Malik”). At the conclusion of the second administrative hearing, the ALJ granted Mr. Valentine's request that Plaintiff undergo additional physical and mental status consultative examinations, AR at 625, which were completed on December 3, 2019. AR at 1036-57. The recently completed consultative physical and mental status examinations were made part of the administrative records and were considered by ALJ Devlin in issuing his decision on March 10, 2020, which was partially favorable to Plaintiff with Plaintiff awarded disability benefits as of November 9, 2019, based on a discretionary, “non-mechanical” application of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2 (“the Grids”), pursuant to which the ALJ, in consideration that based on her age, Plaintiff' was about to enter the “advanced age” category. AR at 572-99 (“Second ALJ's Decision”). On July 6, 2020, Plaintiff commenced the instant action seeking an award of benefits prior to November 9, 2019.
On April 5, 2021, Plaintiff moved for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. 16) (“Plaintiff's Motion”), attaching the Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Dkt. 16-1) (“Plaintiff's Memorandum”). On September 1, 2021, Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. 18) (“Defendant's Motion”), attaching Acting Commissioner's Memo. in Support of Acting Commissioner's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and in Response to Ms. H[___]'s Memo. Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 5.5 (Dkt. 18-1) (“Defendant's Memorandum”). Filed on October 13, 2021, was Plaintiff's Reply to Commissioner's Memorandum in Support (Dkt. 13) (“Plaintiff's Reply”), advising Plaintiff “deems no reply necessary and relies on the original arguments and authority contained in her primary brief.” Oral argument was deemed unnecessary.
Based on the following, Plaintiff's Motion is GRANTED; Defendant's Motion is DENIED; the matter is REMANDED for calculation of benefits.
FACTS[3]
Plaintiff Pamela H. (“Plaintiff”), born May 9, 1970, was 42 years old as of her alleged disability onset date (“DOD”) of March 1, 2013, and 48 years old as of November 9, 2019, the date on which ALJ Devlin found Plaintiff disabled. AR at 185, 202, 592. Plaintiff lives in an apartment with her two daughters and was separated from her husband. AR at 217, 609, 781.
Plaintiff attended high school in regular classes through 11th grade before dropping out. AR at 208, 617. Plaintiff has not obtained a general equivalency diploma nor attended or completed any specialized job training or vocational school. AR at 208. Plaintiff does not have a driver's license and relies on public transportation. AR at 220. Although Plaintiff goes outside every day, regularly goes to her daughter's school, the store, and the hospital, and shops in stores for food and clothing, she does not go out alone because she needs someone to help carry bags. AR at 220-22.
Plaintiff describes her activities of daily living as walking her daughter to school, trying to clean the house, feeding her children and helping them with homework, preparing simple meals, sweeping and mopping with help, and laundry. AR at 218-21, 616. Plaintiff can handle money, her interests include reading and watching television, and she enjoys talking with others to socialize. AR at 221-22. When Plaintiff initially applied for disability benefits, she reported being able to tend to her personal care and grooming and did not need reminders to take medication, AR at 218-19, but at the second administrative hearing, Plaintiff testified she needed help with buttons and zippers when dressing, and fixing her hair. AR at 616-17. Plaintiff's past relevant work history as a cleaner, automobile assembly line, and as a hotel restaurant cook and dishwasher, AR at 229-32, 243, and she babysat children in her home for one year. AR at 618-19. Plaintiff last worked in 2006, but stopped after becoming pregnant, and did not return to work because she is diabetic. AR at 252.
It is undisputed that Plaintiff has been blind in her right eye since birth, and suffers from degenerative changes of the thoracic spine and lumbar spine, bilateral hand arthritis, bilateral knee arthritis, nerve damage in both feet, and diabetes mellitus, and relies on a back brace and cane, both prescribed by doctors, to ambulate. Since 2004, Plaintiff has received primary care from Genesee Health Service where her primary care physician is Tai T. Nguyen, M.D. (“Dr. Nguyen”). Plaintiff also received medical care from Rochester Regional Health where she saw RPA-C Stephanie Alexandra Hanzlik (“PA Hanzlik”). In connection with her disability benefits application, Plaintiff underwent a psychiatric evaluation by consultative psychologist Adam Brownfield, Ph.D. (“Dr. Brownfield”) on April 9, 2014, AR at 252-55, and on April 23, 2014, State Agency psychiatric consultant G. Kleineman, M.D. (“Dr. Kleineman”) reviewed Plaintiff's mental status records. AR at 256-57. On December 3, 2019, upon remand from this court, Plaintiff underwent a second psychiatric evaluation performed by Dr. Brownfeld, AR at 1037-43, and an internal medicine examination performed by Susan Dantoni, M.D. (“Dr. Dantoni”). AR at 1044-54.
A claimant is “disabled” within the meaning of the Act and entitled to disability benefits when she is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i)(1); 1382c(a)(3)(A). A district court may set aside the Commissioner's determination that a claimant is not disabled if the factual findings are not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision is based on legal error. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99 105-06 (2d Cir. 2003). In reviewing a final decision of the SSA, a district court “is limited to determining whether the SSA's conclusions were supported by substantial evidence in the record and were based on a correct legal standard.” Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Id. It is not, however, the district court's function to make a de novo determination as to whether the claimant is...
To continue reading
Request your trial