Pamer v. State
Citation | 426 N.E.2d 1369 |
Decision Date | 29 October 1981 |
Docket Number | No. 3-281A45,3-281A45 |
Parties | Jerry A. PAMER, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). |
Court | Court of Appeals of Indiana |
Harriette Bailey Conn, Public Defender, M. E. Tuke, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Jack R. O'Neill, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
A jury found Jerry A. Pamer guilty of burglary, 1 a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced Pamer to eight years' imprisonment. On appeal, Pamer raises the following issues for review:
(1) Did the trial court err in denying Pamer's pretrial motion to suppress his written confession and in admitting the confession at trial?
(2) Did the trial court err in admitting tangible evidence and testimony about Pamer's oral confession that were obtained after Pamer was confronted with his written confession?
(3) Is the jury's verdict supported by sufficient evidence?
Affirmed.
Pamer contends that his written confession was made involuntarily because (1) during custodial interrogation, police officers induced him to confess to several burglaries, including the one for which he was convicted in the present case, by a direct promise of immunity from prosecution, and (2) the confession was a product of an unreasonable delay between Pamer's arrest and his initial appearance before a judge. Because the confession was made involuntarily, Pamer contends that the confession should have been suppressed and that it was improperly admitted at trial over his objection.
The proper analysis for determining the admissibility of a confession has been delineated by the Indiana Supreme Court in Long v. State (1981), Ind., 422 N.E.2d 284, 285-86; Chandler v. State (1981), Ind., 419 N.E.2d 142, 147; Battle v. State (1981), Ind., 415 N.E.2d 39, 42; and Love v. State (1980), Ind., 400 N.E.2d 1371, 1372. It must be determined from the totality of the circumstances whether the confession was made voluntarily and not through inducement, violence, threats, or other improper influences so as to overcome the free will of the accused. The State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the protective guidelines of Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, were scrupulously honored to protect the accused's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination; (2) the accused knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived the "Miranda rights"; and (3) the accused's eventual confession was the product of an essentially voluntary, free, and unconstrained choice. The issue of voluntariness is a matter for the trial court to resolve. As in other sufficiency matters, the appellate court will not weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses in reviewing the propriety of the trial court's ruling on the admissibility of the confession. If the evidence is conflicting, only that evidence that tends to support the trial court's ruling will be considered on appeal. The reviewing court's function is to determine whether substantial evidence of probative value supports the trial court's ruling.
The circumstances under which Pamer made his written confession are as follows: In the late hours of February 20, 1980, several police officers responded to a report of a burglary in progress at a Radio Shack store in Syracuse which is located in Kosciusko County, Indiana. Pamer was apprehended inside the store and was arrested for the commission of a burglary. While being transported to jail, Pamer requested to talk with David Hobbs, Chief of the Milford Police Department. Pamer asked for Hobbs' assistance because Pamer thought Hobbs "could offer me some kind of deal like if I would plead guilty to the charge I was picked up on, that they'd lower it or something like so it would be easier for me." Pamer knew Hobbs from a prior theft incident for which Pamer was convicted on January 3, 1980, and received probation in lieu of imprisonment.
Police business prevented Hobbs from meeting with Pamer until the evening of February 22, 1980. At 9:15 that evening, Pamer, Hobbs, and Lieutenant Richard Mikel of the Kosciusko County Sheriff's Department met at the Kosciusko County Jail to discuss the Radio Shack burglary. Pamer was immediately advised of his "Miranda rights," and he then read and signed a standard waiver of rights form (State's Exhibit No. 2). From that point in the interrogation, the subsequent events are best explained by Lt. Mikel's testimony at trial:
Hobbs verified Mikel's recitation of the substance of their interrogation of Pamer, but Hobbs used more positive language in explaining the type of "deal" that could be arranged if Pamer confessed to other offenses:
Mikel and Hobbs testified that they were authorized by the Kosciusko County Prosecutor, Michael L. Miner, to negotiate plea agreements for "non-serious charges." The primary purpose of vesting the officers with authority to negotiate plea agreements was to promote administrative efficiency in "clearing the records" of unsolved offenses when an individual agrees to plead guilty and be punished for one of the offenses. Miner testified that he would honor a "deal" struck by the officers when a series of minor offenses were involved.
Pamer accepted the offer of a "deal" and proceeded to confess to other burglaries he committed. Pamer first confessed to burglarizing a Pacer service station in Kosciusko County. He then began to discuss a burglary of an establishment called "Leisure Time." As soon as Pamer mentioned the words "Leisure Time," Mikel and Hobbs stopped Pamer and informed him that Leisure Time was located in Elkhart County, Indiana, and that no prosecutorial immunity could be offered for any offenses committed outside of Kosciusko County. After being informed that the Leisure Time burglary would not be part of the "deal," Pamer stopped his confession and asked to make a telephone call. Pamer called his girl friend to determine "who else was supposed to have broken in there and ... to check with somebody before I went ahead and said anything." The testimony of Mikel and Hobbs again best explain the events that occurred after Pamer made his telephone call. Mikel stated:
Hobbs stated:
Pamer then confessed to committing the Leisure Time burglary with Leo Perry sometime in January of 1980. After that confession, Pamer confessed to a fourth burglary. All four confessions were reduced to writing and were signed by Pamer in the presence of Mikel and Hobbs.
Sometime after Pamer was interrogated by Mikel and Hobbs, Elkhart County authorities learned of Pamer's confession to the Leisure Time burglary. On March 7, 1980, Detective Gary Kenawell of the Elkhart County Sheriff's Department interrogated Pamer about the burglary. Kenawell began the custodial interrogation by advising Pamer of his "Miranda rights." After Pamer waived those rights, Kenawell confronted Pamer with the Leisure Time confession he gave to Kosciusko County authorities. Pamer admitted having burglarized Leisure Time and described the items and money he and his accomplice took from the establishment. Elkhart County authorities then charged Pamer with the Leisure Time burglary. In prosecuting the case, the State relied...
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...has refused to extend Ashby to cases which do not involve "direct or implied promises" of immunity or leniency. Pamer v. State, 426 N.E.2d 1369, 1374 (Ind.Ct.App.1981). For example, in Love v. State, 272 Ind. 672, 676, 400 N.E.2d 1371, 1373 (1980), the court held that an officer who told a ......
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