Panarello v. City of Vineland
| Decision Date | 07 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | Civil. No. 12-4165 (RBK/JS) |
| Parties | JOHN PANARELLO and SHERI PANARELLO, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF VINELAND, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
KUGLER, United State District Judge:
This civil rights suit is before the Court upon the various motions and cross motions for reconsideration of this Court's opinion dated February 8, 2016 [Dkt. No. 186], reported at Panarello v. City of Vineland, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2016 WL 475246 (D.N.J. Feb. 8, 2016) (the "Summary Judgment Opinion"); the corresponding order dated February 8, 2016 [Dkt. No. 187] (the "Initial Order"); and the subsequent order to correct a clerical error dated February 17, 2016 [Dkt. No. 194] (the "Amending Order").
Before the Court are submissions from Defendant Sergeant Jeffrey Riggione ("Riggione") who has submitted a Motion for Reconsideration [Dkt. No. 195] ("Riggione Motion"); from Plaintiffs John Panarello ("Panarello") and Sheri Panarello (collectively, "Plaintiffs") who have submitted a Motion for Leave to File Out of Time [Dkt. No. 199] ("Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave") and a Motion for Reconsideration [Dkt. No. 200] ("Plaintiffs' Motion"); from the four individual police officers, Adam Shaw, Matthew Laielli, Brian Armstrong, and James Day (collectively, the "Officer Defendants"), who have submitted a Cross Motion for Reconsideration [Dkt. No. 203] ("Officer Defendants' Cross Motion"); and from Defendants Detective Antonio "Pete" Ramos ("Ramos") and his wife, Jeanne Ramos (collectively, the "Ramos Defendants"), who have submitted a letter requesting additional relief from this Court [Dkt. No. 205] ("Ramos Letter").
For the reasons that follow, the Riggione Motion is GRANTED, Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave is DENIED, Plaintiffs' Motion is DENIED, the Officer Defendants' Cross Motion is GRANTED, and the request of the Ramos Letter is GRANTED-IN-PART AND DENIED-IN-PART.
The Court set out the lengthy factual background and procedural history of this case in its Summary Judgment Opinion, 2016 WL 475246, at *1-3, and reincorporates that portion of the original opinion as if recited herein. Subsequent procedural facts and the contents of the opinion are relevant to the disposition of the motions pending before the Court.
The Court in its Summary Judgment Opinion determined that most of Plaintiffs' claims would be dismissed. The Court disposed of state law tort claims that were not adequately noticed by the Plaintiffs' Notice of Claim, pursuant to the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1, et seq. ("NJTCA"). Summ. J. Op., 2016 WL 475246, at *4-6. The Court went on to consider the constitutional claims made against the individual actors under the federal and state constitutions. First, claims of constitutional conspiracy were found to be unsupported by proffered evidence. Id. at *7-8. Additionally, the Court noted that the Ramos Defendants had not moved for summary judgment of any claims against them, so despite a finding that the claim of constitutional conspiracy was unsupported, the Court would not dismiss a claim of constitutional conspiracy against them. Id. at *7 n.11. Next, the Court satisfied itself that itcould consider Panarello's claims regarding events leading up to his criminal conviction without running afoul of the Supreme Court's holding in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). Id. at *8-9. Having done so, the Court evaluated Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims in detail.
The Court found that the officers' initial entry onto Plaintiffs' driveway was permissible and could not be the basis for a Fourth Amendment violation. Id. at *9-10. The Court then rejected the Officer Defendants' entry into the backyard based on a theory of customary access as a matter of law, and permitted the Fourth Amendment claim to go forward based on the factual dispute over whether Panarello was exposed to public view at the time the Officer Defendants began effecting his arrest. Id. at *10-13. Turning to Panarello's claims of excessive force, the Court determined that the specific factual finding of the state court that Panarello was not entitled to use force to resist his arrest in Panarello's criminal conviction foreclosed any argument by Panarello that the arresting officers used excessive force in effecting his arrest due to the Heck doctrine. Id. at *14-15. The Court then denied summary judgment on the allegations of excessive force during Panarello's transport to the police station and the reasonableness of using oleocapsicum ("OC") spray in the booking room at the police station due to the presence of genuine issues of material fact. Id. at *15-16.
Next, the Court assessed the claims of retaliatory complaints, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process. The Court recognized that no moving defendant had requested summary judgment on the alleged First Amendment retaliatory prosecution grounds, and so explained that any claim survived summary judgment due to a failure to move. Id. at *17. The Court found that the claims of malicious prosecution failed because either Panarello was actually convicted of the charge in the complaint, the charge in the complaint was related to conduct for which Panarello was convicted, or the charge in the complaint was supported by probable cause. Id. at*17-20. The Court also determined that there was insufficient evidence from Panarello that there was any abuse of process. Id. at *20.
The Court continued on to evaluate constitutional claims against the City of Vineland and its chief of police, Chief Timothy Codispotti. The Court found no evidence of a policy or custom effecting unconstitutional arrests, no evidence of a failure to train or supervise, and finally no evidence to tie an alleged unconstitutional ordinance to the alleged unconstitutional conduct of the individual officers. Id. at *20-23. The Court finally turned to the remaining state law tort claims, and found that the City of Vineland had no liability for any intentional torts of the officers, id. at *23, that claims of assault and battery during Panarello's arrest were barred by the Heck doctrine, id. at *24, that claims of false arrest were precluded by the presence of probable cause at the time of Panarello's arrest, id., that a claim for "negligent personal injury" could not lie, id., that a claim for negligent training and supervision failed for the same reasons the constitutional claim failed, id. at *25, that Sheri Panarello's per quod claim had to be dismissed because there was no surviving claim related to Panarello's arrest from which her claim could derive, id., and that Sheri Panarello's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress had to be dismissed for lack of evidence of any emotional distress, id. at *25-26.
The Court at the conclusion of the Summary Judgment Opinion acknowledged the length and complexity of the decision, and so explicitly recited for the parties what claims the Court believed to remain in the case as a result of the opinion. Id. at *26-27. The Court issued the Summary Judgment Opinion and entered the Initial Order to be consistent with the opinion on February 8, 2016.
Subsequent to the entry of the Initial Order, on February 10, 2016, counsel for Riggione wrote to the Court to apprise the Court of a clerical error contained within the Initial Order. (See Benson Letter [Dkt. No. 189] at 2.) The Initial Order failed to dismiss one count of the First Amended Complaint ("FAC") [Dkt. No. 79] consistent with the Summary Judgment Opinion, and so the Court entered the Amending Order on February 17, 2016 to correct this error. (See Amending Order.)
In the letter from Riggione's counsel was also a request for supplemental briefing on the issue of First Amendment retaliatory prosecution. (See Benson Letter at 1-2.) Counsel represented that the claim was not addressed in briefs because the moving defendants were unaware that the FAC contained such a claim, and that if they had been aware, they would have addressed it. (See id. at 2.) Mr. Benson represented that counsel for the Officer Defendants also joined in his request. (Id.) Plaintiffs opposed any supplemental briefing by written letter filed with the Court on February 11, 2016, and recommended that any Defendant unsatisfied with the Court's decision move for reconsideration. (See First McFadden Letter [Dkt. No. 191].)1 Accordingly, Riggione filed such a motion on February 22, 2016. (See generally Riggione Mot.)
On March 2, 2016, Plaintiffs filed under seal a twenty-five page, single-spaced letter with sixteen attachments that purported to be a letter brief seeking reconsideration of the Summary Judgment Opinion. (See McFadden Letter Br. [Dkt. No. 196].) The next day, the Honorable Joel Schneider, United States Magistrate Judge, struck the submission, instructing Plaintiffs to comply with this district's Local Civil Rules if they intended to file a motion, and furtherinstructing Plaintiffs to comply with Local Civil Rule 5.3 if they desired to file anything under seal. (See Order (Mar. 3, 2016) [Dkt. No. 197] (the "Schneider Order").) Plaintiffs re-filed the identical twenty-five page, single-spaced letter as a motion brief the same day, accompanied by Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave. Plaintiffs also filed supplemental exhibits under seal without an accompanying motion to seal. (See Pls.' Add'l Ex. [Dkt. No. 201].)
On March 7, 2016, the Officer Defendants filed a Cross Motion for Reconsideration joining in and relying on Riggione's Motion. (See Off. Defs.' Cross Mot.) Plaintiffs opposed Riggione's Motion and the Officer Defendants' Cross Motion on March 9, 2016. (See Pls.' Opp. [Dkt. No. 204].) On March 21, 2016, all defendants submitted briefs opposing Plaintiffs' Motion. (See Off. Defs.' Opp. [...
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