Panghat v. Balt. Veterans Affairs Med. Ctr.
| Decision Date | 27 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. ELH-19-994 |
| Parties | LIJO PANGHAT, M.D. Plaintiff v. BALTIMORE VETERANS AFFAIRS MEDICAL CENTER, et al. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
This Memorandum Opinion resolves motions filed by the self-represented plaintiff, Lijo Panghat, M.D. in his employment discrimination case. He asks the Court to reconsider its dismissal of his suit (ECF 47), and he seeks recusal of the judge on the grounds of conflict of interest, bias, and prejudice. ECF 52.
Plaintiff sued his former employers, Baltimore Veterans Affairs Health Center ("VA") and the University of Maryland, Baltimore ("UM"), alleging that defendants fired him in retaliation for lodging a sexual harassment complaint against his supervisor. ECF 5 (the "Complaint"). The Complaint asserted claims, inter alia, for denial of due process; misrepresentation; intentional infliction of emotional distress; breach of contract; and retaliation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. ("Title VII").
The Court dismissed plaintiff's suit in a Memorandum Opinion (ECF 42) and Order (ECF 43) of December 27, 2019. Unhappy with that ruling, Dr. Panghat has filed a "Motion to Reconsider" (ECF 47), supported by an Affidavit. ECF 47-1. UM and the VA oppose the Motion to Reconsider. ECF 48 (UM); ECF 49 (VA). Plaintiff has replied. ECF 50; ECF 51. In addition, plaintiff has filed a "Motion for Recusal" (ECF 52) supported by four exhibits. ECF 52-1 to ECF 52-4. UM opposes the Motion for Recusal (ECF 53), and plaintiff has replied. ECF 54. The VA has not responded.
No hearing is necessary to resolve the motions. See Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons that follow, I shall deny both the Motion to Reconsider and the Motion for Recusal.
On January 23, 2019, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Dr. Panghat filed a 44-page Complaint (ECF 5) against UM and the VA, along with thirteen exhibits. ECF 5-2 to ECF 5-14. The United States timely removed the case to this Court on behalf of the VA on April 2, 2019. ECF 1; see also ECF 10. Thereafter, UM filed a motion to dismiss (ECF 16) under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The VA also moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) and, in the alternative, it sought summary judgment under Rule 56. ECF 17. Plaintiff opposed the motions. ECF 25 (UM); ECF 26 (VA). Defendants replied. ECF 27 (UM); ECF 36 (VA).
Thereafter, on November 7, 2019, plaintiff filed a "Motion to Submit New Evidence To Further Support The Case of Dr. Panghat" (ECF 37), along with an Affidavit and two exhibits. ECF 37-1 to ECF 37-3. UM filed an opposition to the motion (ECF 38), and plaintiff replied. ECF 39. Then, on December 13, 2019, plaintiff filed a "Request to Clerk of Court to Enter Order of Default." ECF 40. In that motion, plaintiff requested an entry of default against the VA on the ground that the VA "failed to plead or otherwise present its defense against" plaintiff's opposition in accordance with the time provided "as per Court Rules . . . ." ECF 40 at 1. The VA opposed that motion on December 20, 2019. ECF 41.
As noted, in a Memorandum Opinion (ECF 42) and Order (ECF 43) of December 27, 2019,I granted defendants' motions to dismiss, denied plaintiff's various filings, and directed the Clerk to close the case. With respect to UM, I determined that plaintiff's claims were foreclosed by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity and the doctrine of res judicata. As the Court explained, the Eleventh Amendment generally bars suits against State entities, such as UM, unless an exception to sovereign immunity applies. ECF 42 at 19. The Court observed that the Maryland General Assembly has waived sovereign immunity for breach of contract claims that are filed within one year of the date on which the claim arose or the date on which the contract was completed. Id. at 20 Md. Code , §§ 12-201(a). Likewise, Maryland has waived its sovereign immunity for tort claims, provided that the plaintiff gives notice of his claim to the State Treasurer within one year after the injury to the person or property that is the basis of the suit. ECF 42 at 20-21 ().
However, plaintiff failed to satisfy these conditions precedent to Maryland's waivers of sovereign immunity. The Court found that "plaintiff's breach of contract claim was filed outside the one-year period for the limited waiver of immunity and is therefore barred" because "[a]t the latest, the alleged breach occurred when plaintiff was terminated on March 18, 2016," but "plaintiff did not file this action until January 18, 2019." ECF 42 at 20. Likewise, plaintiff's tort claims did not satisfy the MTCA's notice requirement because he did not submit a notice of claim to the State Treasurer until November 2017, more than one year after his termination. Id. at 21. Therefore, "because plaintiff's breach of contract claim and his tort claims are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity," the Court dismissed those claims as against UM. Id.
Further, the Court concluded that plaintiff's remaining claims are foreclosed by res judicata, a doctrine that precludes parties from re-litigating claims that were or could have beenlitigated in a previous action that resulted in a final judgment. See id. at 22. Under Maryland law, res judicata bars claims where "'(1) the parties in the present litigation are the same or in privity with the parties to the earlier litigation; (2) the claim presented in the current action is identical to that determined or that which could have been raised and determined in the prior litigation; and (3) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation.'" Id. (quoting Cochran v. Griffith Energy Servs., Inc., 426 Md. 134, 140, 43 A.3d 999, 1002 (2012)).
Applying the doctrine to plaintiff's suit compelled the conclusion that plaintiff was barred from litigating his termination by UM in this Court. Id. at 23. In particular, Dr. Panghat had sued UM in a Maryland State Court in June 2017, alleging that the termination letter that UM sent him was defamatory. See id. at 5; see also Panghat v. Univ. of Md., Balt., 24-C-17-003267 (Balt. City Cir. Ct.). The case sub judice is "on all fours" with the plaintiff's State court action, as both are predicated on the same nucleus of facts: plaintiff's alleged wrongful termination by UM. ECF 42 at 24. And, the State court action resulted in a final judgment. Id. at 24-25. Accordingly, the Court explained that res judicata warranted the dismissal of plaintiff's suit against UM. Id. at 25.
As for the VA, the Court determined that plaintiff failed to state a plausible Title VII claim because he did not contact an EEO counselor within 45 days of his termination and thus failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. ECF 42 at 30. Similarly, plaintiff's tort claims are barred because he did not exhaust his administrative remedies under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671 et seq. ECF 42 at 33. And, plaintiff's constitutional claims were precluded by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 ("CSRA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq. ECF 42 at 35.
With respect to plaintiff's motion for entry of default, the Court explained that "[a]n entry of default is appropriate where a party fails to respond to one of the pleadings enumerated in Fed. R. Civ. P. 7." Id. at 36. However, as the Court observed, the VA "did respond" to plaintiff'sComplaint, when it "moved to dismiss the complaint or, in the alternative, for summary judgment." Id. Accordingly, I denied plaintiff's motion for entry of default. Id. at 37.
Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider and Motion for Recusal followed.
A. Motion for Recusal
In the Motion for Recusal, which spans 28 pages, Dr. Panghat details what he regards as "a large number of shortcomings and irregularities" in the Court's decision dismissing his suit, which he asserts warrant my recusal. ECF 52 at 1. First, plaintiff fixates on the VA's reply (ECF 36) to his opposition (ECF 26) to the VA's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment (ECF 17). According to plaintiff, the VA's reply was tardy by one day and therefore was "invalid and inadmissible." ECF 52 at 3. Nonetheless, plaintiff claims that the Court erroneously relied on this filing in its Memorandum Opinion, as evidenced by the statement "'But, the VA did respond.'" Id.
Moreover, plaintiff claims that the VA's reply constitutes an improper ex parte communication, because the VA never served him with a copy of the filing, id. at 3, which constitutes a "grave irregularity . . . ." Id. at 4. Consequently, plaintiff asserts that I violated Maryland Rule 1-351, "Order Upon Ex Parte Application Prohibited-Exceptions,"3 and Canon XVI of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which generally prohibits ex parte communications. Id. And, Dr. Panghat contends that he was deprived of his "rightful opportunity" to respond to the VA's reply. Id. at 5.
Further, plaintiff claims that I am biased because I once worked as an Assistant Attorney General in the Civil Division of the Office of the Maryland Attorney General and as an Assistant United States Attorney in the District of Maryland. Id. at 7-8.4 In plaintiff's view, these positions give rise to the "genuine possibility that [I] could be swayed by partisan interests and [my] outlook may not be entirely impartial." Id. at 8.
Plaintiff also identifies a litany of "errors and inconsistencies" in the Memorandum Opinion that "may be better noticed recognized [sic] by a different judge who would understandably have a fresh and unbiased perspective on these faults." Id. "In the interest of brevity," plaintiff purportedly "highlights" only the "major shortcomings" with the Court's ruling; he then relitigates his case in excruciating detail over the course of twenty pages. Id. at...
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