Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Beaupre
| Decision Date | 08 July 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 11-cv-1327 |
| Parties | PANHANDLE EASTERN PIPE LINE COMPANY, L.P., Plaintiff, v. DENNIS P. BEAUPRE; LISA B. BEAUPRE; BILLY D. CHAMBERS; KAY A. CHAMBERS; RICHARD A. FAUBER; MARSHA A. FAUBER; CORY K. REID; LYNN D. REID; RUSSELL F. MONROE; DIANA MONROE; THOMAS E. AND PHYLLIS A. CARR TRUST; THOMAS E. CARR; PHYLLIS A. CARR; EUGENE TOPPER; MARIANNE C. TOPPER; JOSEPH J. SARMIENTO, III; and TAMMY C. SARMIENTO, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Defendants Cory K. Reid and Lynn D. Reid1 (Doc. 39). In it, Plaintiff seeks judgment, allowing it to clear its right-of-way on Defendants' property. No response was filed, and thus, the Motion is granted and Plaintiff is awarded a permanent injunction as set forth in this Order.
Plaintiff filed the present action on September 2, 2011. In the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the need for injunctive relief to access and clear aportion of land pursuant to an easement to which Defendants' fee simple is subject. (Doc. 29). Defendants have not filed an answer or appeared in this case.
Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment on February 1, 2013. Defendants' response was due February 25, 2013. On February 28, 2013, no response having been filed, the Court extended Defendants' time to file to March 11, 2013, sua sponte. (Text Order, Feb. 28, 2013). The Court also warned Defendants that if they failed to respond, the Motion would "be deemed admitted pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(D)(2)." (Id.). On March 11, 2013, Plaintiff filed a status report that purported to also be a motion to extend Defendants' time to respond, noting ongoing settlement negotiations. (Doc. 42). Even assuming this motion were procedurally proper, and were granted, Defendants' response would still have been due April 11, 2013. To date, no response or filing of any sort has been received from Defendants.
As a result of Defendants' failure to respond, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is deemed admitted pursuant to Local Rule 7.1. CDIL-LR 7.1(D)(2). Thus, the facts asserted within are taken as true. However, deeming the motion admitted does not necessarily mean the Court will grant judgment entirely as requested by the moving party. That is particularly true where, as here, the requested relief is an injunction. Cf. e360 Insight v. Spamhaus Project, 500 F.3d 594, 604 (7th Cir. 2007) (). Courts have an "independent responsibility" to ensure that injunctions are administrable and follow Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. Marseilles Hydro Power, LLC v. Marseilles Land & Water Co., 299 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2002).
Plaintiff is a company engaged in transporting natural gas through underground pipelines, including through a pipeline it calls the Galesburg Lateral that runs underneath Defendants' property, located at 5201 Adam Avenue, Bartonville, Illinois. Plaintiff obtained the right to build and maintain this pipeline through a series of easements granted to it by previous owners of Defendants' land. The most recent and only operative easement, entitled "Right-of-Way Grant,"3 was executed on September 19, 1962, and was properly recorded. It grants Plaintiff "a Right-of-Way to lay, construct, maintain, alter, inspect, repair, replace, relocate, change the size of, operate and remove two (2) pipe lines . . . under, on, over and through" the described property, which includes Defendants' property. (Doc. 39-1 at 8). It also grants "the right to continue to maintain, alter, repair, replace, operate and remove" three existing lines. (Doc. 39-1 at 8). The easement identifies on an attached diagram "two (2) easement strips of land fifty (50) feet in width" where the pipe lines are located and requires that "Grantor shall not place any structures above ground level on said easement strips." (Doc. 39-1 at 9). The easement also includes the "right of ingress and egress to and from the public raod [sic] running along the Easterly side of said premises over and across said two (2) easement strips." (Doc. 39-1 at 9).
In February 2011, Plaintiff notified Defendants of its intent to clear trees, brush, vegetation, and man-made obstructions on or encroaching on its easement to allow for inspection and maintenance of its pipeline. Plaintiff must inspect its pipelines to ensure safety and to comply with federal regulations. In particular, as is industry practice, Plaintiff intends to inspect the pipelines aerially. Trees and structures on the easement impede Plaintiff's inspection and maintenance operations, and can prevent efficient repair in the event of an emergency. Further, tree roots can damage the pipelines. In particular, Plaintiff points to two trees and one man-made structure on Defendants' property that interfere with its easement rights. As depicted on a photograph, one tree is 14.5 feet from the center of the pipeline, one tree is 16 feet away, and there is a small structure, which Plaintiff refers to as a shed, 24 feet from the pipeline. Defendants refused Plaintiff access to the property.
To clear up any confusion at the outset, the Court here briefly addresses two of Plaintiff's apparent mistakes in the applicability of federal law to this state property law claim. First, among other deficiencies in the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that this Court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, but nothing in the pleading supports such a conclusion. Plaintiff does not bring a claim under a federal statute, and simply referencing a federal statute that is related to the subject of litigation does not create a federal question. That is Jurisdiction 101. Fortunately for Plaintiff, theparties are diverse, and the Court accepts the assertion that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, thus allowing for diversity jurisdiction in this Court.
Second, Plaintiff makes a confusing and misleading argument about preemption in its Motion. (Doc. 39 at 9-10). Plaintiff explains that federal law preempts state safety standards for pipelines such as theirs, which is unremarkable. (Doc. 39 at 4, 9). But they also cite a Michigan state court case for the proposition that "Federal law, not Defendants, defines and controls Panhandle's obligation to inspect and maintain its pipelines," and seems to imply that the federal regulations give Plaintiff a free pass to act in whatever way they deem necessary to comply with such regulations, essentially preempting the easement. (Doc. 39 at 9 (citing Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Musselman, 668 N.W.2d 418, 421 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003))). The cited case states that "[a]lthough federal law does not grant plaintiff any more rights over the property than does the grant of the right-of-way itself, federal law defines plaintiff's duties with regard to the maintenance of its pipelines and, thus, addresses what is required of plaintiff with regard to the right-of-way." Musselman, 688 N.W.2d at 421. This seems an accurate analysis of the impact of federal law in this area, but of course does not mean property law is preempted. Rather, the federal regulations to which Plaintiff is subject inform the interpretation of the granted easement, which provides for access to maintain and inspect the pipelines. Naturally, federal regulations would provide strong evidence of more precisely what the easement rights, including access to inspect and maintain, would entail, but Plaintiff points to no federal law that preempts state property law.
An easement is a "right or a privilege in the real estate of another." Beloit Foundry Co. v. Ryan, 192 N.E.2d 384, 390 (Ill. 1963). The owner of an easement is entitled to "necessary use," which is "such use as is reasonably necessary for the full enjoyment of the premises." Erday's Clothiers, Inc. v. Spentzos, 592 N.E.2d 615, 621 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). The owner of the property subject to the easement, referred to as the servient estate, is still entitled to reasonable use of the property. Id. Here, Plaintiff holds an easement that burdens Defendants' property, and seeks an injunction to allow it to take certain actions pursuant to its easement.
Under Rule 65(d), an order granting an injunction must include the reasons it issued, the specific terms, and "describe in reasonable detail—and not by referring to the complaint or other document—the act or acts restrained or required." Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1). The Seventh Circuit "insist[s] on strict compliance with these requirements." United States v. Apex Oil Co., 579 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 2009). Of course, that is only where such compliance is "feasible or desirable." Id. at 740. Before a federal court can award a permanent injunction, a plaintiff must satisfy four requirements:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). Further, where an injunction is requested in a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff must show success on the merits. See Collins v. Hamilton, 349 F.3d 371, 374 (7th Cir. 2003).
Taking the asserted facts as true, Plaintiff has shown that a permanent injunction is appropriate. First, Plaintiff points to the need to inspect and maintain its pipelines, which it cannot do without access to Defendants' property. The shed located within the fifty-foot strip specifically violates the terms of the easement, that Defendants not "place any structures above ground level" on those strips....
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