Panjiva, Inc. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot.

• Decision Date: 24 September 2018
• Docket Number: 17-CV-8269 (JPO)
• Parties: PANJIVA, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

342 F.Supp.3d 481

PANJIVA, INC., et al., Plaintiffs,

v.UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, et al., Defendants.

17-CV-8269 (JPO)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed September 24, 2018

David Alan Bahr, Bahr Law Offices, P.C., Eugene, OR, Sharon Yamit Yamen, Law Office of Sharon Yamen, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs.

Stephen Seungkun Cha-Kim, United States Attorney's Office, New York, NY, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

J. PAUL OETKEN, United States District Judge

Plaintiffs Panjiva, Inc. and Trade Data Services, Inc. d/b/a ImportGenius (collectively, "Panjiva") bring this action against Defendants the United States Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") and the United States Department of Treasury (collectively, "the Government") under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq. ("FOIA"), the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. ("APA"), and the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1431(c). (Dkt. No. 1 ("Compl.") ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs assert that CBP unlawfully failed to comply with the requirements of FOIA in response to Plaintiffs' requests for data from aircraft cargo manifests. (Compl. ¶¶ 3–4.) Plaintiffs further assert that CBP and the Treasury violated the Tariff Act and the APA by denying access to aircraft cargo manifest information and failing to promulgate regulations to facilitate public access to such information. (Compl. ¶ 5.)

Defendants now move to dismiss the Complaint in part under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Dkt. No. 21.) For the reasons that follow, Defendants' motion is granted.

I. Background

The Court draws the following facts from the Complaint, which are taken as true for the purpose of resolving this motion to dismiss.

Plaintiffs Panjiva and ImportGenius are companies that seek to serve the global trade community and improve efficiency and decision-making in global commerce by aggregating and analyzing data from a number of sources, including U.S. customs shipment data from CBP. (Compl. ¶¶ 11–12.) At issue in this suit are "aircraft cargo manifests," which contain information regarding airborne cargo shipments entering the United States. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 25.) CBP has the statutory authority to require that aircraft entering the United States submit these cargo manifests, as well as the authority to regulate the contents of and submission procedures for these manifests. See 19 U.S.C. § 1431(b), (d) ; 19 C.F.R. §§ 122.48, 122.48a(a).

Plaintiffs have each submitted FOIA requests seeking aircraft manifest information from CBP. Specifically, on January 26, 2015, ImportGenius submitted a FOIA request to CBP seeking "access to and copies of the portions of ALL aircraft manifests for inbound shipments form [sic] January 1, 2014 to July 31, 2014 that have been designated for public disclosure by 19 U.S.C § 1431(c)." (Compl. ¶ 32.) CBP denied ImportGenius's request. (Compl. ¶ 40.) ImportGenius appealed, and CBP again declined to respond to the request because "doing so would impose an unreasonable burden upon the agency." (Compl. ¶ 48.) Similarly, on January 17, 2017, Panjiva submitted a FOIA request to CBP seeking "access to and copies of the portions of ALL aircraft manifests for inbound shipments from December 5, 2016 to December 9, 2016 that have been designated for public disclosure by 19 U.S.C § 1431(c)." (Compl. ¶ 57.) As of October 26, 2017, CBP had not made a final determination on Panjiva's request. (Compl. ¶ 66.)¹

Panjiva filed this action in connection with those unsuccessful FOIA requests. Its claims fall into three groups: first, Panjiva asserts that CBP violated FOIA by failing to disclose the requested aircraft manifest information, failing to adhere to the statute's procedural requirements, and engaging in a pattern or practice of unlawful conduct by specifically withholding aircraft manifest information. (Compl. ¶¶ 83–125 (Counts I–V).) Second, in the alternative, Panjiva asserts that CBP's failure to satisfy the requirements of FOIA also violates the APA. (Compl. ¶¶ 114–125, 148–155 (Counts V, VIII).)² And third, Panjiva asserts that CBP has violated the Tariff Act and the APA by failing to disclose the information, and that the Treasury has violated the same statutes by failing to promulgate regulations to facilitate access to such aircraft manifest data. (Compl. ¶¶ 126–147 (Counts VI–VII).) The Government now moves to dismiss the Complaint in part, seeking to dismiss the second and third sets of claims invoking the Tariff Act and the APA for failure to state claims upon which relief can be granted. (Dkt. No. 22 at 1–2.)

II. Legal Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead factual allegations sufficient "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A claim is facially plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The Court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and "draw[ ] all inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Allaire Corp. v. Okumus , 433 F.3d 248, 249–50 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. "[T]he duty of a court" in ruling on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6)"is merely to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof." Hogan v. Fischer , 738 F.3d 509, 514 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable LLC , 622 F.3d 104, 113 (2d Cir. 2010) ).

III. Discussion

The Government seeks dismissal of two sets of claims against it: (1) claims premised on the Tariff Act and its amendments (Counts VI–VII); and (2) claims under the APA that are duplicative of Panjiva's FOIA claims (Counts V and VIII). The Court discusses each in turn.

A. Tariff Act Claims

In Count VI of the Complaint, Panjiva asserts that CBP's failure to disclose the requested aircraft manifest information constitutes a violation of the Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act ("ACPA"). (Compl. ¶ 129.) Panjiva reads the ACPA to require CBP to make certain categories of information in aircraft manifests "available for public disclosure," and to permit withholding the information only if the agency invokes specific exceptions. (Compl. ¶¶ 25–26.) Relatedly, in Count VII, Plaintiffs assert that the ACPA required the Treasury to "establish procedures to provide access to [aircraft] manifests" and promulgate regulations to carry out the terms of the ACPA related to aircraft manifests, but it has unlawfully failed to do so. (Compl. ¶¶ 137–140.)

The Government has moved to dismiss both of these claims, arguing that they rest on an incorrect interpretation of the Tariff Act and its amendments. In the Government's interpretation of the relevant statutes, it is not required to publicly disclose aircraft manifests, and thus it need not adopt procedures or promulgate regulations facilitating access to aircraft manifests. (Dkt. No. 22 at 1–2.) The Court agrees with the Government's reading of the statutes, and therefore grants its motion to dismiss these counts.

To understand the parties' dispute, the Court first examines how the statutory provision at issue has evolved over time. The foundational statute at issue is the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which required that all vessels entering the country maintain certain information in "a manifest" for customs inspection. Pub. L. No. 71-361, § 431, 46 Stat. 590, 710 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1431(a) ). Since the enactment of the Tariff Act, the statutory term "vessel" has been consistently defined to encompass anything "capable of being used, as a means of transportation in water," and the term expressly "does not include aircraft." Id. § 401(a), 46 Stat. at 708; 19 U.S.C. § 1401(a).

Congress amended § 431 of the Tariff Act in 1984, adding as subsection (c)(1) the requirement that a list of specified "information, when contained in such manifest, shall be available for public disclosure." Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, Title II, § 203, 98 Stat. 2948, 2974 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1431(c)(1) ). This provision in effect created a public-disclosure requirement for vessel manifests, subject to exceptions that the Secretary of the Treasury could invoke to withhold information. See 19 U.S.C. § 1431(c)(2).

In July 1996, Congress amended the public-disclosure requirement in § 431(c)(1) of the Tariff Act with the enactment of the ACPA. The ACPA modified § 431(c)(1) "by inserting ‘vessel or aircraft’ before ‘manifest.’ " Pub. L. No. 104-153, § 11(1), 110 Stat.1386, 1389 (July 2, 1996). The ACPA also amended the list of specified information to be disclosed, to insert references to airports and aircraft. Id. § 11(2)–(4). The effect of these changes was to extend the public-disclosure requirement to encompass both vessel and aircraft manifests. As of July 2, 1996, the operative clause of § 431(c)(1) of the Tariff Act appeared thus: "Except as provided in subparagraph (2), the following information, when contained in such vessel or aircraft manifest, shall be available for public disclosure[.]"

Shortly thereafter, in October 1996, Congress amended § 431(c)(1)'s public-disclosure requirement yet again. This time, the amending statute provided that "Section 431(c)(1) of the Tariff Act of 1930 ( 19 U.S.C. 1431(c)(1) ) is amended in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) by...