Pankopf v. Hinkley

• Decision Date: 07 December 1909
• Citation: 123 N.W. 625,141 Wis. 146
• Parties: PANKOPF v. HINKLEY.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

141 Wis. 146

123 N.W. 625

PANKOPF

v.HINKLEY.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Dec. 7, 1909.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Milwaukee County; Warren D. Tarrant, Judge.

Action by Maude Pankopf against George C. Hinkley. A demurrer to the complaint was overruled, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.Edgar L. Wood, for appellant.

Julius E. Kiefer (Gross & Saltzstein, of counsel), for respondent.

WINSLOW, C. J.

This is an action for personal injuries resulting from negligence. A general demurrer to the complaint having been overruled, the defendant appeals. The complaint in brief charges that, while the plaintiff was riding in a hired carriage upon a country highway with several other people, an automobile driven by the defendant came up behind the carriage, and the driver of the carriage turned out to the extreme right side of the road and stopped in order that the automobile might pass by; that, although there was ample room to pass, the defendant, in attempting to pass, negligently and carelessly steered the automobile directly into the horses attached to the carriage with such force that the horses were thrown or pushed off from the road, pulling the carriage with them with such force and violence that the plaintiff and the other occupants of the carriage received “a severe fright and shock; that due to such fright and shock, as aforesaid caused by the negligence of the defendant, the said plaintiff suffered injury to her body; that at the time she was pregnant, and as a result of said fright and shock there resulted a miscarriage,” causing severe pain and suffering, and resulting in permanent injury to her health. It is plain from the language of the complaint that this is an action to recover damages for physical injuries, namely, the miscarriage and its subsequent consequences, and is not an action to recover damages for mere mental anguish, which is not preceded by or accompanied with some physical injury. Hence the doctrine that there can be no recovery in this latter class of cases, first announced in Summerfield v. W. U. Tel. Co., 87 Wis. 1, 57 N. W. 973, 41 Am. St. Rep. 17, and affirmed in Gatzow v. Buening, 106 Wis. 20, 81 N. W. 1003, 49 L. R. A. 475, 80 Am. St. Rep. 1, and subsequent cases, is not at all involved nor affected by anything which may be said in this case.

The word “shock” has a number of meanings. It may mean the collision or concussion of two physical bodies striking together, or it may mean simply a surprised or disgusted state of the emotions which momentarily disappears. In the present case perhaps it might properly be construed as meaning a physical jolt given to the person of the plaintiff as the carriage was suddenly pulled or pushed off from the highway. From the allegations of the complaint, it seems well-nigh certain that there must have been some jolt of this kind. However, it seems evident to us that the pleader did not use the term as meaning external violence or physical inconvenience, but rather in its pathological sense, meaning an abnormal condition, either of mind or of body, or of both mind and body, resulting from the imminent apparent danger of injury or death, which suddenly flashed upon the vision of the plaintiff. The Century Dictionary defines “shock” used pathologically as follows: “A condition of profound prostration of voluntary and involuntary functions, of acute onset, caused by trauma, surgical operation or excessive sudden emotional disturbance (mental shock).” Whether a condition of profound prostration of both voluntary and involuntary functions of the body be not as truly a physical injury when produced by violent emotional disturbance as when produced by bodily violence would perhaps be an interesting question, but we do not find it necessary to consider it.

It is charged that the shock was directly caused by the defendant's...