Pannell v. Commonwealth

• Citation: 86 Pa. 260
• Parties: Pannell <I>versus</I> The Commonwealth.
• Decision Date: 06 May 1878
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

86 Pa. 260

Pannell versus The Commonwealth.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

February 11 and 12, 1878.

May 6, 1878.

February 11th and 12th 1878.

Before AGNEW, C. J., SHARSWOOD, MERCUR, GORDON, PAXSON and TRUNKEY, JJ. WOODWARD, J., absent

Error to the Court of Oyer and Terminer of Lancaster county: Of May Term 1878, No. 102. Certified from the Middle District.

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S. H. Reynolds and William Aug. Atlee, for plaintiff in error.— "Did or did you not discover anything that led you to think he was insane?" We contend that this question indicates to the witness the difficulty he must find in having any such thought; the use of the word "anything," indicates to him that there is nothing to lead the mind in that direction, and the whole question indicates to the witness that the answer which it is wished he should make is "No."

Another objection to the question is that the witness has not stated facts to enable him to form an opinion. The rule of the admission of testimony of non-experts undoubtedly is that the witnesses must state facts and circumstances sufficient to enable them to form an opinion, and then, having thus given the jury an opportunity to test the soundness of their opinions, they may give their opinions. But "facts and circumstances are to be sworn to as the groundwork of the opinions offered:" Bricker v. Lightner's Executor, 4 Wright 199.

To instruct the jury that they must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the prisoner's insanity is erroneous: Meyers v. Commonwealth, 2 Norris 131. Conclusive is equivalent to reasonable doubt. It admits only of the construction that there must be no doubt in the minds of the jury: Hiester v. Laird, 1 W. & S. 245.

It is argued, however, that the jury could not have been misled by this language, because the whole charge was such that they must have gathered from it that the court instructed them that "the evidence need be only satisfactory to them;" that they could not have been wrongly impressed, and that, therefore, under the doctrine of Green v. Commonwealth, 2 Norris 75, the error was cured. We contend, however, that in the four times in which the court alludes to this subject their instruction was so strong that none of the language of the context can qualify it.

Ordinary men of the world cannot be so well qualified to form an opinion on such a subject-matter as insanity as those who have devoted more years to its examination, treatment and study, than most of the members of the jury have lived. Diseases of the brain are hidden; at the same time they may be simulated. It takes the skill and experience of the medical man in some cases to discover the disease or detect the simulation. Some phases of insanity are discoverable of all men; extreme cases are patent to every eye; but there are others not so patent, which the ordinary observer cannot see, and he cannot be so well qualified to pronounce an opinion on the case as the experienced physicians who have had more than twenty years' acquaintance with the patient. The value of such testimony is recognised in Pidcock v. Potter, 18 P. F. Smith 342.

J. B. Amwake, M. Brosius and J. W. Johnson, District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.—The measure of proof required to warrant an acquittal on the ground of insanity is definitely determined and declared in a series of cases in the last five years, ending with Commonwealth v. Meyers, 2 Norris 141, which says, "it must be satisfactory, such as flows fairly from a preponderance of the evidence." This measure of proof has been stated in various forms of expression: Ortwein v. Commonwealth, 26 P. F. Smith 421; Lynch v. Commonwealth, 27 Id. 207; Brown v. Commonwealth, 28 Id. 123. To make the opinion of a witness that a person is insane, competent evidence, he must state some facts fairly indicative of insanity: Rambler v. Tyron, 7 S. & R. 90; Dickinson v. Dickinson, 11 P. F. Smith 404. The question whether the witness is qualified to testify as an expert is to a large extent within the discretion of the judge trying the cause, and a court of review will not interfere, except in a clear and strong case: Pidcock v. Potter, 18 P. F. Smith 342; Del. & Chesapeake Steam Tow-boat Co. v. Starrs, 19 Id. 36; Sorg v. First German Congregation, 13 Id. 156; Dole v. Johnson, 50 N. H. 452.

Mr. Justice MERCUR delivered the opinion of the court, May 6th 1878.

Forty-six errors are assigned. Many of them were not pressed on the argument, and have no special merit.

The killing of Anna C. Pannell by her husband, the plaintiff in error, is not questioned. The sole ground of defence urged to secure an acquittal, or to lessen the grade of the crime, was the unsound mind of the prisoner. We cannot say that there was not much evidence tending to prove him to be of unsound mind. If several of the witnesses were believed, the opinion of his insanity was not first entertained after the commission of this act, but existed, and was expressed, many years prior thereto. It was claimed that he had hereditary insanity. To sustain this view evidence was given that the mother of the prisoner was of unsound mind and committed suicide.

The only plea being that of insanity, and some eight or ten witnesses having testified to facts in support of that plea, it was rather an unfriendly remark of the learned judge, when he said to the jury, near the commencement of his charge, "should it become necessary in your judgment to consider the evidence bearing upon the plea of the prisoner, and by which it is claimed he is entitled to palliation or excuse." In its effect it was equivalent to saying, should it become necessary for you to consider whether he has any defence. As he had no other defence, the jury may well have considered that the judge expressed a doubt whether they should deem the evidence of sufficient importance to consider it.

The homicide occurred some three months after the parties were united in marriage. At times he appeared to doubt the faithfulness of his wife. Sometimes he was irritable, cross and quarrelsome. At others he was loving and kind towards her. The defence rested on hereditary taint, his own conduct and appearance for many years, and his fickle and unreasonable conduct toward his wife. It was not claimed that his insanity was of that type which is manifested in the paroxysmal or frenzied action of a maniac; but that, in a more subdued form, his mind was dethroned. This distinction was not very prominently presented in the charge, and the omission so to do may possibly have misled the jury; yet it is not so clear as to require us to say there was positive error therein. The assignments, from the 5th to the 25th inclusive, excluding the 9th, 21st, 22d, 23d and 24th, are designed to present this distinction. They cover objections to the form in which the question was put to the witnesses on the part of the Commonwealth. It was, "Did you or did you not discover anything that led you to think he was insane?" It was contended the word "insane" implied a higher degree of mental alienation than was necessary to exculpate the prisoner, and that...