Pannell v. Guess

• Decision Date: 28 March 1996
• Docket Number: No. 91-CA-01216-SCT,91-CA-01216-SCT
• Citation: 671 So.2d 1310
• Parties: David PANNELL, as Administrator of the Estate of Shelly Pannell, Deceased; David Pannell and Betty Pannell, individually, as Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Shelly Pannell v. Beverly GUESS, Lisa Thompson, Lana Pannell and Mark Pannell.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 1310

671 So.2d 1310

David PANNELL, as Administrator of the Estate of Shelly

Pannell, Deceased; David Pannell and Betty

Pannell, individually, as Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Shelly Pannell v. Beverly GUESS, Lisa Thompson, Lana Pannell and Mark Pannell.

No. 91-CA-01216-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

March 28, 1996.

Appeal No. 42164 from Judgment dated Sept. 17, 1991, James Lamar Roberts, Jr., Ruling Judge, Lee County Chancery Court.

John Leroy Long, Saltillo, for Appellant.

Thomas E. Childs, Jr., Fulton, for Appellee.

En Banc.

DAN M. LEE, Chief Justice, for the Court:

This appeal arises from a September 17, 1991, ruling of the Lee County Chancery Court in which the chancellor held that Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (1972) required that the insurance proceeds negotiated from a wrongful death action be distributed equally among the deceased's six statutory wrongful death beneficiaries. The chancellor also held that the contingent fee agreement signed by David Pannell, the deceased's father, with attorney John Long did not satisfy the requirements of Uniform Chancery Court Rule 6.12, which requires court approval of such contracts, and, thus, the contingent fee agreement did not bind any of the wrongful death beneficiaries except David Pannell. Thereafter, the Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration which was subsequently overruled. Appellants, aggrieved by the chancellor's ruling, assign as error the following:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE CHANCERY COURT OF LEE COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 11-7-13, MISSISSIPPI CODE ANNOTATED, AS AMENDED.

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CHANCERY COURT OF LEE COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, ERRED IN FAILING TO APPROVE THE CONTINGENT FEE CONTRACT OF THE ATTORNEY FOR THE ESTATE OF SHELLY PANNELL.

I. FACTS

On or about March 17, 1990, Shelly Pannell, an unmarried minor, was killed in an automobile accident when the car in which she was a passenger, driven by Raymond Griffin, Jr., collided with another vehicle. Shelly was survived by her mother (Betty), father (David) and four half-siblings from her father's previous marriage (hereinafter Shelly's half-siblings).

After Shelly's death, David Pannell retained John Long to pursue a wrongful death action against Griffin. David Pannell petitioned the Lee County Chancery Court to appoint him administrator of his deceased daughter's estate, and this petition was granted. Afterward David Pannell, through his attorney, John Long, initiated negotiations with Griffin's insurance company seeking damages for Shelly's wrongful death. Within two weeks of being retained by David Pannell to begin settlement negotiations, Long was able to negotiate a $150,000 settlement offer from Griffin's insurer.

On February 1, 1991, the chancellor authorized the chancery clerk to receive $150,000 from Griffin's insurance company into the registry of the court pending settlement of a doubtful and disputed claim. The $150,000 was held in the registry of the court pending a determination of Shelly Pannell's wrongful death beneficiaries.

A hearing was held on April 8, 1991, to determine Shelly's wrongful death beneficiaries. The lower court, pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13, found that Shelly's wrongful death beneficiaries were: (1) Betty Pannell (her natural mother), (2) David Pannell (her natural father), (3) Beverly Guess (Shelly's half-sister through her father's previous marriage), (4) Lisa Thompson (Shelly's half-sister through her father's previous marriage), (5) Lana Pannell (Shelly's half-sister through her father's previous marriage), and (6) Mark Pannell (Shelly's half-brother through her father's previous marriage). At the April 8, 1991, hearing, all six of Shelly's wrongful death beneficiaries agreed to settle the wrongful death claim against Griffin for the $150,000 that was being held in the registry of the court. However, at that same hearing, David and Betty Pannell then took the position that Shelly's half-siblings (David's children by his previous marriage) were not entitled to any of the proceeds. Not surprisingly, Shelly's half-siblings disagreed with them and hired their own attorney to represent them in any further matters dealing with the distribution of the wrongful death proceeds.

After the April 8, 1991, developments, Shelly's half-siblings petitioned the chancery court to order an equitable distribution of the settlement proceeds among Shelly's parents and themselves. In turn, attorney John Long sought the chancery court's enforcement of the contingency fee contract he had entered into with David Pannell. Long argued that the contingency fee agreement of January 22, 1991, was binding on all of Shelly's wrongful death beneficiaries.

A hearing on these matters was held July 19, 1991. At the hearing Shelly's half-siblings claimed Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13 provided for an equal distribution of the insurance settlement, and, thus, they were each entitled to one-sixth of the $150,000. The chancellor looked to the wording of the statute and determined that in the case sub judice the wrongful death statute provided for equal distribution of the proceeds. Accordingly, on September 17, 1991, the lower court entered a decree authorizing and directing the clerk of the court to set aside $1,078.00 for payment of statutorily designated expenses and to distribute the remainder of the $150,000 settlement among the six wrongful death beneficiaries.

On September 26, 1991, David Pannell, as administrator of Shelly's estate, filed a motion for the court to reconsider its September 17, 1991, decree. At the November 6, 1991, hearing on that motion, the chancellor listened to argument from both sides and then ruled, once again, that the statute mandated that each wrongful death beneficiary receive an equal share of the insurance settlement. The lower court held that there was no authority in the statute to allow the chancellor to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine how the proceeds of the settlement should be disbursed. Likewise, the lower court held that the contingent fee contract between David Pannell and Long was not binding upon the rest of the beneficiaries since they had not consented to or signed said contract.

DISCUSSION

II.

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE CHANCERY COURT OF LEE COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 11-7-13, MISSISSIPPI CODE ANNOTATED, AS AMENDED.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Upon appellate review, this Court will not reverse the chancellor's decision unless manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or an erroneous legal standard was applied. Hill v. Southeastern Floor Covering Co., 596 So.2d 874, 877 (Miss.1992). In the case sub judice, the question is whether the lower court applied the correct legal standard, and, if so, did the lower court correctly apply the standard. This Court reviews questions of law de novo, and we will reverse for erroneous interpretations or applications of the law. Bank of Mississippi v. Hollingsworth, 609 So.2d 422, 424 (Miss.1992); Harrison County v. City of Gulfport, 557 So.2d 780, 784 (Miss.1990).

WRONGFUL DEATH

Mississippi's wrongful death statute, Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13, created a cause of action unknown to the common law. The wrongful death action is not part of the estate of the deceased, Partyka v. Yazoo Development Corp., 376 So.2d 646, 650 (Miss.1979) (citing Byars v. Austin Admrs, 218 So.2d 11, 15 (Miss.1969)), and only those individuals listed in the wrongful death statute may bring this independent cause of action. Partyka, 376 So.2d at 650 (citing Hasson Grocery Co. v. Cook, 196 Miss. 452, 459, 17 So.2d 791 (1944)). On appellate review, we strictly construe Mississippi's wrongful death statute. Smith v. Garrett, 287 So.2d 258, 260 (Miss.1973).

The case sub judice initially started out as a wrongful death action. Shelly Pannell was killed when the car she was a passenger in was involved in an accident. However, because a settlement agreement with the driver's insurer was approved by all of Shelly's beneficiaries, no wrongful death suit was actually filed by any of them.

All of Shelly's beneficiaries agreed that they would settle all claims against Griffin for $150,000.00. The lower court approved this settlement, and neither Shelly's parents nor her half-siblings ever had to prove damages for loss of companionship or pain and suffering. See Jones v. Shaffer, 573 So.2d 740, 743 (Miss.1990).

In the case sub judice, the issue below was how to disburse the insurance settlement funds among Shelly's six wrongful death beneficiaries. David and Betty Pannell first argued that the half-siblings were not entitled to any of the wrongful death proceeds. As a fall-back position, they argued that Shelly's half-siblings were not entitled to share equally in the proceeds.

Notwithstanding these arguments, the chancellor looked to the wrongful death statute to determine how the funds were to be disbursed. The statute provides in relevant part:

....

In an action brought pursuant to the provisions of this section by the widow, husband, child, father, mother, sister or brother of the deceased, or by all interested parties, such party or parties may recover as damages property damages and funeral, medical or other related expenses incurred by or for the deceased as a result ... if the deceased has no husband, nor wife, nor children, the damages shall be distributed equally to the father, mother, brothers and sisters, or such of them as the deceased may have living at his or her death.... There shall not be, in any case, a distinction between the kindred of the whole and half blood of equal degree.

of such wrongful or negligent act or omission or breach of warranty, whether an estate has been opened or not. Any amount, but only such an amount, as may be recovered for property damage, funeral, medical or other related expenses shall be subject only to the payment of the debts or liabilities of the deceased for property damages, funeral, medical or other related...